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PROLOGUE 
 
“Science 
 is organized knowledge.  
Wisdom  
is organized life.”  
Immanuel Kant 
 
 
 
When I started out the reflection on this dissertation, the first two components of its 
subtitle (“conceptual” and “empirical”) have quite rapidly been defined from the literature at 
hand. I knew what I was looking for and I knew how I would like to go by in order to achieve 
this. However, it was not clear at all on which patient population(s) these hypotheses will be 
tested. 
 If one would have told me at the outset of this work in 2004 that a great part of my 
dissertation will be based on a sample of patients suffering from Bipolar Affective Disorder, I 
would have said plainly - at the time as a trainee-psychotherapist - that this disorder is not 
accessible to any psychotherapeutic conceptualization nor treatment. Images would have 
come up of my first clinical experience as a psychologist, right after the end of my 
undergraduate studies in 2001, at the psychiatric clinic of Burghölzli in Zurich: patients in 
manic states, loosing control over themselves, being aggressive or presenting with bizarre 
behaviors and attitudes. How would one be able to intervene effectively as a psychotherapist 
with such patients? Difficult or impossible, I thought like many others… 
 10
 Six years after these first experiences, the work at hand should contribute to dispute in 
a constructive and creative way this wide-spread assumption I adhered for a long time. It will 
not answer completely the posed question, but question the underlying implications. Thus, 
this dissertation is a work aiming at questioning and interrogating, at researching and opening 
up, but not at answering nor finding the truth. 
 In my clinical experience as a psychotherapist, I find this attitude of quest very often 
the fundamental stance when entering a helping relationship with a patient. Also 
psychotherapy is not about offering the answer to the client’s question, but understanding the 
posed question so fully and deeply in its premises that many possible options arise from the 
reflection. 
 In this sense, the third component in the subtitle merits fully to be added: “clinical”. 
This component links practice, theory and research and acknowledges the therapist’s and 
researcher’s implication in the relationship with the client or the subject of study. I sincerely 
hope, this multi-faceted approach will make as much sense to the reader as it does to me. 
  
 INTRODUCTION 
 
“The irrationality of a thing 
 is no argument against its existence,  
rather a condition for it.”  
Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
 
 
Conceptualizing and Measuring Adaptational Processes in Clinical Psychology 
When formulating a general model for the prediction of therapeutic change, 
psychotherapy researchers generally distinguish between patient’s characteristics, therapist’s 
characteristics, process and relationship variables (Norcross, 2002; Clarkin, & Levy, 2004). 
These variables function as moderator or mediator variables in research designs, interacting 
with each other and influencing symptom change. Relationship variables, such as the quality 
of the therapeutic alliance, may be understood as one of the core mechanisms of change in 
psychotherapy – as a specific or unspecific variable – and are therefore investigated in various 
settings (Barber, Luborsky, Crits-Christoph, Thase, Weiss, Frank, Onken, & Gallop, 1999; 
Castonguay, Constantino, & Grosse Holtforth, 2006; Crits-Christoph, & Beth Connolly, 1999, 
2003; Horvath, 2006; Martin, Garske, & Davis, 2000; Zuroff, & Blatt, 2006), whereas patient 
and therapist contributions to alliance processes and outcome are less systematically studied 
(Castonguay, Constantino, & Grosse Holtforth, 2006). Data exist as regards the influence of 
patient’s functioning on alliance (Hersoug, Monsen, Havik, & Hoglend, 2002), as well as on 
the effect of the therapist’s adapting technique to the patient’s characteristics on alliance 
(Caspar, Grossmann, Unmüssig, & Schramm, 2005; Crits-Christoph, Cooper, & Luborsky, 
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1988; Crits-Christoph, & Beth Connolly, 1999; Despland, de Roten, Despars, Stigler, & 
Perry, 2001; Hersoug, Hoglend, & Bogwald, 2004). These results suggest the importance of a 
better understanding of the influencing variables per se, and of the study of linkages among 
them, as well as their linkages with symptoms and symptom change. 
In this dissertation, we will focus on adaptational processes as patient’s characteristics. 
We noticed that patient’s variables were very rarely studied in a theory-consistent way, and 
even when they were, the diagnosis usually served as operationalization. This is insufficient 
(Clarkin, & Levy, 2004), especially with regard to the enhancement of clinically relevant case 
conceptualizations for psychotherapeutic treatment planning, process monitoring and 
prospective mediator modeling. The advantage of using the diagnosis as sole patient 
characteristic is its consensual value and relative acceptance beyond the boundaries of 
psychotherapeutic approaches. Using theory-consistent concepts related to adaptation in 
psychoanalytic treatments for instance might weaken the relevance of such conclusions for 
other therapeutic approaches, and inversely, using theory-consistent concepts related to 
adaptation in cognitive-behavioral treatments alone yields results which do not necessarily 
apply to other approaches. It can be argued that cognitive-behavioral concepts are mostly 
related to the subject’s capacities in adaptation, whereas psychoanalytic concepts mostly 
relate to internal determinants of adaptation. Their respective limitations become therefore 
evident, as competence-related concepts ignore aspects of internally determined reality-
distortion and concepts which focus on internal determinants tend to ignore aspects of 
competence; consequently, these concepts need to be approached in an integrative 
perspective, for optimal benefit for scientific and clinical purposes (see Bateman, 2002; 
Castonguay, Newman, Borkovec, Grosse Holtforth, & Maramba, 2005; Power, 2002; 
Stricker, & Gold, 2005). Therefore, studies on patient’s characteristics from a theory-
consistent and integrative point of view are needed; the focus on adaptational processes in 
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psychiatric and psychotherapy patients is certainly a first step in this direction. Moreover, the 
focus on adaptational processes enables us to integrate data and models from fundamental 
psychology research into psychotherapy research, hence aiming at a research-informed 
practice (Grawe, 1997). Figure 1 depicts a general model of concepts and links as we 
understand the role of adaptational processes in the psychotherapeutic context. Since this 
dissertation does not lay the focus on therapist nor process variables in the narrower sense, we 
simplified the model (for recent empirical evidence focusing on therapist variables, see 
Barber, Gallop, Crits-Christoph, Frank, Thase, Weiss, & Beth Connolly Gibbons, 2006; 
Kramer, Despland, Drapeau, Currat, Beretta, & de Roten, in revision). 
 
Figure 1 
Simplified interaction model on potential moderators and mediators influencing therapeutic 
change 
 
     Contextual variable: 
     Therapeutic Alliance 
 
Patient Characteristics       Psychotherapeutic  
* Adaptational Processes        Change (Outcome) 
* Psychosocial Functioning 
* Diagnosis 
* Interpersonal Functioning 
*….. 
 
Adaptational processes, understood as the way the individual meets his/her need to 
adapt to external and internal constraints, involve the individual’s affect regulation. Affects 
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and emotions are central in the process of the individual’s adaptation to reality in that 
disturbing affects need to be avoided, contained or modulated, and what the individual might 
call in subjective terms “an emotion” may accompany such a process  (Lazarus, 1991; 
Westen, 1998). Individual psychological processes involved in this respect are defense 
mechanisms and coping processes (Cramer, 1998a). Control concepts (e.g., Horowitz, 
Cooper, Fridlander, Perry, Bond, & Vaillant, 1992), concepts more narrowly related to 
emotion regulation (e.g., Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001; Znoj, 2006) or concepts 
related to other regulating processes (e.g., Sjöbäck, 1973) are not the main focus of this 
dissertation. 
The question of the definition and width of the concept of adaptation is disputed 
(Hartmann, 1958; Sjöbäck, 1973; Vaillant, 1977; Wallerstein, 1967;  White, 1974). In 
extremis, adaptation as the interaction between the individual and his/her environment may be 
considered as wide a concept as beauty, i.e., in the “eyes of the beholder” (Vaillant, 1977). 
Even if there is some truth in Vaillant’s comparison – the eyes of the beholder or those of the 
external observer are indeed highly important for the evaluation of adaptation and 
adaptational processes -, we would add, consistent with a relativistic and pragmatic point of 
view of mental health (Sjöbäck, 1973), that adaptation to reality is a successful way of finding 
consensus between the normative societal imperatives and imperatives related to internal 
desires, wishes and conflicts. Furthermore, adaptation implies the two facets of phase-
adequacy (“timing”) and reality-appropriateness. Thus, adaptation in human life is above all 
social adaptation (Wallerstein, 1967).  
Particularly within psychoanalytic theory, no consensus exists as regards the extent of 
the concept of adaptation. Defensive processes conceptualized in this context have either the 
function of an internal counter-cathexis of arousal related to unresolved inner conflicts or a 
reality-appropriateness with the external world (Wallerstein, 1967; Sjöbäck, 1973). Reality 
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appropriateness is related to mental health, whereas counter-cathexis not necessarily so, as 
this function has pathogenic effects in the sense of a “weakening of the Ego” (Freud, 1937). 
This is especially the case when these defenses are applied in a pervasive manner. Later, a 
hierarchical organization of defenses (Vaillant, 1977; Perry, 1990a) was put forward, as 
initially suggested by Freud (1926; Wallerstein, 1967). Needless to say, psychoanalytic theory 
considers not merely defenses, but also the resolution of internal conflicts and free 
communication within the mental apparatus (Sjöbäck, 1973) as related to the individual’s 
adaptation to reality; in its turn, mature defensive functioning might itself contribute to 
conflict resolution. Within cognitive theory, adaptation to reality of coping may be 
operationalized as the short-term successful elimination of the stressor (“effectiveness”) 
yielding a positive subjective experience, with no long-term negative effects (Skinner, Edge, 
Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). The latter concept is an important overlap between coping and 
defense theories; an individual’s adaptation to reality is impeded – “his/her Ego weakened” - 
when adaptational processes are applied in a pervasive manner. Links with mental health are 
postulated in the sense that Ego strength and coping effectiveness correlate both with healthy 
functioning (Vaillant, 1977; for empirical evidence see Perry, 1993a). In this context, we need 
to differentiate between the adaptational process as the means the individual deploys in order 
to attain adaptation to reality, the state of adaptedness as the outcome of the adaptational 
process, also called “adaptation”, and the degree of adaptiveness as the level of accuracy to 
reality of a specific adaptational process, based on its short- and long-term effects (Hartmann, 
1958). 
Two intertwined problems need to be clarified beforehand: (1) Possible confounding 
variables when studying adaptation;  and (2) The construction of reality. (1) As suggested by 
Lazarus (2000), adaptational processes, such as defense and coping, may confound with input 
(i.e., appraisal) and output (i.e., outcome) variables of these same processes. We would argue 
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that some limited confound is unavoidable. Both models, psychoanalytic (Vaillant, 1977) and 
cognitive-behavioral (Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984), postulate a circular interaction between 
adaptational process and stress perception (“primary appraisal”; Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984). 
As level, intensity and type of stress are moderately related to the type of adaptational process 
and its adaptiveness, a slight overlap exists between the concepts, but is not considered 
substantial (see also for a discussion, Vaillant, 1977). (2) If the stress perception of reality 
(and appraisal of related stress level) is related to individual features such as adaptational 
processes, what exactly is reality? The definition of reality and its construction depend on the 
individual’s characteristics and premises. We would argue, along with Clark, Beck and Alford 
(1999), that in normalcy, continuous negotiation between a constructivistic and an 
empiricistic stance takes place in the individual, yielding a reality construction that is always 
singular, but presenting sufficient overlap with reality constructions of other individuals in the 
same social structure. This dynamic view overlaps with Piaget’s facets of adaptation as 
equilibration processes, assimilation and accommodation, in the construction of knowledge 
(Piaget, 1975). In the case of a “distorted” definition of reality, characterized by low 
adaptation in defenses and heightened levels of cognitive distortions (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 
1999), the empiricist stance vanishes and individuals become pure constructivists in 
construing and defining reality. Such reality constructions are only minimally shared with 
other individuals of the same social structure, and potentially impede successful adaptation. 
Our focus on affective disorders – a great part of this thesis being based on a sample of 
Bipolar Affective Disorder – has not come about by chance. Affective disorders in the 
broadest sense encompass any mental disorders characterized by disturbances in mood 
regulations. Psychological and biological processes are underpinnings of these dysregulations 
of inner affective life (see also the descriptive definition offered by the International Society 
for Affective Disorder; ISAD). Bipolar Affective Disorder is a particularly complex 
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diagnosis, encompassing at times unpredictable mood changes and loss of the function of 
reality-testing (see APA; 1994; Goodwin, & Jamison, 1990; Kraepelin, 1913). Emotion and 
affect dysregulating processes are of paramount importance in such patients (Goodwin, & 
Jamison, 1990; Greenhouse, Meyer, & Johnson, 2000; Lam, & Wong, 1997); understanding 
these processes better would help to improve psychological and psychotherapeutic treatments 
for these psychopathological conditions (for a single case study, see Kramer, 2006b; see also 
Mansell, 2007). Especially for long-term outpatient treatments of Bipolar Disorder (BD), - 
excluding the acute crisis situation -  psychotherapy has proven to be highly effective as 
adjunct to pharmacological treatments (Jones, 2004; Kazvi, & Zaretzy, 2007; see also 
Jamison, 1995, for a personal account). However, literature on adaptational processes in these 
patients is sparse (Ablon, Carlson, & Goldwin, 1974; Greenhouse, Meyer, & Johnson, 2000; 
Perry, 1988; Perry, & Cooper, 1986). To our knowledge, no literature exists on links with 
psychotherapeutic contextual variables; no literature applying methods of individualized case 
conceptualizations for psychotherapy has been found (for a first attempt from an integrative-
cognitive perspective, see Mansell, 2007; see also Kramer, 2006b). Another reason of our 
focus on BD patients is that there are very few structured psychotherapeutic concepts being 
proposed to this patient group. This enables to study adaptational processes per se, extraneous 
to the psychotherapeutic intervention context and, by the same token, to develop, adapt and 
enhance such interventions to these patients. Finally, when we as psychotherapists and 
clinical researchers work with this challenging group of patients, we should be humbly aware 
that the effects of a highly biologically-determined mental disorder (Faraone, Glatt, & 
Tsuang, 2003; Goodwin, & Jamison, 1990; McElroy, Altshuler, Suppes, Keck, Frye, 
Denicoff, Nolen, Kupka, Leverich, Rochussen, Rush, & Post, 2001; Smoller, & Finn, 2003) 
impose considerable limitations on long-term individual functioning, and at times on the 
psychotherapeutic process, as well. This should be part of any case conceptualization in BD. 
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Finally, we aim at understanding adaptational processes as patient characteristics in all 
types of patients, irrespective of their initial diagnosis. We believe that these processes differ 
slightly in different groups of patients – which is relevant information for further studies and 
clinical practice. Most importantly, the methods used for conceptualization of adaptational 
processes should prove to be accurate for all types of patients and almost all clinical 
situations. For these reasons, we will not hesitate to apply our hypotheses to a very different 
population: university students with Adjustment Disorder, undergoing short-term 
psychodynamic psychotherapy.  
In-depth understanding of adaptational processes in inpatients suffering from 
significant mood swings and the tentative understanding of the same processes in a higher-
functioning sample of psychotherapy patients will enable us to draw first conclusions with a 
heightened level of external validity and clinical usefulness. The focus on specificity of 
adaptational processes in different diagnostic groups is supported by the current important 
trend in psychotherapy to tailor conceptualization and treatment as a function of disorder-
specific and approach-independent, i.e., integrative models, rather than to use disorder-non-
specific techniques from a single therapeutic approach (Ambühl, 1998; Dammann, & Janssen, 
2007; Grawe, 1998; McCollough, 2000; Sachse, 2003). 
Clinical psychology, as we understand it, requires the use of high-quality, valid, 
reliable methodology, aiming at advances on conceptual, empirical and clinical levels and 
fully taking into account the inherent complex inter-relatedness of these three levels. When 
faced with the suffering of patients, as psychotherapist or clinical researcher, it is convenient 
for us to admit that we never make an observation within a theory-free zone. We may be 
reduced to using a loose juxtaposition or compulsive accumulation of data of multiple clinical 
trials; these observations are in reality embedded in a “clinically holistic” and meaningful 
understanding (Stiles, 2005). In this sense, our view is clearly opposed to the precept “let the 
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data speak for themselves”, where research conclusions are supposed to be drawn free from 
any theoretical pre-conceptions (see Strauss, & Corbin, 1998). Clinically meaningful 
understanding implies (1) A level of inference based on systematic observation of (verbal and 
non-verbal) behaviors and experiences in context; (2) An attempt to integrate the observations 
into a coherent conception; (3) An attempt to draw practical conclusions for case 
conceptualization or treatment. Hence, using a clinical methodology in this narrower sense, 
the researcher’s percept is influenced by the concept (sensu Kant). We will follow this 
principle and its three implications radically and apply methodology based on clinical theory - 
observer-rater methodology derived from clinical and theoretical background. The advantages 
of this radical clinical-theoretical stance will be high face-validity of the methods, the 
possibility of understanding the case by means of a case conceptualization, going beyond the 
mere description and approaching thus the explanation of the clinical phenomenon, the 
possible use of contextual information giving meaning to observed phenomena, i.e., 
contradictory information helping to reveal self-deceptions, interpersonally manipulative 
tendencies or lies, and, finally, the perspective of inherent and immediate clinical relevance of 
the gathered data with the aim to enhancing psychotherapeutic practice. Thus, such research 
presents high levels of external validity. Observer-rater methodology based on session-
transcripts may be applied to either psychotherapy sessions or research interviews. For the 
main part of this dissertation, we have opted for the latter, using the research interview 
technique of dynamic interview (Perry, Fowler, & Semeniuk, 2005; for details see chapter B 
for example). This choice has been made for several reasons, in line with the above: (1) High 
external validity of the technique, since it offers a clinical situation very similar to a 
psychotherapy intake interview; (2) Internal coherence of the interaction, which enhances the 
quality of ratings done by external observers, because necessary contextual information is in 
the session-transcript; (3) Information is provided about the feasibility of a psychotherapy 
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with clinically challenging patients; (4) Non-directive interview approach which allows the 
optimal study of the patient’s spontaneous discourse revealing adaptational processes; and 
finally, (5) Ethical acceptability, since it offers the patient support, the possibility of 
clarification and better understanding of him/herself by the therapist use of interpretation and 
synthesis techniques. The risk of the observer-rater methodology is the projection of the 
researcher’s own subjective material onto the patient’s material, in the form of session-
transcripts. This risk, which one might call of “radical constructivism”, needs to be avoided 
by the introduction of empiricism in the data analysis, in the form of control ratings by several 
independent observers, aiming at minimizing biases and at replicability of the trial (Hill, 
Knox, Thompson, Williams, Hess, & Ladany, 2005; Stiles, 2005). 
Theory-embeddedness implies the use of “traditional” theories, those that have already 
developed a sufficient body of validating research, either conceptually, empirically or 
clinically, another reason why we will mainly concentrate on defense mechanisms and coping 
processes. In line with these, we will add as complementary strategies of conceptualization 
cognitive errors (Beck, 1976) and Plans (Plan Analysis, Caspar, 1995). Although defenses and 
coping as traditional concepts describing adaptational processes have been clinically and 
empirically validated, their mutual interactions, or possible integration, have not yet been the 
subject of much research. Therefore, our work will be inspired by several general models on 
defense and coping, in particular the one defined by Steffens and Kächele (1988). Although 
this model as a whole is more complex, we will present and apply here only some of its basic 
assumptions. These are consistent with Lazarus and Folkman’s transactional conception of 
stress and coping and with the traditional psychoanalytic theory of defenses. Figure 2 depicts 
these assumptions in a graphical form. 
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Figure 2 
General Model of Adaptational Processes (based on Steffens, & Kächele, 1988) 
 
 
Stress           Outcome 
             
DEFENSES 
Internal   Conflict- 
Conflict   Free- 
Zone  Zone 
COPING
       Ego 
     Activating  Activating   
     Neurotic Fears  Real Anxiety   
 
Figure 2 shows the basic assumptions with regard to the dynamic interplay between 
defenses and coping. External stress, but also stress resulting from internal constraints, e.g., 
internal conflicts due to contradictory desires, motives or Plans, elicit the Ego’s adaptational 
potential. For patients presenting Bipolar Affective Disorder, one might imagine the stress to 
be the inpatient treatment situation, a “crisis” episode, possibly resulting from manic 
decompensation. This stressful situation encompasses internal and external stressors. These 
stressors might elicit unconscious conflicts in the subject: e.g., desires of subjugation based on 
childhood experiences controlled by a more rational and conscious desire for independence 
and self-control. Due to the uncomfortable arousal linked to the emerging awareness of such 
an internal conflict, the subject engages in a defensive process to contain the latter, e.g., 
he/she denies the desire for subjugation, or uses reaction formation by declaring to the 
clinician that he/she will always aim at total self-control in the future, in order to avoid future 
symptomatic decompensation. If the defensive process is sufficiently successful, the subject 
has an internal conflict-free zone at disposal in which, he/she might either seek help by trying 
to find a psychotherapist or object to inpatient treatment constraints: the subject thus engages 
in coping. Outcome in this model is conceived on the micro-level and understood as the result 
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of the dynamic-transactional interplay between defense and coping. It can be measured by the 
symptom level the subject displays during inpatient treatment or his/her overall functioning, 
more specifically social functioning, in inpatient treatment as indicators for adaptation to 
reality (Vaillant, 1977). More detailed theoretical elaborations will be found in the following 
chapters, in particular in chapter A. 
While advocating this integrative model of adaptational processes, we are aware of the 
pitfalls and limitations of integrative tendencies in psychotherapy practice and research; 
Norcross (2005) has identified five: (1) Defense of “pure” psychotherapy orientations, (2) 
Inadequate training in integrative psychotherapy, (3) Possible antagonisms on epistemological 
levels between the models, (4) Different language for the same construct (the metaphor of the 
Tower of Babel;  Messer, 1987) and (5) Omission of factors concerning multiculturalism. 
Although the second and fifth limitations are certainly not addressed by the model presented 
and remain clear limitations, we argue that this model responds to the defense of pure 
psychotherapies and the question of different languages (points one and four), because we use 
an integrative model that does not invent new concepts, but rather postulates links between 
established and validated concepts. Finally, the possibility of epistemological antagonisms 
cannot be completely ruled out by our approach, but we would consider it less important from 
a clinical-pragmatic perspective. This reflection leads to the question of the ontological status 
of the model outlined above. The model does not aim to be a fundamental scientific theory. 
Consistent with clinical theories on defense and coping, it corresponds to the level of an 
applied scientific theory (see also Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999 for the same discussion with 
regard to the cognitive model in psychotherapy). Consistent with this ontological status, we 
have chosen clinical methodology (see above). Thus, the objective of our research is two-fold: 
to corroborate implications of the theoretical model by means of appropriate methodology and 
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to demonstrate by the same token clinical usefulness and relevance of the model and 
associated assumptions.  
 
Outline of the Chapters of the Dissertation 
Written in the form of seven chapters, and ultimately articles, numbered in 
alphabetical order, the main body of this dissertation addresses some of the issues related to 
the afore-mentioned integrative model on defense and coping, questions of measurement and 
conceptualization, stability and change of the processes and relations with psychotherapeutic 
contextual variables and outcome. Chapter A is a conceptual overview, chapters B through E 
are based on the patient sample presenting Bipolar Affective Disorder, and chapter G on the 
student sample undergoing psychodynamic psychotherapy. The individual chapters may be 
read independently. These chapters will be followed by a general discussion. All references 
are to be found at the end of the text. Several additional tables are provided under appendices, 
respecting the corresponding alphabetic order of the seven chapters. 
Chapter A focuses on conceptual issues related to integrative models of defense and 
coping. It is based on Cramer’s (1998a) discussion of the distinctiveness of underlying 
psychological processes. Particular emphasis will be given to the presentation and discussion 
of recent integrative models of defense and coping (Chabrol, & Callahan, 2004; Steffens, & 
Kächele, 1988; see Figure 2). Cramer’s conclusions and these models will be discussed with 
regard to four aspects potentially differentiating defense from coping, consciousness, goal-
directiveness, adaptiveness and the question of trait versus state. It appears that, unlike 
Cramer’s conclusion (1998a; 2001), both defenses and coping probably have unconscious and 
conscious aspects, thus limiting the relevance of this criterion for differentiation. Similarly, 
both processes are characterized by some goal-directiveness. Adaptiveness may be described 
according to different criteria, namely qualitative for defenses and quantitative for coping. It 
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appears theoretically that a clear-cut differentiation can be found with regard to the state-trait 
debate: Coping is a state-variable, whereas defense encompasses trait- and state-aspects.  
Finally, the nature of the underlying fear may be differentiated: coping entails dealing with 
real anxiety and defenses neurotic anxiety. The latter assumption from the Steffens and 
Kächele model will not be tested empirically. 
Chapter B focuses on the right-hand side of the general model (Figure 2): coping 
specificity in BD and its links with outcome on a micro-level, operationalized as symptom 
level. With this in mind, we will compare the mean coping profile of BD patients with the 
mean coping profile of matched controls. The latter are controlled with respect to gender, age 
and level of education. Focusing on specificity in BD should imply that coping is independent 
from symptom phase, but varies as a function of diagnostic group. These processes are 
investigated at a second measure point, as is the relationship with symptoms. Moreover, in 
line with the debate on the consciousness of coping processes (Cramer, 1998a; Lazarus, 
2000), a multi-method comparison is applied, lending some support to the concept of coping 
as a partially unconscious process. Finally, relevant aspects from Figure 1 will be 
investigated; the influence of coping processes on the quality of the therapeutic alliance and 
on symptom change is tested. The unit of analysis will be the individual coping strategy. 
Chapter C is twin to the preceding chapter, but focuses on the left-hand side of the 
general model depicted in Figure 2: specificities in defense mechanisms and their links with 
outcome of the adaptational process, operationalized as symptom level. Similarly as above, 
the mean defense profile of the BD patients is compared to the mean defense profile of the 
control group; in particular, the role of immature defenses is investigated, also by relating 
them to the symptom level (Perry, 1988). Again, specificity in BD implies that defense is 
independent from symptom phase, but varies as a function of diagnostic group. Defenses at a 
second measure point are tested. In the same way as in chapter B, a multi-method comparison 
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is applied, which aims at lending support for defenses as an unconscious process (Cramer, 
1998a). Finally, as aspects drawn from Figure 1, mature defenses will be tested as regards the 
prediction of the quality of the therapeutic alliance. The unit of analysis will be the individual 
defense mechanism. 
Chapter D concentrates on the complete model depicted in Figure 2: defenses and 
coping addressed from an integrative vantage point, linked to the clinical diagnosis of Bipolar 
Affective Disorder and to symptom level, as micro-outcome of the general model (Figure 2). 
In particular, we will investigate the core hypothesis related to stability and change in 
adaptational processes outlined in chapter A (Steffens, & Kächele, 1988). Furthermore, the 
assumption underlying Cramer’s (1998a) review, which says that defenses and coping are 
underpinned by two different psychological processes, is tested and discussed within the 
context of previous studies. Finally, the clinical notion of “crisis” (Küchenhoff, & Manz, 
1993) and particular intervention strategies are discussed based on the results. Units of 
analysis are respectively the coping category and the defense level.  
Chapter E illustrates the links between cognitive errors on the one side and symptoms 
and the therapeutic alliance on the other. Overall and specific comparisons will be made. 
Consistent with Beck’s negativity and universality hypotheses (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999), 
a specific focus is laid upon the differentiation between positively and negatively valenced 
cognitive errors and their links with either mania or depression as predominant symptoms. 
Finally, the influence of these errors on the therapeutic alliance is investigated, thus, this 
chapter focuses more particularly on aspects outlined in Figure 1.   
Chapter F applies a valid methodology of psychotherapeutic case conceptualizations 
to the clinical diagnosis of BD: Plan Analysis (Caspar, 1995). Based on individualized Plan 
Analyses done on the entire sample of BD patients, this chapter proposes the establishment of 
a prototypical Plan structure for BD. Two subtypes are identified, described in terms of Plan 
INTRODUCTION 26
specificities, conflict constellations between Plans, prototypical emotions and coping Plans. 
Relations with symptoms are established. In this respect, Plans and the related hypotheses do 
not appear directly on either figure as presented in this introduction, but one aspect of the 
notion of “Plan” is the individualized conceptualization of adaptational processes. These 
results are discussed with regard to adapted psychotherapeutic attitudes useful when dealing 
with these patients, according to the principles of the motive-oriented therapeutic relationship 
(Caspar, Grossmann, Unmüssig, & Schramm, 2005).  
Chapter G, finally, might be understood as twin to chapter D, but it will take into 
account more relevant aspects of the contextual model of psychotherapy than chapter D. This 
is the only one which focuses on the student patient sample presenting Adjustment Disorder 
with several co-morbidities and undergoing psychodynamic psychotherapy. This chapter also 
focuses on the complete model depicted in Figure 2: defenses and coping and their links with 
symptoms in patients in psychodynamic psychotherapy. In particular, we will investigate a 
core hypothesis elaborated in chapter A concerning stability and change in these processes in 
the context of early sessions of psychotherapy (Drapeau, de Roten, Perry, & Despland, 2003). 
Finally, we examine the role of the therapeutic alliance as a context variable influencing the 
dynamics of adaptational processes in patients undergoing time-limited psychotherapy. As 
suggested by Figure 1, the links between adaptational processes and therapeutic outcome will 
also be addressed. 
In a final stage of this dissertation (General Discussion), we will discuss eleven core 
theses with regard to their empirical status, using the seven chapters as a basis and will 
illustrate some of these by means of patient verbatims from our data pool. The applied 
methodologies – along with the ensuing results - will be evaluated, compared among each 
other and criticized in the Discussion section. Further research on adaptational processes is 
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outlined. Finally, several chapters, but more fully the Discussion section, include clinical 
recommendations and perspectives for improving conceptualization and treatment practice. 
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ABSTRACT 
Research into adaptational processes has sometimes been confusing as regards 
differentiating coping and defense mechanisms. This theoretical discussion is based on 
Cramer’s (1998a) highly inspiring effort to disentangle the two concepts concerning the 
psychological processes involved, as well as acknowledge their mutual overlapping. Although 
such an effort is needed, at the same time several issues should be re-addressed and further 
implications on the differentiation of coping and defense processes discussed, such as 
consciousness and intentionality, goal-directiveness, adaptiveness, and the question of trait v 
state. Recent integrative models of defense and coping yield a more differentiated picture with 
regard to these issues: coping includes conscious and unconscious efforts, coping and defense 
serve very similar functions, adaptiveness can be defined in qualitative (defenses) and 
quantitative (coping) terms and the question of stability of defenses and coping needs to be 
tested empirically. Furthermore, the nature of the underlying fear can be theoretically 
differentiated and related to the difference between coping and defense, as is the implication 
of competence-related aspects of functioning (coping) and of internal determinants of 
functioning (defense). Implications for research perspectives implying defense and coping 
concepts are proposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Key-Words: Coping, Defense Mechanism, Psychotherapy Integration, Adaptational 
Process 
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COPING AND DEFENSE MECHANISMS: WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE? – SECOND 
ACT 
 
When P. Cramer (1998a) wrote her paper on coping and defense mechanisms, the 
author chose an evocative subtitle: “What’s the difference?”. This simple phrase aiming at 
clarification reflects well the state-of-the-art knowledge about the issue: there are a host of 
empirical studies, based on a variety of conceptions, more or less theory-driven, leaving 
researchers and theoreticians somewhat overwhelmed. Confronted with so many ways to deal 
with adversity – from concrete behavioral strategies to emotion regulation and to intra-
psychic counter-cathectic processes –, one might wonder “Does distinction really make a 
difference?” 
The afore-mentioned paper makes it clear that the answer is at the same time yes and 
no, depending on the conceptual criterion applied. It also becomes evident that Cramer’s 
(1998a) comparative view was greatly needed and is therefore very helpful for further studies 
and elaborations. Thus, our communication will be based on Cramer’s review. For example, 
confusion surrounding the topic has been lessened by the introduction of the term of 
“adaptational process” (Cramer, 1998a, p. 920) encompassing coping and defense, based on 
the assumption that both serve the individual’s need for adaptation to reality. Within this 
over-arching definition, we use the following definitions of coping and defense: “Defense 
mechanisms – i.e., mental mechanisms that alter veridical perception – [are] postulated to 
function so as to protect the person from excessive anxiety, whether the source of that anxiety 
be the perception of a disturbing external event or the presence of a disruptive internal 
psychological state (e.g., a wish, drive or fear)” (A. Freud, 1936, p. 43, cited by Cramer, 
1998a, p. 920) and coping as “overt and covert behaviors that are taken to reduce or eliminate 
psychological  distress or stressful conditions” (Fleishman, 1984, p. 229, cited by Holahan & 
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Moos, 1987, p. 946). However, several conceptual issues on integration of defense 
mechanisms and coping addressed by Cramer need to be re-addressed and re-evaluated. We 
think that more reflection is needed, in particular on consciousness and hierarchies of 
adaptiveness. A second act is needed.  
With this article, we aim at maintaining, as far as possible, clear-cut definitions of 
defense mechanisms on the one hand and coping on the other and preparing hypotheses which 
can be empirically tested. We will first complete Cramer’s review of models of defense and 
coping – both historical and recent – which will be evaluated according to their empirical and 
clinical usefulness, their integrative tendency, as well as regarding issues of conceptual 
overlappings, sequential links between defense and coping, and their inherent limitations. 
Finally, we will discuss several issues raised by Cramer – consciousness, aim-directiveness, 
adaptiveness and trait v state -, based on the models presented. 
 
Historical Models of Defense and Coping 
Two historical models have been documented by Cramer (1998a), Haan’s and Plutchik’s. 
We will re-examine them from a modern vantage point, in order to learn more about 
shortcomings and strengths of research in the field. 
Haan’s (1977) three-fold model is based on three levels of Ego functioning: (a) optimal 
functioning described by coping strategies, (b) non-optimal functioning by defense 
mechanisms and (c) Ego failure. Ten basic Ego processes have been defined: discrimination, 
detachment, means-end-symbolization, delayed response, sensitivity, time reversion, selective 
awareness, diversion, transformation and restraint. Associated to these processes are ten 
specific processes nested within the levels. The author suggests that a given Ego process in an 
individual is potentially pervasive on all three levels; facing adversity, the individual deploys 
a specific coping; if this is insufficient, the person uses the corresponding defense and, if 
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necessary, the corresponding Ego failure process. Thus, Haan formulates a model of 
psychopathology close to the Freudian conception of a continuum between normal and 
pathological states.  
In this model, coping and defense are clearly differentiated (Haan, 1977; 1982), coping 
being defined as mechanisms eliciting secondary processes of thought allowing the individual 
deliberate and flexible choice and efficient affect modulation and expression; defense being 
defined as mechanisms referring to primary processes of thought deforming reality and 
putting the individual in a situation of non-voluntary and rigid functioning. No conceptual 
overlap is considered in Haan’s model. The temporal sequence of coping preceding defense - 
emerging when coping fails - is postulated by the model. 
The principal limitation of the three-fold theory is its definition of coping as optimal and 
defense as non-optimal processes (Parker & Endler, 1996; Perry, 1990a), reflecting the state-
of-the-art definition of the time when N. Haan wrote her books. Later, the concept of defense 
encompasses adaptive mechanisms, inasmuch as the concept of coping describes maladaptive 
processes. Thus, the 30 processes described perfectly reflect the three-fold model, but account 
for neither current psychoanalytic conceptions nor behavioral theories. 
Only very little empirical research has been conducted to test the model (see Haan, 1977 
for an overview), all categories of coping and defense are theory-driven. The clinical 
relevance of the model is important, especially for diagnostic purposes of psychopathology.  
With his psycho-evolutionary theory of emotion studying adaptation of organisms to 
emergency, Plutchik (1995) developed another integrative model of basic adaptational 
processes. According to this theory, ego defenses and coping styles are derivatives of eight 
basic emotions (depicted in subjective terms: fear, anger, joy, sadness, acceptance, disgust, 
expectation and surprise) in conflict with anxiety. A correspondence is established between 
each basic emotion and a specific defense mechanism and a specific coping style. Factor-
COPING AND DEFENSE MECHANISMS – SECOND ACT 34
analytic methodology (Plutchik,  Kellerman, & Conte, 1979) has confirmed these eight basic 
defenses; however, so far, no full replicative validation study confirming the complete model 
is known (Grebot, Paty, & Girard Dephanix, 2006 for a partial replication). Included as 
defenses are: repression, displacement, reaction formation, compensation, denial, projection, 
intellectualization and regression; and as coping: avoidance, substitution, reversal, 
replacement, minimization, fault finding, mapping and help seeking. Each couple of 
correspondence factors serves a specific function for survival, postulated as important for 
both humans and higher-order animals. In this model, defense and coping are clearly 
distinguished, ego defense being defined as  “unconscious, rigid [processes] of limited 
adaptive value to an immature Ego” and coping styles as “conscious methods of solving 
problems, flexible and generally adaptive”. (Plutchik, 1995, p. 30, italics by ourselves). No 
overlapping, but a clear correspondence between each defense and coping style in terms of a 
derivative is postulated. The main force – at the same time a limitation - of Plutchik’s model 
is to simplify the list of defenses and coping. For the researcher on the one hand, this might be 
a welcome variable reduction. For the therapists on the other hand, it seems difficult to accept 
this reduced version of highly-developed theories of defense or coping; its implementation in 
clinical practice seems therefore limited. The question of consciousness of the processes, as 
defined by Plutchik (1995), will be addressed in the Discussion section. 
 
Current Models of Defense and Coping 
 In Cramer’s (1998a) review, at least two recent integrative attempts on defense and 
coping have not been included, due to the fact that at that point in time, no publication in 
English was available. 
Chabrol and Callahan (2004) developed a conception describing the functional 
organisation of defense and coping. They postulate that defense and coping usually occur at 
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adjacent moments, but not simultaneously, in situations of everyday life or in the patient’s 
narrative in psychotherapy. Temporal proximity has already intrigued other theorists, such as 
Haan (1977) and Vaillant (2000), who postulated a typical sequential order: first the 
individual tries to solve the problem associated with stress or conflict by engaging in coping 
processes, second, if they fail, the individual uses defenses which are conceived as less 
adaptive (see above). Chabrol and Callahan (2004) suggest that this approach is rather 
simplistic corresponding neither to clinical observations, nor to modern conceptions of coping 
and defense, and these authors propose a sequential model where defense mechanisms 
precede coping processes. Thus, defense remains a personality-related concept, very close to 
its Freudian definition (Freud, 1926), nevertheless dynamic, whereas coping processes are 
used once the individual’s basic unconscious defensive stance (with several levels of 
adaptiveness) has been established. Within this model, coping processes can still be adaptive, 
even when preceding defenses are not necessarily adaptive, and inversely, adaptive defenses 
can also precede dysfunctional coping. This sequential hypothesis has several interesting 
clinical implications (see Ihilevich & Gleser, 1991); in particular it elicits potential limitations 
of coping enhancement training, as well as defense interpretation techniques. It might suggest 
that clinicians should be attentive to coping resources – in highlighting and activating them – 
at the same time formulating a defense interpretation, as the latter may  be stressful for the 
patient. Inversely, working on enhancing coping presumes the related defense for the 
particular situation must be clarified (see also Grawe, 1998; Sachse, 2003, for the links 
between clarification and coping enhancement techniques in psychotherapy). 
 The model refers to the definition of defenses by A. Freud (1936) and the definition 
of coping by Holahan and Moos (1987). Overlappings between the two concepts seem 
possible, but are not substantial. An overall conceptual link is postulated in terms of 
synergetics between defense mechanisms and coping. Defense mechanisms facilitate or 
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impede the realisation of the cognitive- or behavior-oriented coping. Adaptive coping may be 
restricted by underlying immature defense mechanisms and potentialized by underlying 
mature defense mechanisms. A recent study realised on 190 psychology graduates yields 
moderate correlations between immature defenses (using the DSQ-40) and maladaptive 
coping processes (using the Brief COPE), as well as moderate correlations between mature 
defenses and adaptive coping (Callahan & Chabrol, 2004). So far, to our knowledge, the 
sequential link has only partially been confirmed by an unpublished study on 20 
psychotherapy sessions using independent observer-rater methodologies. Only 36% of all 
rated defenses are immediately followed by a coping process, suggesting substantial loss of 
information on individual defensive and coping profiles when this sequential methodology is 
strictly applied to session-transcripts (Kramer, 2005b).  
Yet another model has been proposed by Steffens and Kächele (1988), where the 
individual’s need for adaptation to reality represents the missing link between coping and 
defense; both categories of processes serve this same function (see also Cramer, 1998a). A 
clear-cut distinction is made with regard to two criteria: the status of fear and the impact of 
novel situations to be faced by the individual. With reference to Freud (1926), realistic 
anxiety (“Realangst”) is differentiated from neurotic fear (based on idiosyncratic conflict 
constellation; see also Hartmann, 1958); defenses operate in the case of the latter, whereas 
coping is the answer to the former. Thus, in novel situations, both processes are activated at 
the same time and have clearly distinctive functions,  i.e., sub-functions of adaptation. In a 
stressful “novel” situation, both types of fears (realistic anxiety and neurotic fear) might be 
activated and these are neutralized by means of defenses and coping. We would develop this 
point by assuming the signal-anxiety as proximal cause for both defense and coping, and as 
distal cause only in defense the presence of neurotic fear related to inner conflict (see also 
Sjöbäck, 1973).  
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Steffens and Kächele give the following example: in a person given a diagnosis of 
chronic illness (e.g., cancer), (1) Defenses are activated in order to contain the resurgence of 
traumatic memories or fantasies related to death, loss, disintegration or castration and (2) 
Coping processes are activated to face the novel and threatening situation, in a so-called 
conflict-free zone of the Ego.  Two basic coping processes are proposed: allo-plastic and auto-
plastic (Hartmann, 1958; see also Perrez, & Reicherts, 1992, for an elaborated definition). 
Thus, the conflict-free zone of the Ego is only created, if the defensive process is sufficiently 
effective. We should note that this definition of conflict-free zone in the dynamics of the 
interplay between defense and coping does not completely overlap with Hartmann’s (1958) 
definition of “conflict-free sphere”, elaborated strictly on the basis of psychoanalytic theory. 
Nevertheless, Steffens and Kächele’s assumption is consistent with the traditional 
psychoanalytic definition of defenses (Freud, 1894; A. Freud, 1936;  Hartmann, 1958; Moser, 
1964) underlining the primacy of internal stressors, mainly traumatic memories and fantasies, 
as main triggers of defenses.  Steffens and Kächele’s (1988) conception is also consistent with 
the transactional theory by Lazarus (1991; Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984) emphasizing situation-
dependency of coping. The assumption of simultaneity contradicts Chabrol and Callahan 
(2004), but is an argument in favor of parallel processing in facing adversity, underlined also 
by appraisal research (Scherer, 1984). The model does not exclude a dynamical shift from 
defenses to coping and vice-versa, thus partially undermining clear-cut boundaries between 
the two concepts. Hence, defenses, if induced by a situation, might be used as direct 
adaptation and thus, become coping for a given situation. On the other hand, if adaptational 
processes (defenses or coping) are used in a pervasive manner – the same process being 
implacably overused in many different situations -, one must assume the existence of an 
underlying internal conflict eliciting defensive manoeuvres (and not coping). This seems to 
contradict what Cramer (1998a; see also Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003) called 
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quantitative criteria of coping adaptiveness (versus qualitative for defenses). In our opinion, if 
overused coping characterized by stability across different situations is called coping or 
defense, this is a theoretical question which should be resolved for a particular clinical 
situation (with limited generalizability), based on empirical data available as to the presence 
of an internal conflict associated with the process.  
 In conclusion, according to the basic assumption by Steffens and Kächele, defense and 
coping are clearly distinguished. However, the authors do not exclude the dynamical 
transition, under specific conditions, between the two. This transition might account for what 
in other – more static – conceptions is called conceptual overlap between defense and coping. 
In Steffens et al.’s conception, the overlap phenomenon is clinically and theoretically 
accounted for, with a rationale of pervasiveness of adaptational processes related to internal 
conflicts being provided. The model postulates an overall link between defense and coping, 
where the creation of a conflict-free zone in the Ego is central, as well as different types of 
fears elicited by novel situations. So far, no empirical evidence supports the model, although, 
Küchenhoff and Manz (1993) have corroborated part of a derived model. From a clinical 
vantage point, however, this integrative conception is consistent with several clinical theories, 
above all Freud’s defense theory and Lazarus’ stress-coping model and therefore, thus both its 
clinical implementation and its empirical exploration seem promising. 
 
DISCUSSION 
As shown by the presentation of models of defense and coping, Cramer’s (1998a) 
discussion of the question lacks several current references and thus, needs to be reviewed 
taking into account these modern conceptions of defense and coping. This is the aim of this 
second act. We will discuss the issues of consciousness, aim-directiveness, adaptiveness and 
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trait-state discussion, among others already raised by Cramer. Finally, we will argue in favor 
of theory-consistent methodology for assessment of defense and coping. 
 
Consciousness 
As suggested by Cramer (1998a), the question of consciousness is related to the 
question of intentionality, without both concepts being perfectly overlapped by each other. 
Unconscious processes may have conscious correlates, but the motive - or intention - of the 
adaptational process is generally concealed from consciousness, as may be the process as a 
whole. Therefore, we discuss the two questions together (for an opposing view, see 
Newman’s reaction, 2001). Defenses, especially non-adaptive ones, are usually defined as 
processes with an important unconscious part (Freud, 1926; Perry, 1990a). The question is 
less clear for coping and adaptive defenses. Cramer refers to suppression, traditionally 
categorized as mature defense (Vaillant, 1977), but implying “a semiconscious decision to 
defer paying attention” (Vaillant, 1990, p. 262, cited by Cramer, 1998a, p. 925). Based on the 
argument that suppression thus involves “conscious intention to not allow some thought or 
event to create psychological disturbance”, Cramer would suggest it be categorized as coping 
(see also Haan, 1977, for the distinction between suppression and repression). This argument 
needs to be challenged, since it is based on a static conception of adaptational processes. In 
line with Steffens and Kächele (1988), it can be argued that suppression might be understood 
as coping and as defense, depending on the type of fear to be contained in the subject and 
depending on its functionality in novel situations: the question would be: “does this process 
aim at direct adaptation to external reality – facing realistic anxiety - or at creating an internal 
conflict-free zone – facing neurotic fear?”. Depending on the response to this question, 
suppression in a given situation would be classified as coping or as defense. A similar 
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argument might be advanced in answer to the question as to whether denial is a defense or a 
coping (Sjöbäck, 1973). 
 The second argument raised by Cramer is that the conscious status of coping is one of 
the main distinctive features of coping processes (as opposed to defenses). Paradoxically, 
Cramer (1998a) herself mentions divergent opinions of coping researchers on this tricky 
question. Certain do not exclude un- or pre-conscious coping (Erdelyi; 1985, 2000; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984), others claim that coping can only be conscious (Parker, & Endler, 1996; 
Singer, & Sincoff, 1990; Suls, & Harvey, 1996), but these opposing views are discussed 
neither with regard to theory nor to empirical data. Cramer (1998a, p. 924) concludes that “the 
majority of coping researchers see these processes as under the conscious control of the 
person”. We would argue, along with Steffens and Kächele (1988, p. 41) that “(…) coping 
processes on the other hand may certainly occur automatically and thus, may be described as 
being unconscious, however, they are not - as Ego strategies – anchored within unconscious 
conflicts”1. The latter is reserved for defense mechanisms. Thus, we may have to admit that, 
at least theoretically, the non-conscious status of an adaptational process alone does not 
inform us if we are dealing with a defensive or a coping process (see also the discussion of 
Cramer’s paper by Newman, 2001, Erdelyi, 2001; and Cramer’s reaction, 2001). According to 
Steffens and Kächele (1988), we need to be able to identify an internal conflict in the 
individual in order to talk of a defense; coping does not require this type of adversity. This 
theory-driven conception is consistent with most conceptions on coping, as it is generally 
understood as a strategy against situation-related adversity, whether the strategy is conscious, 
                                                 
1 „Bewältigungsvorgänge hingegen können zwar automatisiert und damit im deskriptiven 
Sinne unbewusst ablaufen, sie sind jedoch als Strategien des Ich nicht in unbewussten 
Konflikten verankert“. 
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preconscious or unconscious for the individual (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Skinner, Edge, 
Altman, et al., 2003; Zeidner & Saklofske, 1996). 
 In conclusion, in order to be able to answer the question of the (un-) conscious status 
of coping, one needs to compare several methodologies of coping assessment, i.e., self-ratings 
and observer-ratings (see Tschuschke, Pfleiderer, Denzinger, Hertenstein, Kächele, & Arnold, 
1994). Consistent and systematic overlap would be an argument in favor of conscious 
processes, whereas inconsistency in the results would argue in favor of the existence of 
unconscious coping; research into this question is therefore warranted. 
 
Goal-directiveness 
As suggested by Cramer (1998a), there is consistent overlap – or maybe even no 
difference - between the two main functions of coping and defense: (1) To reduce negative 
affect/ward off disruptive negative affect, and (2) Return to baseline functioning/restore a 
comfortable level of functioning. Thus, functions of defense and coping can be described as 
(1) Affect regulating, and (2) Maintaining homeostasis of the system. In this sense, the 
functionality of defense and coping is related to the concept of “Plan” in the Plan Analysis 
approach (Caspar, 1996), which we draw on to illustrate the afore-mentioned consistent 
overlap between defense and coping on an individualized level.  Plan Analysis differentiates 
between interactive and intra-psychic goals – motives – and means, the latter being 
instrumentally related to these goals. For instance, a patient with traumatic memories of his 
childhood tends to “forget” these in a given current stressful situation and might use a 
repression. This defense, which might be described as a Plan (Caspar, 1996) “Do everything 
to forget the painful experience” or “Avoid thinking about the traumatic event”, serves 
instrumentally a higher-order plan which might be called “Avoid upsetting emotions”.  Thus, 
the afore-mentioned function (1) of repression aiming at affect regulation is explained. 
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Moreover, these Plans might also serve another higher-order Plan, such as  “Avoid talking in 
therapy about the trauma” or “Avoid engaging fully in therapy”. Such Plans illustrate the 
afore-mentioned function (2) of repression as defense, which is the maintenance of 
homeostasis of the system. Moreover, the hierarchy of Plans illustrates the means-end 
relationships and thus, overlaps with the concept of aim-directiveness being inherent in 
defense and coping concepts.  
Even if the Plan Analysis approach overlaps partially with defense and coping 
concepts, there are substantial differences, where Plan Analysis clearly surpasses the defense-
coping concepts, such as the tailor-made description of Plans aiming at individualized case 
conceptualizations, the differentiation between intra-psychic and interpersonal regulation 
processes as Plans, the explicit instrumental links between behaviors, Plans and motives, as 
well as the instrumental function of emotions in relation with Plans (Caspar, 2007). 
To sum up, goal-directiveness allows consistent overlap between defense and coping, 
and might even be the Achilles heel of adaptational processes – thus, the necessary condition 
for adaptiveness to be produced; without aim-directiveness of a process, the studied process 
ought not be adaptational, but embedded in a momentary adversity-free context requiring no 
adaptation. We therefore agree with Cramer (1998a): coping and defense cannot be 
differentiated on the sole criterion of aim-directiveness. 
 
Adaptiveness 
 The question of hierarchy of defenses or coping, according to the criterion of 
adaptiveness, has been discussed (Cramer, 1998a). Adaptiveness might depend on at least 
three criteria, initially developed for the concept of coping, but certainly valid for all kinds of 
adaptational processes (Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003): the long-term developmental 
consequences of  the process (a question being “What are the long-term costs?”), its 
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subjective experience (“What does it feel like to practice this process?”) and the current 
qualities (“How can this process be described?”).  
For defense mechanisms, a hierarchical organisation ranging from maladaptive 
defenses to mature defenses is widely accepted in psychoanalytic thinking (Cramer, 1991; 
Perry, 1990a, 1993a; Vaillant, 1977, 1993). However, in coping research, coping processes 
are rarely ranked according to their degree of adaptiveness. Some researchers describe good 
news versus bad news coping (Aldwin, & Revenson, 1987), but critics of this dichotomic 
conception are frequent (Kramer, 2005a, Lazarus, 2000; Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003). 
Cramer (1998a) does not exclude a “horizontal hierarchy” describing coping processes as they 
unfold with time (sequential model: Aspinwall, & Taylor; 1997; Carver, & Scheier, 1981; 
Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Rothbaum, Weisz, Snyder, 1982; Tennen, & Affleck, 1997). 
There are also several attempts to classify coping along a more complex hierarchy; for 
instance, within a three-level-model (Leventhal, Suls, & Leventhal, 1993). With some 
exceptions, it can be concluded that vertical hierarchy is associated to defense, whereas 
horizontal (sequential) hierarchy is linked to coping. 
 Along with Costa, Somerfield and McCrae (1996) and Cramer (1998a), qualitative 
differences in defenses account for adaptiveness (see also A. Freud. 1936, for a discussion) – 
meaning that some defenses are more mature than others -, whereas quantitative criteria might 
apply to the degree of adaptiveness of coping – meaning that any given coping is maladaptive 
if practiced (“overused”) in a highly frequent manner. Therefore, for optimal adaptation, an 
individual should engage in mature – high-level – defense mechanisms and at the same time 
avoid practicing any coping too frequently (Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003). This 
hypothesis is theory-driven and needs to be tested empirically. Recent models of defense and 
coping (Steffens & Kächele, 1988) suggest an overused coping be called defense, due to the 
underlying internal conflict postulated. We would argue that as long as the underlying internal 
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conflict has not been reliably assessed in the given clinical situation, coping may be used 
recurrently, without it becoming a defense. Only empirical research might answer the 
question of internal conflict being associated with frequent use of a specific coping.  
 
Trait v State 
The question of trait v state of defense and coping has been tackled by several 
researchers (Cramer, 1998a). Underlying this distinction is the empirical question of stability 
over time of an adaptational process in a given individual. On a theoretical level, we 
differentiate between personality-driven processes (defense mechanisms) and situation-
induced processes (coping processes) (Chabrol, & Callahan, 2004; Cramer, 1998a; Steffens & 
Kächele, 1988). In this respect, Cramer (1998a) concludes that we are facing mere tendencies, 
rather than a criteria yielding clear-cut differentiation between defense and coping. We only 
partially agree, in view of recent integrative models (Chabrol, & Callahan, 2004; Steffens, & 
Kächele, 1988) and empirical findings (Whitty, 2003). A closer look at the question yields the 
following: it is common to conceive defenses as personality-driven constructs (aspect of trait), 
elicited by intra-psychic or external conflicts (Bergeret, 1985; Cooper, 1998; Kernberg, 1984; 
Perry, 1993a); this would imply both a trait- and state-aspect of defenses (see also Drapeau, 
de Roten, Perry, & Despland, 2003, for the question of stability and fluctuation of defenses 
over psychotherapy). Facing the same unconscious conflict, the individual does not need to 
defend him-/herself by using the same defense across situations, but tends to use certain 
defenses more often than others, yielding a profile of typical defensive patterns, which 
undergoes only limited fluctuation over time (Cramer, 1998b; Perry, & Cooper, 1989; Perry, 
1993a; see also Vaillant, 1976, for the long-term developmental course of defenses in 
adulthood). For coping, on the other hand, the particularities of the situation and its subjective 
appraisal by the individual (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) determine the coping process 
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involved, not directly the individual’s personality nor the nature of inner conflicts. This 
implies higher fluctuation for coping over time, compared to defenses. Of course, appraisal 
research shows links of coping with stable personality-variables (which are aspects of trait; 
Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Costa, & McCrae, 1990; Hewitt, & Flett, 1996; see also 
Beutler, Harwood, Alimohamed, & Malik, 2002), but theoretically, coping is conceived as 
situation-induced, thus rather reflecting the concept of state (Cramer, 1998a; Kramer, 2005a, 
Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984; Perrez, & Reicherts, 1992). This distinction implies the 
differentiation of determinants in adaptational processes: coping is essentially externally 
determined – a concept related to the individual level of competence in adaptation, whereas 
defenses are essentially internally determined – a concept implying a certain degree of reality-
distorted perception. As a result, at least theoretically, clear-cut differentiation can be 
obtained, as defenses encompass trait- and state-aspects, whereas coping is associated to state. 
However, it is high time this conception is better understood by being tested empirically (see 
the conclusions by Whitty, 2003). 
 
Research Perspectives into Defense and Coping 
To sum up the research agenda related to adaptional processes, we would need to see the 
following questions addressed by empirical research (non-exhaustive). 
(1) Are defenses and coping based on conscious or non-conscious processes, or both? 
Comparison between self-report and observer-rater methodology would shed light on 
this question. 
(2) Is optimal adaptation, as operationalized, for instance, by symptoms or symptom 
change, associated to mature defenses and low frequencies of any coping? A clinical 
trial on defense and coping in patients undergoing psychotherapy or other treatment 
would help answer this question. 
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(3) Are defenses always related to internal conflicts; does coping always follows realistic 
anxiety? Concurrent assessment of conflicts, defenses and coping on the same clinical 
material would be of use. 
(4) Are defenses best understood as state- and trait-dependent, whereas coping is after all 
state-dependent? Research into stability and change of defense and coping over time is 
needed. 
 
Measurement of Coping and Defense in Clinical Psychology 
 The issue of accurate measurement has been addressed by several scholars and 
researchers, separately for coping (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Lazarus, & Folkman; 
Endler, & Parker, 1990; Perrez, & Reicherts, 1996) and defenses (Cramer, 1991; Haan, 1977; 
Perry, 1990a). The clinical v research origins of the two concepts are generally reflected by 
the assessment strategies: clinician-rated evaluation systems of defenses, versus self-report 
measures, i.e., questionnaires, self-observational methodologies regarding coping. Whereas 
the former yield high external – clinical and theoretical - validity but may suffer from flaws in 
inter-rater reliability, the latter show high internal validity and reliability  - on subscales 
produced by factor-analytic procedures - but potentially suffer from low external validity, low 
theory-consistency and limited usefulness for clinical psychology, due to the low level of 
complexity in the assessable concepts with such methods. 
 Related to this classical divergence in measurement is the differentiation between 
defense and coping in unconscious and conscious processes (see Discussion section). 
Assessment of coping by means of solely self-report measures is prone to distorted 
perceptions of self, manipulative tendencies or lies, which might be the consequence of 
unconscious adaptational processes. On the contrary, assessment of defenses and coping by 
means of clinician- or observer-rater systems would seem unnecessary for those researchers 
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who postulate that such processes are conscious for the individual; in this case, questionnaires 
or self-observation methodologies would suffice. Based on the afore-mentioned discussion, 
we should leave open the query as to whether coping is conscious or not, and thus, would opt 
for observer-rater methodology, in addition to self-report measures for assessing coping and 
defenses (Cramer, 2000; Kramer, 2005a; Lazarus, 2000; Perry, 1993a; Tschuschke, et al., 
1994).  Observer-rater methods are also perfect ways of controlling for biases due to social 
desirability, acquiescing, interpersonally manipulative and self-deceptive tendencies. Such 
methodology responds optimally to the complexity inherent in clinical psychology. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper aims to assess Cramer’s effort to address confusion in the concepts of 
defense and coping and proposes further elaborations on several of the related topics. As such, 
recent integrative models on defense and coping are presented and discussed. Furthermore, 
the discussion shows that coping, as well as defense, can be – but need not be - unconscious 
for the individual. The criteria of goal-directiveness and adaptiveness do not fundamentally 
differentiate defenses from coping. However, the nature of the underlying fear theoretically 
differentiates defenses from coping. We may add more generally that competence-related 
functioning is reflected by coping, whereas internal determinants of functioning are related to 
defenses. Stability over time is theoretically related to defenses as a personality-related 
concept, whereas change is related to the concept of coping, due to the status of the latter as a 
situation-induced adaptational process. Measurement issues are discussed, the relevance and 
clinical validity of self-report measures for unconscious adaptational processes questioned 
and theory-consistent methodologies corresponding to the complexity of clinical research 
objects put forward.
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ABSTRACT 
Ways to enhance research into coping have been suggested by Lazarus (2000). The 
issues of consciousness, adaptiveness and structure of coping (Cramer, 1998a; Skinner, Edge, 
Altman, & Sherwood, 2003) are particularly relevant in this regard; thus, they are addressed 
and applied in a clinical research setting. A total of 30 inpatients presenting with Bipolar 
Affective Disorder (BD) have been interviewed twice, as well as the participants of a matched 
control group (N = 30). Self-report and observer-rater methods of coping have been applied. 
Multi-method comparison adds an argument in favor of coping as unconscious processes. 
Coping specificities in BD have been identified: opposition and support-seeking are most 
frequently practiced by BD patients, in comparison with controls; the maladaptive character 
of opposition is confirmed by links with symptom evolution. No significant link has been 
found between coping processes and the therapeutic alliance. This study lends support for a 
quantitative definition of coping adaptiveness which is discussed further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key-Words: Coping, Bipolar Affective Disorders, Opposition, Observer-Rater 
Method,  Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy 
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 COPING SPECIFICITIES IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDERS: RELATIONS WITH 
SYMPTOMS, SYMPTOM EVOLUTION AND THERAPEUTIC ALLIANCE 
 
Coping: Assets and Challenges 
Ways of coping, understood as the individual’s strategies to face stressful situations, is 
a central notion in cognitive psychology, research, and therapy. Coping is generally 
understood as a moderator variable between situational inputs and outcome (Holahan, & 
Moos, 1987; Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984; Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). 
Fleishman (1984, p. 229, cited by Holahan, & Moos, 1987, p. 946) defines coping as “overt 
and covert behaviors that are taken to reduce or eliminate psychological distress or stressful 
conditions”. 
Beyond this minimal definition, little consensus exists in the literature on 
conceptualization, structure and measurement of coping (Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003). 
The great number of empirical studies on coping, aiming at the description of coping in cross-
sectional designs, certainly yielded some insight into coping processes, but also contributed, 
paradoxically, to its threatening disintegration as a scientific concept (see Coyne, & 
Racioppo, 2000; Kramer, 2005a; Lazarus, 2000). Confounds with outcome variables (Coyne, 
& Racioppo, 2000), as well as issues of delimitation of the field (a difficulty due to a 
“bewildering richness” of behaviors related to coping; Pearlin & Schooler, 1978, p. 4) 
contributed to this confusing picture of coping research. In this article, several conceptual 
issues are addressed, aiming at reducing maximally these confusions (Lazarus, 2000): the 
degree of consciousness of coping processes, the question of good news v bad news ways of 
coping and the structure of coping. We will then apply the concept of coping to the specific 
clinical diagnosis of Bipolar Affective Disorder (BD). Systematic theory-driven coping 
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research is sparse in this clinical field, despite its high psychological relevance, according to 
current clinical conceptualizations of BD (e.g., Johnson & Leahy, 2004). We then present, test 
and discuss the ensuing hypotheses. Our objective is to describe coping specificities in BD, 
relate them to outcome (e.g., symptom level and change) and other process variables (e.g., 
therapeutic alliance). 
With regard to consciousness of coping, as highlighted by Cramer (1998a), no 
consensus has been reached among researchers up till now. Certain studies argue in favor of 
coping being confined to conscious strategies (Parker, & Endler, 1996; Singer, & Sincoff, 
1990), whereas others (Erdelyi, 1985, 1990; Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984) also accept the 
concept of unconscious coping. As argued by Steffens and Kächele (1988), referring to 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984), coping essentially responds to stress appraisal within a specific 
situation, generally in an automatized way. Thus, it can be at least described as unconscious, 
not always being under the individual’s control. Conceptual overlap with unconscious action 
tendencies (Lazarus, 1991) support this argument. Furthermore, limitations of a pure 
questionnaire-approach on coping are well described by Perrez and Reicherts (1996), Tennen, 
Affleck, Armeli, and Carney (2000) and Lazarus (2000). Biases of social desirability, 
acquiescing and biases related to self-deceptive processes need to be taken into account. A 
multi-method approach, implying the comparison between self-report measures and observer-
rater methodology (see also Tschuschke, Pfleiderer, Denzinger, Hertenstein, Kächele, & 
Arnold, 1994) may compensate for the drawbacks of self-report measures and is likely to 
supply empirical evidence with regard to consciousness of coping. 
Another conflictual point of the coping concept is the question of adaptiveness (White, 
1974). Are there “good news and bad news ways of coping” (Aldwin, & Revenson, 1987; 
Lazarus, 2000; Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003) or is any coping in any situation 
potentially adaptive? Lazarus (2000) argues in favor of situation-dependency of coping 
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adaptiveness, based on individualized patterns of stress management and heuristics. In line 
with this, objective rules have been defined in order to evaluate an individual’s coping 
adaptiveness in a specific situation (Reicherts, & Perrez, 1992; Reicherts, 1999). While this 
position radically applies the situation-dependency of coping, it is doubtful that coping 
adaptiveness can be evaluated reliably without taking into account the specific context of the 
situation, including similar – or dissimilar - situations when the individual had to face 
adversity. Furthermore, the possibility of dismantling contradictions in the individual’s 
narrative – essential for clinical assessment of coping adaptiveness - is not taken into account 
by this approach. However, the argument of situation-dependency of coping adaptiveness 
suggests that coping specificities exist as a function of specific clinical situations or 
diagnoses.  These arguments imply that a quantitative criterion for coping adaptiveness may 
be applied, rather than qualitative (Costa, Somerfield, & McCrae, 1996; Cramer, 1998a): The 
more often a specific coping process is used by the same individual – thus becoming a “high-
frequency coping” -, the less adaptive this same process becomes; one could talk of “rigidity” 
of coping patterns (see also the notion of coping inflexibility in personality disorders; 
Summerfeldt, & Endler, 1996), rather than the qualitative classification of coping processes 
into distinctly adaptive and maladaptive processes. Finally, Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al. 
(2003) combine both arguments – qualitative and quantitative - and point out that the 
prolonged use of certain ways of coping, such as helplessness, social withdrawal and 
opposition, indicates that the individual is “at developmental risk” (Skinner, Edge, Altman, et 
al., 2003, p. 231). Thus, coping processes dealing with adversity appraised as a threat, if 
overused, may be more harmful than other types of coping.  
The question of the structure of coping refers to theory-driven classifications (yielded 
by confirmatory factor analyses or rationale sorting), as opposed to merely empirically-driven 
classifications (mainly based on exploratory factor analyses; Skinner, Edge, Altman et al., 
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2003;  see also Lazarus, Averill, & Option, 1974). A total of 100 attempts to structure the 
concept of coping have been found and criticized based on several desiderata for category 
systems, i.e., clarity, mutual exclusiveness, comprehensiveness, functional homogeneity and 
distinctiveness, generativeness and flexibility of the categories (Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 
2003, p. 219). Instead of multiplying the number of low-level ways of coping or using merely 
higher-order categories, the authors propose a hierarchical system of the structure of coping, 
based on action regulation theories (Brandstätter, 1998). Twelve categories - or “families” - of 
coping, distinguishable according to the nature of primary appraisal of stress (stress appraisal 
as threat v as challenge), domain (relatedness, competence and autonomy) and orientation 
(self-directed v other-directed coping), encompass a host of lower level ways of coping (e.g., 
shouldering, help-seeking, rumination). This classification is the basis used in recent 
observer-rater methodology (Perry, Drapeau, Dunkley, & Blake, 2005, see Method section), 
which is characterized by high face validity, as it responds to desiderata formulated for 
category systems. 
 
Coping Specificities in Bipolar Affective Disorders (BD) 
Coping in BD has been addressed by only a few studies as yet. The instruments 
applied did not meet the high expectations of face and structure validity of coping, as defined 
by Skinner, Edge, Altman et al. (2003). In a general way, psychopathological states such as 
depressive or manic symptoms can be understood as either (1) Outcome of coping (Zeidner, 
& Saklofske, 1996), or (2) Input stressor which the individual has to deal with by means of 
coping (Summerfeldt, & Endler, 1996). In our study, we will focus on the former, even if 
some confounds with the latter exist in studies on coping in BD. Furthermore, particularly in 
BD, a highly biologically-determined mental disorder, a third possibility exists: absence of 
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direct conceptual link between psychological processes such as coping and occurrence of 
symptoms and presence of a biologically-determined mediator variable. 
Lam, Wong and Sham (2001) and Wong and Lam (1999) base their conclusions on 
ad-hoc interview ratings developed for measuring coping with manic prodromes (Lam, & 
Wong, 1997): priority-setting prevented relapse, whereas extra-stimulation as coping 
increased the probability of relapse. Another study reports rumination and risk-taking as being 
associated with both depression and hypomania (Knowles, Tai, Christensen, & Bentall, 2005; 
see also Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, & Morrow, 1993, as well as Rohde, 
Levinsohn, Tilson, & Seeley, 1990 and Uehara, Sakado, Sato, & Someya, 1999, for coping in 
unipolar depression). Greenhouse, Meyer and Johnson’s (2000) study yields a correlation 
between acceptance and treatment compliance in BD, whereas denial is associated with 
treatment non-compliance. Denial is also reported by Krober (1993) as a specificity of BD, 
but only after a great number of inpatient treatments. According to Paykel (2001), the nature 
of primary stress appraisal – together with the absence of social support as secondary 
appraisal – predicts relapse in BD. When focusing on BD specificity, we assume that specific 
coping processes occur as a function of the clinical diagnosis as a whole, - as contextual input 
variable - independently from the current predominant symptomatology. Finally, in the case 
of BD inpatients, it is particularly important to address the question of lack of consciousness 
of coping, as the level of insight into their own functioning is generally low (Lam, & Wong, 
1997).  
This leads us to our hypotheses: (1) Comparison between self-report and observer-
rating of coping: moderate or no relationships/correlations are expected; (2) Coping 
specificity in BD: specific coping processes are more frequently used by BD inpatients, what 
may be called “high-frequency coping”; (3) High-frequency coping is associated with higher 
levels of symptoms and negative symptom evolution; (4) Coping changes as a function of the 
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situation; less high-frequency coping should be observed after discharge; (5) Coping is related 
to therapeutic alliance during inpatient treatment: the more high-frequency coping, the lower 
the therapeutic alliance. 
 
METHOD 
Sample 
A total of 30 inpatients with Bipolar Affective Disorders (BD) were included in the 
study. A total of 20 (67%) were female, with a mean age of 46.1 years (SD = 11.2 ; ranging 
from 21 to 60). Their socio-demographic level was assessed by means of the total number of 
years of education in any field. On average, the patients had 12.4 years of education (SD = 
1.1 ; range from 10 to 16). All had a DSM-IV-R diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder I (either 
F30.x[296.x], F31.x[296.4x or .5x] or F31.6[296.6x]) and were included in the study 
irrespective of the nature of the most recent phase or of the level of chronicity. Some (13; 
43%) presented co-morbid disorders, such as drug abuse (23% ; cannabis, alcool, cocaine), 
personality disorders cluster C (10%), compulsive-obsessive disorders (3%), acute suicidality 
(3%) and epilepsy (3%). Diagnoses were established by trained medical staff by means of 
DIGS (Diagnostic Interview for Genetic Studies; Preisig, Fenton, Matthey, Berney, & 
Ferrero, 1999). The number of inpatient treatments in psychiatry, including current treatment, 
varied between 1 and 29 (Mean = 7.7 ; SD = 7.0). 
A strictly matched control group was introduced; matching criteria were gender, age 
and years of education,  as these have an influence on coping (Labouvie-Vief, Hakim-Larson, 
& Hobart, 1987; Whitty, 2003). A total of N = 30 persons from a community sample were 
recruited for the study. Out of these, 20 (67%) were female, with a mean age of 41.9 (SD = 
14.3 ; range from 23 to 65). Their mean number of years of education was 12.9 (SD = 1.4 ; 
range from 11 to 18), corresponding to intermediate education level. No inpatient treatment in 
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psychiatry is known for these participants and general symptomatology was in the normal 
range for all control participants. T-tests yielded no significant differences in the matching 
variables between the groups (see table 1). All participants gave written informed consent. 
 
Instruments 
Coping Action Patterns (CAP; Perry, Drapeau, Dunkley, & Blake, 2005; French 
translation by Kramer, & Drapeau, 2005; APPENDIX B1; APPENDICES B6 to B9). CAP is 
an observer-rating system assessing coping processes based on interview-transcripts 
(Drapeau, & Perry, 2005). The rating scale encompasses 12 categories of coping (based on 
Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). Three general domains have been identified 
(relatedness, competence, autonomy) encompassing each four categories (“families”)  of 
coping. Moreover, six of the coping categories are conceived as coping with stress appraised 
as challenge (problem-solving, information-seeking, self-reliance, support-seeking, 
accommodation, negotiation) and the other six as coping with stress appraised as threat 
(helplessness, escape, delegation, isolation, submission, opposition). Each coping category is 
broken down into three action levels (affective, behavioral and cognitive). Therefore, 36 
coping processes are assessed by this instrument. Relative frequencies are computed for all 
coping processes. Based on Skinner, Edge, Altman et al. (2003), an Overall Coping 
Functioning (OCF) score can be computed (relative frequency of challenge-coping). 
Preliminary empirical validation data have been presented by D’Iuso, Blake and Drapeau 
(2007), Drapeau and Perry (2005), Drapeau, Perry, Blake and D’Iuso (2007), Perry, Drapeau, 
Dunkley, Foley, Blake and Banon (2007) for the original English version and by Kramer 
(2006), Kramer, Drapeau, Perry, Bodenmann, Despland and de Roten (2007) and Kramer and 
Drapeau (in prep.) for the French version used for this study. For the current study, reliability 
coefficients on 20% of the ratings were established among fully-trained raters and yielded 
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satisfactory results in terms of intra-class correlation coefficients (2,1; Wirtz, & Caspar, 2002; 
APPENDIX B2) varying between .59 and .94 (M = .84; SD = .10; APPENDIX B3). These 
coefficients have been established on coping as the unit of analysis (36 categories). Intra-class 
correlation coefficients (2,1) with the CAP authors’ group of raters vary between .51 and .83 
(M = .71; SD = .11; the .51 score is the only one below .60; APPENDIX B4).  
 
Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations (CISS; Endler, & Parker, 1988; 1990). This 
48-item self-report questionnaire is empirically derived and assesses three basic dimensions 
of coping: task-oriented, emotion-oriented and avoidance (encompassing two factors 
distraction and social diversion); low correlations between the three factors are reported, 
internal and external validity, as well as test-retest reliability yield satisfying results (Endler, 
& Parker, 1990).  Subjects report coping frequency using a Likert-type scale from 1 (not at 
all) to 5 (a lot). The French version has been validated (Endler, & Parker, 1998). Cronbach 
alpha for this patient sample is .95. 
 
Symptom Check List SCL-90-R (Derogatis, 1994). This questionnaire includes 90 
items addressing various somatic and psychological signs of distress. These items are scored 
using a Likert-type scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Although the instrument is 
composed of 10 subscales, our study used only the General Symptomatic Index (GSI, score 
ranging from 0 to 4), which is a mean rated over all symptoms. Clinical cut-off score is 0.80. 
The French validation study has been carried out by Pariente and Guelfi (1990) and yielded 
satisfactory coefficients. Cronbach alpha for this sample was .98.  Mean symptom level for 
patients is higher than for controls (see table 1; the range of the patients’ scores is 0.12 to 
3.17). Symptom change has been calculated according to Jacobson and Truax’ (1991) 
recommendation by means of Reliable Clinical Change Index (RCI; see also Beretta, de 
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Roten, Drapeau, Kramer, Favre, & Despland, 2005). Negative numbers indicate symptom 
decrease. In our sample, 38% presented no change, 31% symptom decrease and 31% 
symptom increase (M(RCI) = 1.15; SD = 4.25; see table 1). 
 
Bech-Rafaelson Mania Scale (BRMS; Bech, Rafaelson, Kramp, & Bolwig, 1978). The 
BRMS is a clinician-rated scale for manic symptoms, based on 11 items tapping activity level, 
mood, and other characteristics of mania. The items are rated on a scale from 0 (normal) to 4 
(extreme). Clinical cut-off score for mania is 15 (hypomania 6). The range of our patients’ 
scores is 0 - 12. Inter-rater reliability has proven to be high (.80 - .95; Bech, Rafaelson, 
Kramp, &, Bolwig, 1978; Altman, 2004). BPRS is effective in assessing outcome in clinical 
trials on BD (Bech, 2002). The French translation has been realized by Chambon, Poncet and 
Kiss (1989). Cronbach alpha for our patient sample was .77. 
 
Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery, & Asberg, 
1979). MADRS is a clinician-rated scale for depressive symptoms, including among others 
items on sadness, internal tensions, insomnia, appetite reduction, cognitive impairment and 
suicidal ideation. The 10 items are anchored on a scale from 0  (absence of symptoms) to 6 
(invalidating presence of symptoms). Clinical cut-off score for depression is 15. The  range of 
our patients’ scores is  0 - 38. Several validation studies have reported satisfactory 
coefficients for the original version (Montgomery, & Asberg, 1979) and concurrent validity 
(Kearns, Cruickshank, McGuigan, Riley, Shaw, & Snaith, 1982; Maier, & Philipp, 1985). The 
French translation has been realized by Lemperière, Lepine, Rouillon, Hardy, Ades, Luauté 
and Ferrand (1984) and validation studies on this version yield satisfactory coefficients on 
specificity, homogeneity, internal consistency (Pellet, Decrat, Lang, Chazot, Tatu, Blanchon, 
& Berlier, 1987). Cronbach alpha for our patient sample was .89. 
COPING IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 60
Working Alliance Inventory (WAI; Horvath, 1981; Horvath, & Greenberg, 1989). The 
WAI is originally a 36-item self-report measure assessing the quality of the therapeutic 
alliance according Bordin’s conception (1975). Responses are reported on a 7-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (always). Construct validity has been established by 
Malinckrodt and Nelson (1991), reliability for the whole scale ranges between .84 and .93 
(Horvath, 1994). Concurrent and predictive validity have been established (Tichenor, & Hill, 
1989; Shick Tryon, & Kane, 1993). A 12-item short version has been developed by Tracey 
and Kokotovic (1989), based on factor-analytic procedures. Its French translation has been 
validated by Corbière, Bisson, Lauzon and Richard (2006) who suggest one general score be 
considered for the evaluation of alliance. The 12-item-version has been used for this study. 
Cronbach alpha for this patient sample was .87. 
 
Procedure 
 All patients and controls were asked to participate in a dynamic interview (Perry, 
Fowler, & Semeniuk, 2005) lasting 50 minutes. Dynamic interview (DI) as a research tool has 
been developed from clinical practice of psychodynamic psychotherapy; thus, the context of 
DI is comparable to the context of an intake psychotherapy interview (Perry, personal 
communication). It has been widely used in psychotherapy research (Perry & Cooper, 1989 ; 
Hoglend & Perry, 1998). As shown by Perry, Fowler and Semeniuk (2005) and Fowler and 
Perry (2005), high-quality dynamic interviews are associated with Interviewer’s and Overall 
Dynamic Interview Adequacy (I-DIA and O-DIA). Five tasks of the interviewer compose the 
I-DIA : (1) Setting the interview frame : work-enhancing strategies ; (2) Offering support : 
questions, support strategies, associations ; (3) Exploration of affect : questions, reflections, 
clarifications, low-level defense interpretations ; (4) Trial interpretations : defense and 
transference interpretations; (5) Offering a synthesis. In particular, exploring affect and trial 
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interpretations are highly correlated with O-DIA, when the patient’s contribution is controlled 
for (Perry, Fowler, & Semeniuk, 2005). The author completed an intensive one-week-training 
at Austen Riggs Center, Stockbridge, USA, and later underwent regular supervision with 
senior supervisors in Psychodynamic Psychotherapy. All interviews were conducted in 
French by the author.  
All inpatients participated in the dynamic interview, as soon as their symptomatic state 
allowed it. This means that the patients were included in the final third of the duration of 
inpatient treatment, shortly before discharge. Only two patients had to be excluded from the 
study due to non-feasibility of the research interview; all other patients responding to the 
inclusion criteria and willing to participate were included. The patients were given treatment 
as usual, encompassing non-specific supportive therapy and medication. All patients were 
appointed for a second interview at a three-month interval. Only 18 patients respected this 
appointment, despite great efforts on the part of the researcher. At the second interview, the 
patients were all discharged from inpatient treatment. Along with the dynamic interview, the 
evaluation procedure encompassed clinician-ratings of depression and mania. The patients 
were given the questionnaires at the end of the interview and were asked to fill them in and 
send them back within two days. The study was endorsed by the expert ethical committee of 
the psychiatric hospital. 
 The control group was recruited by means of two local institutions : (1) School of 
Social Studies (n = 17) ; (2) Association promoting Community Activities and Service (n = 
13). Matching criteria were transparently issued at the outset of the control group recruitment. 
Therefore, only nine participants had to be refused from participation due to failure to meet 
the matching criteria. The control participants, unlike the patients who were not paid, were 
given a contribution (the equivalent of USD 16). The study was endorsed by the expert ethical 
committee of the School of Social Studies. 
COPING IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 62
 All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed by Master’s-level psychology 
students, according to the method defined by Mergenthaler and Stigler (1997).  
Interviews were rated based on the transcripts. In-depth training and supervision was 
organized for all raters. Four Master’s-level psychology students were trained during four 
months by the author and reliability was established on a dyadic basis among the student 
raters, between the student raters and the trainer and between the student raters and the 
authors of the CAP-method. A randomly chosen 20% of all interviews was rated by two raters 
independently, in order to establish inter-rater reliability checks (results see under 
Instruments).  
 
 Data Analytic Strategy 
Canonical correlations were carried out (only on the patient’s first sessions) in order to 
test our first hypothesis. We avoided the use of a set of Pearson’s correlations, due to the 
multiplication of errors ensuing from multiple hypothesis testing; according to Tabachnik and 
Fidell (1996), canonical correlations as multivariate statistics control optimally for such flaws 
and are known to maximize inter-correlations between the two sets of variables. MANOVAs 
were performed to test our second and fourth hypotheses, respectively on data from the first 
and second sessions. Linear regressions were carried out in order to test the relationship 
between coping, symptom level and change, as well as with the therapeutic alliance. 
Bonferroni’s correction was introduced where necessary. 
 
RESULTS 
Comparison Between Self-Report and Observer-Rating of Coping 
Canonical correlations on N = 30 BD patients between CAP (36 dimensions plus 
OCF) and CISS (5 dimensions), yielded an overall t-value of 0.81 (ns; APPENDIX B5). The 
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CISS subscale task-oriented coping correlated with four CAPs and with OCF (t = 2.29): 
information-seeking affective (t = -2.12), helplessness affective (t = -2.12), accommodation 
behavioral (t = -2.45), and negotiation cognitive (t = 2.45). Finally, CISS emotion-focused 
coping correlates with CAP opposition affective (t = 2.10) and CISS escape with CAP 
submission cognitive (t = -2.04). No other correlations were significant. 
 
Coping Specificities in BD Patients  
Multivariate statistics on the first session yielded five CAP and two CISS factors being 
different between BD patients and parallelized controls, thus lending support for coping 
specificities (see table 2). CAP self-reliance behavioral and CISS task-oriented coping are less 
often practiced by the patients, whereas CAP support-seeking both affective and behavioral 
and opposition both affective and behavioral, along with CISS distraction, are more 
frequently practiced by patients, compared to controls. Moreover, OCF has proven to be 
lower in patients, compared to controls. Thus, opposition, support-seeking (affective and 
behavioral) and distraction are the only high-frequency coping in BD. Effect sizes of these 
between-group differences are moderate to high (the latter is true for OCF, self-reliance 
behavioral, opposition affective and behavioral). 
No effect for either of these variables was observed when we compared subgroups of 
patients according to their predominant symptomatology, mania or depression, at first session 
(median-split method applied). No effect was found with regard to the status of the patients 
(completers v non-completers). 
Frequency of Coping, Symptom Level and Evolution, and Therapeutic Alliance 
Regression analyses on coping predicting the symptom level for the first session, 
whether general symptomatic level (GSI) or specifically mania or depression, did not yield 
any significant links. However, with regard to change in symptom level (RCI on GSI after 
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three months), results are depicted in table 4 with regard to coping processes when stress is 
appraised as threat. Due to missing data, regression analyses were carried out on a sub-sample 
of n = 13 (43%) patients, diminishing the power of the results. To compensate for this 
shortcoming, Bonferroni’s corrections were strictly applied. Nevertheless, there are two 
noteworthy predictive links: helplessness and opposition as a prediction of symptom change 
in the sense that higher frequency of these coping processes are related to less symptom 
reduction or greater deterioration. No significant link with symptom evolution was found 
between coping processes when stress is appraised as challenge. 
No significant links were found with regard to coping processes predicting the 
therapeutic alliance at first session. 
 
High-Frequency Coping at the Second Session 
Multivariate statistics have been carried out on the second session (N = 18; see table 
3), in order to control for the obtained results at the first session. Interestingly, it appears that 
all differences – based on self-report and observer-rater methods - which were noticed at the 
first session disappear, apart from support-seeking behavioral as high-frequency coping in BD 
also at the second session. This effect is only marginally significant on the multivariate level 
(p = .05), but presents a high effect size on an univariate level. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The results partially confirm our hypotheses. The first aimed at comparing self-report 
measure and observer-rater method: only a few moderate, otherwise low, correlations have 
been found between CAP and CISS; overall correlation is not significant. There seems to be 
limited overlap in the perception of coping frequency between the subject and the 
independent observer; the subject is probably unaware of parts of his/her functioning. This 
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conclusion is corroborated by the observation that specific CAPs (e.g., opposition and 
support-seeking) differ between the groups, whereas corresponding CISS (e.g., emotion-
factor being conceptually and empirically close to opposition, see canonical correlation) do 
not differ. This lack of empirical correspondence can also be due to conceptual differences in 
the construction of the two scales.  
As far as the question of the coping specificity in BD is concerned, we observed a 
between-group effect - with 1.20 the highest effect size found - on a general level of coping 
adaptiveness (OCF); patients present lower Overall Coping Functioning, compared to 
controls. In addition, we found three high-frequency coping: CAP opposition (affective and 
behavioral), CAP support-seeking (affective and behavioral) and CISS distraction, along with 
low frequencies in BD of several others (CAP self-reliance and CISS task). The high 
frequency of opposition suggests its maladaptive character in the dynamics of stress 
management (Cramer, 1998a; Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003). Opposition is related to 
symptom evolution, thus adding an argument in favor of its maladaptive quality in BD. The 
observation that CAP opposition, affective and behavioral, did not come out as significant at 
the second session – after discharge from inpatient treatment - , suggests that we might be 
dealing with specific coping reactions to inpatient treatment contexts which entails some 
degree of constraint. The observation that these effects disappear when comparing subgroups, 
as a function of predominant symptomatology, adds a strong argument in favor of coping 
specificity of BD as a whole, irrespective of symptomatic phase. Moreover, symptom increase 
(or low symptom decrease) tends to be associated with the patient’s presenting helplessness in 
inpatient treatment. Along with opposition, this coping process is part of the category when 
stress is appraised as threat and thus partially confirms the maladaptive quality of these 
processes with regard to symptom reduction over time (Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003). 
However, there are several other threat-coping processes which are not related to symptom 
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evolution. Therefore, this interpretation should be seen as tentative and be replicated in other 
samples.  
Overall, the absence of significant links between symptom level, alliance and coping 
processes in the first session suggests the presence of limited conceptual overlap and, thus, 
underlines a clear-cut distinction between coping and symptoms; we may conclude that there 
are very limited confounds in this study, occasionally observed between coping and outcome 
(Coyne, & Racioppo, 2000; Lazarus, 2000). The absence of link between coping and 
symptom level can also be explained by the presence of biological mediators in BD (see 
Goodwin, & Jamison, 1990). This implies also that opposition as BD inpatient specificity is a 
situation-dependent, and not person-dependent, process. 
Coping specificities in BD in inpatient treatment generally vanish over the course of 
three months, attaining the range of the functioning of the control group. This conclusion is 
after all confirmed by the merely moderate effect size (.36) of OCF in the second session. 
This observation does not hold true for Support-Seeking where a difference, with a high ES 
(.96), in favor of high frequency in the second session of this coping process in patients is 
noticed. Two interpretations are possible: (1) While support-seeking is generally understood 
as an adaptive coping process, high-frequency of its behavioral aspect might also represent an 
“overused” coping expressing an exaggerated need for dependency on the therapist, partner or 
any other significant person. (2) Support-Seeking as CAP ratings might have been induced by 
the interview method, which prescribes the investigation of significant - helping - 
relationships in the subject; in dynamic interviews, patients might simply express the fact that 
they do need more support in dealing with symptoms than symptom-free controls.  
 Therapeutic practice might be improved if the clinician is aware that opposition can be 
high-frequency coping, particularly in inpatient treatment, when it is likely to be a 
vulnerability factor in BD. An adequate therapeutic attitude when confronted with 
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oppositional behaviors or stances in inpatients includes empathic limit-reminding, augmenting 
self-observational capacities, Socratic dialogue and eventually clarifying experiential and 
emotion-focused work on the underlying motives and contents related with opposition, aiming 
at decreasing the level of opposition, and ultimately leading to better adaptation to reality. 
Moreover, enhancement of capacities in self-reliance and task-oriented coping by means of 
effective training is warranted. 
 This study confirms the importance of fine-grained analysis of coping in specific 
clinical diagnoses (Lazarus, 2000), and supports not only the relevance of the quantitative 
conception of adaptiveness (Cramer, 2000), but also tentatively the basic distinction of stress-
appraisal in terms of challenge and threat (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Skinner, Edge, Altman 
et al., 2003; Perry, Drapeau, Dunkley, & Blake, 2005). More studies using the same 
methodology on other psychopathological states, e.g., personality disorders, are needed in 
order to shed additional light on the conclusions drawn.  
There are several limitations to this study. No firm conclusion can be drawn with 
regard to the consciousness of coping, since the two instruments used aimed at measuring 
different dimensions of coping. Ideally, both measures should be based on the same 
theoretical structure of coping; this was not the case in our research; the CAP was based on 
the confirmatory factor analysis by Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al. (2003), whereas CISS was 
based on Endler and Parker’s (1990) empirical analysis. Results on specificity are somewhat 
limited, due to co-morbidity in the sample. Participants in the control group were not 
randomly chosen, which is due to matching procedure and the voluntary status of 
participation and as a result, their coping profiles are not respresentative of the general 
population; great care needs to be taken with generalizations. Low numbers in the second 
session - but also lower numbers of self-report questionnaires in the first interview - decreased 
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the statistical power of the applied analyses and prevented higher-order statistics being carried 
out, as was further subgroup comparisons such as a function of gender.  
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Table 1 
Socio-Demographics and Symptoms for Patients and Controls  
Patients (N = 30) Controls (N = 30)  
Criteria Mean SD Mean SD 
 
T(1,58) 
 
p 
Age 
Education (N Years) 
Gender (Female) 
Intimate relationship¹ 
Life situation 
  With partner 
  With partner & siblings 
  Alone 
  Alone with siblings 
  With parents 
  Institution 
WAI² 
GSI² ³ 
RCI³ 
Mania (BRMS)² 
Depression (MADRS)² 
46.14 
12.37 
67% 
37% 
 
30% 
3% 
43% 
10% 
7% 
7% 
63.04 
1.24 
1.15 
3.10 
12.87 
11.20 
1.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.96 
0.87 
4.25 
2.94 
10.40 
41.90 
12.87 
67% 
40% 
 
30% 
7% 
40% 
10% 
13% 
0% 
 
0.48 
-0.10 
14.33 
1.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.23 
1.81 
1.28 
-1.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.47 
1.00 
.12 
 .21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.00 
.33 
Note. WAI: Working Alliance Inventory; GSI : General Symptom Index of Symptom 
Checklist SCL-90-R; RCI: Reliable Change Index (Change on GSI between the two sessions) 
¹Considered as stable intimate relationship when lasting longer than 2 years 
² Measured at first interview 
³N(patients) = 13 ; N(controls) = 18 
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Table 2 
Coping Specificities in Bipolar Affective Disorder: First Session (N = 30) 
Patients Controls  
Coping M SD M SD 
F(1, 58) ES 
CAP 
Total coping 
OCF 
Problem-solving 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Info-seeking 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Helplessness 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Escape 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Self-Reliance 
  Affective 
 
19.60 
.46 
 
0.00 
1.32 
0.51 
 
0.77 
3.71 
3.02 
 
3.04 
1.16 
2.42 
 
0.92 
2.73 
11.29 
 
1.13 
 
7.04 
.17 
 
0.00 
3.24 
1.67 
 
2.09 
5.59 
5.97 
 
5.25 
2.04 
3.68 
 
1.89 
4.41 
10.65 
 
2.19 
 
22.80 
.67 
 
0.00 
1.21 
2.92 
 
0.55 
4.87 
4.61 
 
2.60 
0.99 
1.51 
 
0.82 
4.12 
6.55 
 
2.48 
 
9.36 
.18 
 
0.00 
2.62 
5.82 
 
1.89 
6.79 
6.66 
 
4.60 
2.27 
2.16 
 
2.05 
4.24 
6.93 
 
4.87 
 
2.24 
22.34** 
 
. 
0.02 
4.47 
 
0.17 
0.53 
0.95 
 
0.12 
0.10 
1.39 
 
0.04 
1.54 
4.17 
 
1.93 
 
0.38 
1.20 
 
. 
0.04 
0.56 
 
0.11 
0.19 
0.25 
 
0.09 
0.08 
0.31 
 
0.05 
0.32 
0.54 
 
0.36 
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  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Support-Seeking 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Delegation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Isolation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Accommodation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Negotiation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Submission 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
4.72 
5.68 
 
3.37 
6.79 
1.94 
 
3.12 
2.64 
0.51 
 
1.08 
1.64 
0.44 
 
1.03 
3.74 
5.31 
 
0.17 
1.27 
1.38 
 
0.60 
6.33 
7.93 
6.02 
 
5.02 
4.81 
3.84 
 
4.99 
4.25 
1.62 
 
2.81 
2.73 
1.75 
 
2.55 
5.15 
5.79 
 
0.91 
3.25 
3.09 
 
1.91 
7.16 
13.40 
6.88 
 
1.26 
3.91 
4.61 
 
1.70 
1.73 
0.37 
 
0.34 
1.83 
0.69 
 
1.84 
4.19 
9.57 
 
0.42 
2.10 
2.54 
 
0.75 
3.86 
10.39 
5.57 
 
3.06 
4.58 
12.58 
 
3.17 
3.80 
2.03 
 
1.09 
3.57 
2.28 
 
2.92 
4.74 
8.39 
 
1.34 
3.99 
3.15 
 
2.30 
5.78 
13.23** 
0.64 
 
3.87* 
5.66* 
1.24 
 
1.75 
0.77 
0.09 
 
1.77 
0.05 
0.22 
 
1.32 
0.12 
5.23 
 
0.74 
0.78 
2.05 
 
0.08 
2.16 
0.95 
0.21 
 
0.51 
0.61 
0.29 
 
0.34 
0.23 
0.08 
 
0.35 
0.06 
0.12 
 
0.30 
0.09 
0.59 
 
0.22 
0.23 
0.37 
 
0.07 
0.38 
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  Cognitive 
Opposition 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
CISSª 
Task 
Emotion 
Escape 
Distraction 
Social Diversion 
0.92 
 
7.23 
5.71 
2.64 
 
38.7 
56.6 
53.2 
56.0 
48.2 
2.20 
 
8.45 
6.63 
3.84 
 
19.9 
16.2 
14.9 
14.9 
12.0 
0.59 
 
1.82 
0.75 
1.60 
 
48.9 
49.6 
47.4 
47.4 
45.8 
2.04 
 
2.98 
1.54 
3.36 
 
8.1 
9.6 
7.9 
7.9 
8.7 
0.35 
 
10.93** 
15.86** 
1.22 
 
6.30* 
3.70 
3.20 
4.84* 
0.69 
0.16 
 
0.85 
1.03 
0.29 
 
0.71 
0.54 
0.51 
0.75 
0.23 
Note. MANOVA: Problem-solving:  F (2; 57) = 2.38; p = . 10; Information-seeking: F (3; 56) 
= 0.56; p = .65; Helplessness: F ( 3; 56) = 0.52; p = .67; Escape: F (3; 56) = 1.83; p = .15; 
Self-Reliance: F (3; 56) = 5.24; p = .00; Support-Seeking: F (3; 56) = 3.69; p = .02; 
Delegation: F (3; 56) = 0.94; p = .43; Isolation: F (3; 56) = 0.68; p = .57; Accommodation: F 
(3; 56) = 1.95; p = .13; Negotiation: F (3, 56) = 1.28; p = .29; Submission: F (3, 56) = 0.79; p 
= .50; Opposition: F (3; 56) = 8.12; p =.00; CISS: F (5; 45) = 3.53; p = .01; Bonferroni’s 
correction applied where necessary (significance level .01/12 or .05/12). 
ES: Effect size; CAP: Coping Action Patterns; OCF: Overall Coping Functioning; CISS: 
Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations 
  ª T-scores reported; n = 22 for patients; n = 29 for controls 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 3 
Coping Specificities in Bipolar Affective Disorder: Second Session (n = 18) 
Patients Controls Coping 
M SD M SD 
F(1, 35) ES 
CAP 
Total coping 
OCF 
Problem-solving 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Info-seeking 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Helplessness 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Escape 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Self-Reliance 
  Affective 
 
19.89 
.55 
 
2.47 
1.29 
0.87 
 
2.00 
5.63 
5.65 
 
4.88 
0.92 
0.74 
 
1.55 
6.34 
7.76 
 
1.81 
 
7.90 
.16 
 
10.48 
3.48 
2.10 
 
4.74 
5.23 
6.69 
 
8.86 
2.12 
2.15 
 
3.40 
7.95 
7.96 
 
3.22 
 
23.78 
.61 
 
0.51 
0.89 
2.48 
 
0.42 
4.39 
7.64 
 
5.75 
1.11 
2.25 
 
0.67 
3.22 
10.08 
 
2.42 
 
8.38 
.17 
 
2.16 
1.75 
3.78 
 
1.23 
6.84 
4.12 
 
10.11 
2.19 
3.06 
 
1.55 
5.77 
6.63 
 
4.06 
 
2.05 
1.53 
 
0.60 
0.19 
2.51 
 
1.87 
0.37 
1.04 
 
0.08 
0.07 
3.33 
 
1.00 
1.82 
0.91 
 
0.25 
 
0.48 
0.36 
 
0.28 
0.15 
0.53 
 
0.46 
0.20 
0.36 
 
0.09 
0.09 
0.57 
 
0.33 
0.45 
0.32 
 
0.17 
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  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Support-Seeking 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Delegation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Isolation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Accommodation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Negotiation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Submission 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
6.44 
2.04 
 
3.09 
6.08 
4.03 
 
4.87 
2.06 
2.03 
 
0.17 
1.95 
0.89 
 
1.02 
2.42 
8.36 
 
0.14 
1.60 
1.66 
 
0.00 
1.83 
4.13 
3.10 
 
4.70 
5.62 
4.94 
 
10.00 
3.92 
4.14 
 
0.74 
3.71 
2.15 
 
2.17 
3.28 
7.62 
 
0.62 
3.11 
2.89 
 
0.00 
2.83 
8.30 
6.14 
 
1.69 
1.80 
3.55 
 
2.08 
0.66 
1.13 
 
0.23 
2.12 
0.18 
 
1.01 
3.43 
10.25 
 
1.16 
2.13 
3.56 
 
0.88 
2.18 
8.32 
7.11 
 
2.97 
2.82 
3.86 
 
2.73 
1.52 
2.77 
 
0.98 
3.96 
0.76 
 
1.68 
3.70 
7.50 
 
3.27 
3.09 
4.91 
 
2.15 
4.38 
0.72 
5.04 
 
1.16 
8.37** 
0.10 
 
1.30 
2.02 
0.60 
 
0.04 
0.02 
1.75 
 
0.00 
0.74 
0.56 
 
1.67 
0.27 
1.99 
 
3.02 
0.09 
0.28 
0.75 
 
0.36 
0.96 
0.11 
 
0.38 
0.47 
0.26 
 
0.07 
0.04 
0.44 
 
0.01 
0.29 
0.25 
 
0.43 
0.17 
0.47 
 
0.58 
0.10 
COPING IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 75
  Cognitive 
Opposition 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
CISSª 
Task 
Emotion 
Escape 
Distraction 
Social Diversion 
0.83 
 
4.83 
1.90 
1.88 
 
42.86 
52.64 
55.29 
52.50 
51.43 
2.44 
 
5.86 
3.60 
2.84 
 
17.54 
13.53 
13.07 
12.94 
9.87 
0.97 
 
2.47 
0.65 
1.93 
 
50.00 
48.61 
49.33 
47.61 
46.83 
1.69 
 
3.33 
1.91 
4.22 
 
9.84 
9.92 
10.30 
9.00 
10.15 
0.04 
 
2.22 
1.71 
0.00 
 
2.14 
0.95 
2.08 
1.59 
1.65 
0.07 
 
0.50 
0.43 
0.01 
 
0.52 
0.35 
0.51 
0.45 
0.46 
Note. MANOVA: Problem-solving:  F (3; 32) = 1.41; p = .26; Information-seeking: F (3; 32) 
= 0.85; p = .48; Helplessness: F ( 3; 32) = 1.07; p = .37; Escape: F (3; 32) = 1.02; p = .40; 
Self-Reliance: F (3; 32) = 2.26; p = .10; Support-Seeking: F (3; 32) = 2.94; p = .05; 
Delegation: F (3; 32) = 0.83; p = .49; Isolation: F (3; 32) = 0.60; p = .62; Accommodation: F 
(3; 32) = 0.31; p = .82; Negotiation: F (3, 32) = 0.97; p = .42; Submission: F (3, 32) = 1.05; p 
= .38; Opposition: F (3; 32) = 1.04; p =.39; CISS: F (5; 26) = 1.03; p = .42; Bonferroni’s 
correction applied where necessary (significance level .01/12 or .05/12). 
ES: Effect size; CAP: Coping Action Patterns; OCF: Overall Coping Functioning; CISS: 
Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations; 
  ª T-scores reported 
** p < .01 
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Table 4 
Regression Analyses for Threat-Coping of First Session predicting RCI (n = 13) 
Variable B SE B β 
Helplessness 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Escape 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Delegation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Isolation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Submission 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Opposition 
  Affective 
 
0.27 
0.43 
1.58 
 
-0.83 
0.40 
0.13 
 
0.15 
0.15 
-0.69 
 
-0.88 
0.01 
-0.44 
 
0.35 
0.04 
0.90 
 
0.43 
 
0.14 
0.38 
0.28 
 
0.89 
0.43 
0.14 
 
0.28 
0.28 
0.84 
 
0.69 
0.45 
0.53 
 
0.51 
0.15 
0.43 
 
0.08 
 
.30 
.19 
.89** 
 
-.33 
.32 
-.29 
 
.16 
.18 
-.27 
 
-.39 
.01 
-.27 
 
.19 
.07 
.57 
 
.66** 
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  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
0.31 
0.83 
0.07 
0.14 
.55 
.79** 
Note. Helplessness : R² = .80; p = .00; Escape:  R² = .19; p = .58; Delegation: R² = .16; p = 
.65; Isolation: R² = .19; p = .58; Submission: R² = .34; p = .27; Opposition: R² = .86; p = .00. 
RCI: Reliable Change Index on General Symptom Index from Symptom-Checklist-90-R. 
Bonferroni correction applied (significance level .05/6 or .01/6). 
* p < .05 ; ** p < .01

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter C 
 
Specificities of Defense Mechanisms in Bipolar Affective Disorders: Relations with 
Symptoms and Therapeutic Alliance 
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ABSTRACT 
Defense Mechanisms as a central notion of psychoanalysis have inspired various 
levels of interest in research in psychotherapy and psychopathology. Defense specificities 
have only recently been investigated systematically with regard to several clinical diagnoses, 
such as Affective Disorders, and Personality Disorders. For the present study, 30 inpatients 
with the diagnosis of Bipolar Affective Disorder I (BD) were interviewed twice. Self-report 
and observer-rater methods, applied to session-transcripts, of assessment of defenses have 
been used. A matched control group was introduced. Multi-method comparison confirms 
defenses as unconscious processes. Defense specificities in BD encompass a set of five 
immature defenses, of which omnipotence is linked with symptom level. Stability of these 
defenses over three months is by and large confirmed. The level of the therapeutic alliance is 
predicted by mature defenses. These results are discussed with regard to the psychological 
vulnerability of BD and treatment implications for psychodynamic psychotherapy with such 
challenging patients are evoked. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key-Words: Defense Mechanisms, Bipolar Affective Disorder, Therapeutic Alliance, 
Observer-Rater Method, Psychodynamic Psychotherapy 
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SPECIFICITIES OF DEFENSE MECHANISMS IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDERS: 
RELATIONS WITH SYMPTOMS AND THERAPEUTIC ALLIANCE 
 
Defense mechanisms have inspired various levels of interest in psychotherapy research 
(Cramer, 1998b). Since their first definition by Freud (1894), their conceptualisation, width, 
functionality, clinical and research usefulness have changed, reflecting almost perfectly the 
evolution of psychoanalytic theory. Nevertheless, defense mechanisms have always played a 
role of paramount importance in psychoanalysis, for Freud (1914, p. 16), it is “the cornerstone 
on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests”. Freud’s initial conception of defense as 
the repression of sexual drive seems too restrictive from today’s vantage point (Cooper, 1998; 
Despland, Drapeau, de Roten, 2001). It was S. Freud himself who revised, in Freud (1926, 
later by A. Freud, 1936), his conception of defense mechanisms, by differentiating between 
several intra-psychic mechanisms, different from repression, all aiming at neutralizing 
unconscious drives and impulses by means of counter-cathexis. This solely intra-psychic 
function of impulse regulation has been criticized by Ego-psychologists (Hartman, 1958; 
Hartman, Kris, & Loewenstein, 1964; Schafer, 1968), suggesting defenses certainly had a 
counter-cathectic function, but at the same time express these underlying impulses and thus, 
allow gratification. These dynamics need to be hidden from the individual’s awareness, to 
protect the self from internal conflictuality. Unacceptable aggression shown towards 
somebody close to the individual might be concealed by means of such defenses; for example, 
by turning the aggression into over-indulgence in using reaction formation, and, at the same 
time, by expressing the negative intention by the over-indulgent attitude (see Cooper, 1998; 
Perry, 1993a). This example also illustrates the conceptual shift in psychoanalysis from 
defenses as intra-psychic regulation to defenses encompassing, in addition, interpersonal 
regulation of conflicts and drives (Sullivan, 1953; Winnicott, 1965;  Modell, 1975; Kohut, 
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1984; Sandler, 1976; Kernberg, 1975; Levenson, 1993). Hence, two main – and mutually 
overlapping - functions of defenses can be deduced from current psychoanalytic literature: (1) 
Counter-cathexis and (2) Protection of self-esteem (Cooper, 1998). 
“Ups and downs” in research interest in defenses (Cramer, 2000, 1998b) might be due 
to defense concepts in particular and psychoanalysis in general being taboo during a certain 
time as a research paradigm. It might also be due to previously unsatisfying research 
methodology. As classical personality psychology is mainly based on questionnaire 
evaluation, it cannot assess reliably the complexity of the defense concept as an unconscious 
process. Limitations of self-report evaluation of defenses are reported elsewhere in detail 
(Perry, & Hoglend, 1998; Perry, 1993a); overlaps between questionnaire data on defenses and 
clinical evaluation of defenses are expected to be moderate to low, due to the predominantly 
unconscious status of defenses (Cramer, 2000; Perry, & Hoglend, 1998). Moreover, projective 
techniques are widely used in the assessment of defenses (for a review, see Perry & Ianni, 
1998). For psychotherapy research in particular, several rating scales based on observer-rater 
methodology have been devised; reliability and face validity of the most widely-used methods 
are satisfactory to high (Perry, & Ianni, 1998;  Hilsenroth, Callahan, & Eudell, 2003).  
Vaillant (1971),  based on Semrad’s (1967) conception of defensive organization, 
defined a hierarchical organization of defenses, including four main levels of defensive 
functioning, ranging from the least to the most adaptive (see also S. Freud, 1926, p. 164, for 
the initial hint regarding defenses as a function of psychogenetic “stages of organization”; see 
also A. Freud, 1936; Wallerstein, 1967): psychotic, immature, neurotic and mature. Several 
studies have empirically corroborated this hierarchy of adaptiveness of defenses on various 
clinical diagnoses, mainly affective, anxiety, obsessional and personality disorders (Battista, 
1982; Jacobson, Beardslee, Hauser, Noam, Powers, Houlihan, & Rider, 1986; Vaillant, 1976; 
Vaillant, & Drake, 1985; Perry, & Cooper, 1989; Perry, 1993b). In studies based on the 
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Defense Mechanisms Rating Scales (Perry, 1990a, see Method section), immature defense 
levels (action, borderline, disavowal, narcissistic) are associated with high levels of symptoms 
and poor social functioning (Perry, & Cooper, 1989; Perry, 1995, 1996;  Perry, & Ianni, 
1998). Stability of defenses over time has been confirmed by several studies across 
instruments (Perry, & Hoglend, 1998; Perry, 2001; for a review see Soultanian, Dardennes, 
Mouchabac, & Guelfi, 2005).  
As far as affective disorders are concerned, Hoglend and Perry (1998) have shown that 
eight lower-level defenses are associated with poor outcome of unipolar depression after six 
months’ follow-up. These defenses encompassed passive aggression, acting out, help-
rejecting complaining, splitting of self and other’s images, projective identification and 
devaluation, whereas the other six immature defenses did not predict outcome in depression. 
The importance of immature defenses in depression with suicidal tendencies has been 
partially confirmed by a study on self-reported data (Corruble, Bronnec, Falissard, & Hardy, 
2004). With regard to manic and hypomanic symptoms, Perry (1990b, 1988) has shown the 
linkage between hypomania and mature defenses (e.g., affiliation, self-observation, self-
assertion), as well as a negative association between mania and action defenses. Ablon, 
Carlson and Goldwin (1974) studied the change of defenses over the course of inpatient 
treatment in Bipolar Affective Disorder (BD) and found less denial, distorsions, and 
projection once the BD patient improved; patients coming to the end of a manic state tend to 
use more somatization and hypochondriasis at this point of evolution. According to Perry and 
Cooper (1986), Bipolar II Affective Disorder is related to obsessional defenses (isolation of 
affect, intellectualization, undoing). Moreover, in various patients, a manic defense as 
resistance to treatment - composed by denial and omnipotence (Angel, 1934; Deutsch, 1933; 
Klein, 1935; Lewin, 1932; Sjöbäck, 1973; Winnicott, 1935, 1965) - might appear throughout 
psychotherapeutic treatment and in analysis (Baruch, 1997). The function of the manic 
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defense is counter-cathectic of depressive affect, anxiety or guilt (Battegay, 1987; Clifford, & 
Scott, 1966), thus, Baruch (1997) calls it a reparation process aiming at the avoidance of 
slipping into negative affect through the regressive process of analysis. Paradoxically, this 
defensive process becomes the source of guilt and persecutory ideation, affects to be defended 
by using projective identification. Finally, several psychotherapy case studies report the 
relevance of psychoanalytic case conceptualization (including defensive functioning) and 
treatment for patients with BD (Deitz, 1995; Jackson, 1993, Kahn, 1993; Salzman, 1998; for a 
review, see Jones, 2004). 
This leads us to our hypotheses: (1) Comparison between self-report and observer-
rating of defenses: moderate or no relationships are expected; (2) Defense specificity in 
Bipolar Affective Disorder (BD): inpatients practice more immature defenses, in comparison 
with controls; (3) Immature defenses are associated with higher levels of symptoms; (4) 
Defenses specificities remain stable over time; (5) Defenses are related to therapeutic alliance 
during inpatient treatment: the more mature defenses, the higher the therapeutic alliance. 
 
METHOD 
Sample 
A total of 30 inpatients with Bipolar Affective Disorders (BD) were included in the 
study. A total of 20 (67%) were female, with a mean age of 46.1 years (SD = 11.2 ; ranging 
from 21 to 60). Their socio-demographic level was assessed by means of the total number of 
years of education in any field. On average, the patients had 12.4 years of education (SD = 
1.1 ; range from 10 to 16). All had a DSM-IV-R diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder I (either 
F30.x[296.x], F31.x[296.4x or .5x] or F31.6[296.6x]) and were included in the study 
irrespective of the nature of the most recent phase or of the level of chronicity. Some (13; 
43%) presented co-morbid disorders, such as drug abuse (23% ; cannabis, alcool, cocaine), 
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personality disorders cluster C (10%), compulsive-obsessive disorders (3%), acute suicidality 
(3%) and epilepsy (3%). Diagnoses were established by trained medical staff by means of 
DIGS (Diagnostic Interview for Genetic Studies; Preisig, Fenton, Matthey, Berney, & 
Ferrero, 1999). The number of inpatient treatments in psychiatry, including current treatment, 
varied between 1 and 29 (Mean = 7.7 ; SD = 7.0). 
A strictly matched control group was introduced; matching criteria were gender, age 
and years of education,  as these have an influence on defensive functioning (Labouvie-Vief, 
Hakim-Larson, & Hobart, 1987; Whitty, 2003). A total of N = 30 persons from a community 
sample were recruited for the study. Out of these, 20 (67%) were female, with a mean age of 
41.9 (SD = 14.3 ; range from 23 to 65). Their mean number of years of education was 12.9 
(SD = 1.4 ; range from 11 to 18), corresponding to intermediate education level. No inpatient 
treatment in psychiatry is known for these participants and general symptomatology was in 
the normal range for all control participants. T-tests yielded no significant differences in the 
matching variables between the groups (see table 1). All participants gave written informed 
consent. 
 
Instruments 
Defense Mechanism Rating Scales (DMRS; Perry, 1990a; French translation: Perry, 
Guelfi, Despland, & Hanin, 2004). The DMRS is an observer-rater scale assessing 28 defense 
mechanisms, based on the hierarchical conception of defensive functioning by Vaillant 
(1992). Seven levels, ranged according to the criteria of adaptiveness, are included, from the 
least adaptive to highly adaptive: (1) Action (acting out, passive aggression, hypochondriasis), 
(2) Borderline (splitting of self/object images,  projective identification), (3) Disavowal 
(denial, rationalisation, projection) and autistic fantasy (for further computation, this defense 
will be considered on level 3, even if conceptually distinct) (4) Narcissistic (omnipotence, 
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devaluation, idealization), (5) Neurotic (repression, dissociation, reaction formation, 
displacement), (6) Obsessional (isolation of affect, intellectualization, undoing) and (7) 
Mature (affiliation, altruism, anticipation, self-assertion, humor, self-observation, sublimation, 
suppression). Quantitative scoring has been used, yielding relative frequency scores per 
defense, as well as an Overall Defense Functioning (ODF) score which can be computed by 
weighting the absolute frequency of the defenses by their level. For the current study, 
reliability coefficients on 20% of the ratings were established among fully-trained raters and 
yielded satisfactory results in terms of intra-class correlation coefficients (2,1; Wirtz, & 
Caspar, 2002; APPENDIX B2) varying between .64 and .95 (Mean = . 83; SD = .10; 
APPENDIX C1). For these reliability analyses, the single defense was unit of analysis (28 
categories). 
 
Defense Style Questionnaire (DSQ ; Bond, Gardner, Christian, & Sigal, 1983). This 
self-report questionnaire encompasses 88 items in its original version and measures conscious 
derivatives of 24 defense mechanisms. These statements are to be rated on a nine-point 
Likert-scale from 1 ("Strongly disagree") to 9 ("Strongly agree"). The patient’s score for a 
defense mechanism is the mean of the scores of the items attributed to this mechanism. A 
high score on any one defense measure indicates that the defense is used by the patient. 
Validity and reliability have been reported by Bond and Perry (1994; Bond, Perry, Gautier, 
Goldenberg, Oppenheimer, & Simand, 1989). A short version comprising 60 items has been 
created by Bond, Trijsburg, and Drapeau (2003) in order to ensure congruency of the 
operationalization with DSM-IV (APA, 1994). Cultural variability and French validation data 
have been presented (Thygesen, Hunter, Lecours, Trijsburg, & Drapeau, 2005; Thygesen, 
Drapeau, Trijsburg, Lecours, &, de Roten, submitted; Trijsburg, Bond, Drapeau, Thygesen, & 
de Roten, 2005). A three-factor solution was obtained (image-distorting, affect regulating, 
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mature) with sufficient validity coefficients; however, image-distorting factor had somewhat 
lower reliability (.64) and parts of the correlations between factors were high (between -.12 
and .59; Thygesen, Drapeau, Trijsburg, et al., submitted). Encompassing all 60 items, an 
Overall Defensive Functioning (ODF-DSQ) score can be computed. Cronbach alpha for this 
patient sample was .87. 
 
Symptom Check List SCL-90-R (Derogatis, 1994). This questionnaire includes 90 
items addressing various somatic and psychological signs of distress. These items are scored 
using a Likert-type scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Although the instrument is 
composed of 10 subscales, our study used only the General Symptomatic Index (GSI, score 
ranging from 0 to 4), which is a mean rated over all symptoms. Clinical cut-off score is 0.80. 
The French validation study has been carried out by Pariente and Guelfi (1990) and yielded 
satisfactory coefficients. Cronbach alpha for this sample was .98.  Mean symptom level for 
patients is higher than for controls (see table 1; range for patients’ scores 0.12 - 3.17). 
Symptom change has been calculated according to Jacobson and Truax’ (1991) 
recommendation by means of Reliable Clinical Change Index (RCI; see also Beretta, de 
Roten, Drapeau, Kramer, Favre, & Despland, 2005). Negative numbers indicate symptom 
decrease. In our sample, 38% presented no change, 31% symptom decrease and 31% 
symptom increase (M(RCI) = 1.15; SD = 4.25; see table 1). 
 
Bech-Rafaelson Mania Scale (BRMS; Bech, Rafaelson, Kramp, & Bolwig, 1978). The 
BRMS is a clinician-rated scale for manic symptoms, based on 11 items tapping activity level, 
mood, and other characteristics of mania. The items are rated on a scale from 0 (normal) to 4 
(extreme). Clinical cut-off score for mania is 15 (hypomania 6). Range for our patients’ scores 
is 0 – 12. Inter-rater reliability has proven to be high (.80 - .95; Bech, Rafaelson, Kramp, &, 
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Bolwig, 1978; Altman, 2004). BPRS is effective in assessing outcome in clinical trials on BD 
(Bech, 2002). The French translation has been realized by Chambon, Poncet and Kiss (1989). 
Cronbach alpha for our patient sample was .77. 
 
Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery, & Asberg, 
1979). MADRS is a clinician-rated scale for depressive symptoms, including among others 
items on sadness, internal tensions, insomnia, appetite reduction, cognitive impairment and 
suicidal ideation. The 10 items are anchored on a scale from 0  (absence of symptoms) to 6 
(invalidating presence of symptoms). Clinical cut-off score for depression is 15. Range for 
patients’ scores  is 0 – 38. Several validation studies have reported satisfactory coefficients 
for the original version (Montgomery, & Asberg, 1979) and concurrent validity (Kearns, 
1982; Maier, & Philipp, 1985). The French translation has been realized by Lemperière, 
Lepine, Rouillon, Hardy, Ades, Luauté and Ferrand (1984) and validation studies on this 
version yield satisfactory coefficients on specificity, homogeneity and internal consistency 
(Pellet, Decrat, Lang, Chazot, Tatu, Blanchon, & Berlier, 1987). Cronbach alpha for our 
patient sample was .89. 
 
Working Alliance Inventory (WAI; Horvath, 1981; Horvath, & Greenberg, 1989). The 
WAI is originally a 36-item self-report measure assessing the quality of the therapeutic 
alliance according Bordin’s conception (1975). Responses are reported on a 7-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (always). Construct validity has been established by 
Malinckrodt and Nelson (1991), reliability for the whole scale ranges between .84 and .93 
(Horvath, 1994). Concurrent and predictive validity have been established (Tichenor, & Hill, 
1989; Shick Tryon, & Kane, 1993). A 12-item short version has been developed by Tracey, & 
Kokotovic (1989), based on factor-analytic procedures. Its French translation has been 
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validated by Corbière, Bisson, Lauzon and Richard (2006) who suggest one general score be 
considered for the evaluation of alliance. The 12-item-version has been used for this study. 
Cronbach alpha for this patient sample was .87. 
 
Procedure 
 All patients and controls were asked to participate in a dynamic interview (Perry, 
Fowler, & Semeniuk, 2005) lasting 50 minutes. Dynamic interview (DI) as a research tool has 
been developed from clinical practice of psychodynamic psychotherapy; thus, the context of 
DI is comparable to the context of an intake psychotherapy interview (Perry, personal 
communication). It has been widely used in psychotherapy research (Perry & Cooper, 1989; 
Hoglend & Perry, 1998). As shown by Perry, Fowler and Semeniuk (2005) and Fowler and 
Perry (2005), high-quality dynamic interviews are associated with Interviewer’s and Overall 
Dynamic Interview Adequacy (I-DIA and O-DIA). Five tasks of the interviewer compose the 
I-DIA : (1) Setting the interview frame : work-enhancing strategies ; (2) Offering support : 
questions, support strategies, associations ; (3) Exploration of affect : questions, reflections, 
clarifications, low-level defense interpretations ; (4) Trial interpretations : defense and 
transference interpretations; (5) Offering a synthesis. In particular, exploring affect and trial 
interpretations are highly correlated with O-DIA, when the patient’s contribution is controlled 
for (Perry, Fowler, & Semeniuk, 2005). The author completed an intensive one-week-training 
at Austen Riggs Center, Stockbridge, USA, and later underwent regular supervision with 
senior supervisors in psychodynamic psychotherapy. All interviews were conducted in French 
by the author.  
All inpatients participated in the dynamic interview, as soon as their symptomatic state 
allowed it. This means that the patients were included in the final third of the duration of 
inpatient treatment, shortly before discharge. Only two patients had to be excluded from the 
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study due to non-feasibility of the research interview; all other patients responding to the 
inclusion criteria and willing to participate were included. The patients were given treatment 
as usual, encompassing non-specific supportive therapy and medication. All patients were 
appointed for a second interview at a three-month interval. Only N = 18 patients respected this 
appointment, despite great efforts on the part of the researcher. At the second interview, the 
patients were all discharged from inpatient treatment. Along with the dynamic interview, the 
evaluation procedure encompassed clinician-ratings of depression and mania. The patients 
were given the questionnaires at the end of the interview and were asked to fill them in and 
send them back within two days. The study was endorsed by the expert ethical committee of 
the psychiatric hospital. 
 The control group was recruited by means of two local institutions : (1) School of 
Social Studies (n = 17) ; (2) Association promoting Community Activities and Service (n = 
13). Matching criteria were transparently issued at the outset of the control group recruitment. 
Therefore, only nine participants had to be refused from participation due to failure to meet 
the matching criteria. The control participants, unlike the patients who were not paid, were 
given a contribution (the equivalent of USD 16). The study was endorsed by the expert ethical 
committee of the School of Social Studies. 
 All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed by Master’s-level psychology 
students, according to the method defined by Mergenthaler and Stigler (1997).  
Interviews were rated based on the transcripts. All ratings were done by the author; 
reliability of these ratings was established with fully-trained colleagues and supervisors on a 
randomly chosen 20% of all interviews (for the results see under Instruments). 
 
 
 
DEFENSE MECHANISMS IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 91
 Data Analytic Strategy 
Canonical correlations were carried out (only on patient’s first session) in order to test 
our first hypothesis. We avoided the use of a set of Pearson’s correlations, due to the 
multiplication of errors ensuing from multiple hypothesis testing; according to Tabachnik and 
Fidell (1996), canonical correlations as multivariate statistics control optimally for these flaws 
and are known to maximize inter-correlations between the two sets of variables. Multivariate 
statistics are performed to test our second and fourth hypotheses. Linear regression analyses 
are carried out in order to test the relationship between defenses, symptoms and alliance. 
Bonferroni’s correction was introduced where necessary. 
 
RESULTS 
Comparison Between Self-Report and Observer-Rater Method 
Canonical correlations on the patient group (first session) between DSQ-60  (3 factors 
plus ODF) and DMRS (7 levels plus ODF) yielded a non-significant overall effect (t-value: 
1.51; ns). Furthermore, ODF (DSQ) correlates with self-assertion (t = 2.17), autistic fantasy  
(t = -3.37), splitter other (t = -4.04), splitting self (t = -3.01) and acting out (t = -2.05). The 
DSQ-factor image-distorting correlates with self-assertion (t = -2.44), self-observation (t = -
2.08), intellectualization (t = -2.57), dissociation (t = 2.09), autistic fantasy (t = 2.25), splitting 
other (t = 2.59) and projective identification (t = 2.12). The DSQ-factor affect regulating 
correlates with self-âssertion (t = -.260) and acting out (t = 2.39). Finally, the DSQ-factor 
mature defenses correlates with altruism (t = 2.20), self-assertion (t = 2.23), intellectualization 
(t = 2.28), dissociation (t = -3.40), displacement (t = -2.09), splitting other (t = -2.03) and 
splitting self (t = -2.73; see APPENDIX C2). 
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Defense Specificities in BD  
Multivariate statistics carried out on the first session yielded several results in terms of 
defense specificity (see table 2). Overall, ODF is lower in patients, compared to controls, a 
result confirmed by ODF as assessed by DSQ. At inpatient treatment, BD patients practice 
fewer mature (altruism, humor, self-assertion, self-observation), fewer obsessional 
(intellectualisation), fewer neurotic defenses (reaction formation, but more often 
displacement), whereas they use more often defenses which are narcissistic (omnipotence), 
more often disavowal (rationalization), more often borderline (splitting of others’ images, 
projective identification) and more often action defenses (acting out). DSQ-factors 
differentiate the groups: BD patients display more image-distorting and affect-regulating 
defenses, but less mature ones, compared to matched controls. Effect sizes of the reported 
between-group differences are moderate, except for ODF, altruism, self-assertion, self-
observation, intellectualization, rationalization and the DSQ-factors, where high ES have been 
observed. 
With regard to defense specificities at second interview (see table 3), ODF of both 
DMRS and DSQ remain significantly lower than in controls. However, almost all between-
group effects vanish after three months; only obsessional (intellectualization; a high effect 
size with 1.09) remains significant when comparing the two groups. On the contrary, DSQ-
factors image-distorting and affect-regulate show similar between-group effects (and effect 
sizes) at the second interview as shown at the first interview.  
No effect for either of these variables was observed when we compared subgroups of 
patients according to their predominant symptomatology, mania or depression, at first session 
(median-split method applied). No effect was found with regard to the status of the patient 
(completers v non-completers). 
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Immature Defenses and Symptom Level 
Linear regressions (method enter) yielded specific significant coefficients between 
immature defenses and symptoms, especially manic symptoms (see table 4). Patients with 
higher levels of manic symptoms use more often narcissistic defenses (omnipotence and 
devaluation), whereas no relationship was found for depressive symptoms. General symptom 
level (GSI) was not related in any way to defenses.  
 
Mature Defenses and Therapeutic Alliance  
Linear regression (method Enter) yielded a significant effect between mature defenses 
and the therapeutic alliance at inpatient treatment (see table 5). In particular, self-assertion 
predicted the level of therapeutic alliance; the more assertive the patient, the better the 
therapeutic alliance.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The results corroborate parts of our hypotheses. First of all, they indicate that only a 
small overlap exists between self-report measure and observer-rater method of defenses, thus 
confirming the results on convergent and discriminant validity of overall defensive 
functioning (Perry, & Hoglend, 1998; Hilsenroth, Callahan, & Eudell, 2003). Once again, the 
theoretical assumption of defense mechanisms as potentially unconscious processes is  
confirmed (Perry, 1993a) and suggests that self-report measures tap into conscious derivatives 
of defenses – or their behavioral correlates -  and do not assess the defensive process itself. 
 Our second hypothesis about defense specificities is confirmed; BD patients display a 
significantly lower Overall Defensive Functioning, a lower level of neurotic and mature 
defenses and a higher level of immature defenses; thus, these patients are particularly 
vulnerable due to BD defense specificity. This conclusion is corroborated by the relationship 
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between defenses and manic symptoms and underscored by the result when taking into 
account the patient’s symptom phase: defense specificity is completely independent of the 
predominant symptomatology.  
More specifically, our study yields in total five immature defenses as BD specificities, 
in comparison with matched controls: acting out, projective identification, splitting of others’ 
images, rationalization and omnipotence; the latter predicts specifically the level of manic 
symptoms. There are no effects for idealization, devaluation, denial, projection, autistic 
fantasy, splitting of self images, help-rejecting complaining and passive aggression; 
furthermore, displacement is the only neurotic defense more often practiced by BD patients, 
in comparison with matched controls. Conversely, BD patients practice less often mature, 
obsessional and neurotic defenses. This clear picture confirms and enlarges Perry and 
Hoglend’s (1998) conclusions on affective disorders indicating that a set of eight immature 
defenses are related to symptom level and evolution in depression, and sheds additional light 
on defensive processes in BD specifically. These are different from defensive processes in 
hypomania (Perry, 1990b; Perry, & Cooper, 1986), whose symptoms are associated either 
with mature or obsessional defenses, and negatively with action defenses. Thus, Bipolar type I 
Affective Disorder is consistently associated with lower-level (immature) defenses, unlike 
type II. The use of borderline and action defenses is associated with increased vulnerability 
for Recurrent Depression (Perry, 1990b) and symptom intensity in Borderline Personality 
Disorders (Perry, & Cooper, 1986); the use of narcissistic defenses is associated with higher 
symptom level in BD (see above) and Borderline Personality Disorder (Perry, & Cooper, 
1986). Thus, a specific double defense vulnerability results for BD patients: (1) They are 
psychologically vulnerable to further episodes of depression, (2) They are psychologically 
unstable as regards personality features, i.e., borderline defenses, which contribute together – 
among other factors such as biological determinants - to explaining the substantial 
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symptomatic fluctuation in BD. The relevance of the double defensive vulnerability should be 
confirmed in longitudinal studies. 
With regard to the hypothesis of defense specificity at the second session, it is 
confirmed on the level of Overall Defensive Functioning. However, on a specific defense 
level, only action and obsessional defenses show between-group differences, whereas all the 
others are in the range of the control group. Of course, a lower number of observations at the 
second session might have prevented mature, neurotic, action and narcissistic defense levels – 
all presenting multivariate p-values between .05 and .25 - from turning out to be significant in 
this statistical analysis. In addition, between-group differences have been observed for the 
second session in DSQ-factors, underscoring again the relevance of our fourth hypothesis. 
This mitigated picture draws our attention to the fact that defenses do not only depend on 
trait-variables, but are also directly induced by state-aspects (for fluctuating aspects of 
defenses see Perry, 2001; Drapeau, de Roten, Perry, & Despland, 2003). These are situational 
contingencies eliciting internal conflicts which call for the use of defense mechanisms 
(Steffens, & Kächele, 1988). As suggested above, the diagnosis, related contextual problems 
in functioning and underlying fears and wishes might act as such situational contingencies. In 
the case of our sample, symptoms are moderately present in the first session, but absent in the 
second, as are immature defenses, which is an argument in favor of state changes in these 
defenses. 
Narcissistic defenses are an important aspect of BD functioning. These defenses serve 
to protect a positive self-concept in a crisis situation (Cooper, 1998; Gilliéron, 2004; Drapeau, 
de Roten, Perry, & Despland, 2003). Patients presenting narcissistic defenses have difficulty 
in fully accepting the self as being in need of help. However, this is exactly how they might 
perceive themselves when facing a crisis situation (Gilliéron, 2004) or are induced to reflect 
about themselves – as prescribed by the technique of dynamic interviewing  (Fowler, & Perry, 
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2005) and in psychotherapy – which may elicit narcissistic defenses, such as omnipotence. In 
turn, this defensive attitude again leads to sub-manic manifestations or symptoms requiring 
more of the same defenses for the protection of narcissism; even more omnipotence is used, 
allowing full gratification of desires, maintaining therefore manic symptomatology (Sjöbäck, 
1973). These dynamics explain why such patients might appear to the therapist as both 
“uncomfortable” and “discouraging”. These countertransferential attitudes are not necessarily 
beneficial for the therapeutic process and need further reflection by the clinician. We may 
speculate that such dynamics, among others, might have been at stake when Fromm-
Reichmann concluded that BD patients were “unrewarding” candidates for psychodynamic 
psychotherapy (Fromm-Reichmann, 1949), a position we are trying to overcome by this 
study. 
The development of a positive therapeutic alliance is supported by the presence of 
self-assertion in the patient.  This is an important result for clinical consideration and might 
help the clinician to perceive resources in this clinically challenging group of patients. It also 
suggests the probable undermining of alliance through heightened levels of immature 
defenses. 
To sum up, in order to assess defenses reliably, especially in BD inpatients, a multi-
method approach is preferable rather than a self-report approach, in view of high face-validity 
of observer-rater methodology (Perry, & Ianni, 1998) and the necessity of context-embedded 
assessment based on session-transcripts, due to the unconscious status of defenses. As for BD 
patients, a set of five immature defenses have been identified as specificities, along with 
lower frequencies in mature, obsessional and neurotic defenses. Their links with therapeutic 
outcome need to be clarified on a larger sample. We hypothesize a two-fold vulnerability 
result in BD patients - depression- and personality-related defensive vulnerability - due to 
heightened levels of action, borderline and narcissistic defenses. The positive relationship 
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between mature defenses and therapeutic alliance is encouraging in this clinically challenging 
patient group. 
These results are inspiring for psychodynamic treatment of BD patients (see also the 
case reports by Deitz, 1995; Jackson, 1993; Kahn, 1993; Salzman, 1998). Especially the 
concept of the double defense vulnerability might help the clinician to be more attentive to 
defensive processes in BD patients, in particular to be attentive to narcissistic defenses on the 
one hand and to borderline on the other. The presence of immature defenses warrants specific 
psychotherapeutic interventions, such as supportive techniques and early-in-process defense 
interpretation, in order to increase the awareness in the patient of his or her way of 
functioning and its effects (see Perry, 1993a, for specific therapeutic attitudes as a function of 
the patient’s predominant defensive level). These defenses tend to hinder the construction of a 
positive therapeutic alliance (Coughlin Della Silva, 1996); their early working-through seems, 
therefore, of paramount importance in the process of psychodynamic psychotherapy with BD 
patients (see also Yeomans, Clarkin, & Kernberg, 2002). 
 There are several limitations to this study. Whereas the sample size is certainly 
acceptable for the first interview, lack of data at the second interview prevents robust 
predictive analysis. The low numbers did not allow us to test our hypotheses as a function of 
gender. Co-morbidity in the patient sample reduces somewhat the internal validity of the trial. 
The lack of complete overlap between DMRS and DSQ might also be due to slight conceptual 
divergence between the measures which we did not completely control. Participants in the 
control group were not randomly chosen due to matching criteria and the voluntary status of 
participation and, thus, their defensive profiles are not representative of the general 
population; great care with generalizations need to be applied. Finally, psychotic defenses (or 
level of defensive dysregulation, Perry, 1993a; see also Piasentin, Vigano, Azzone, Verga, & 
Freni, 2001) are not assessed by the methodologies used, even if patients with Bipolar I 
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Affective Disorder do present such defenses, associated with momentarily inaccurate reality 
testing (Baruch, 1997). 
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Table 1 
Socio-Demographics and Symptoms for Patients and Controls  
Patients (N = 30) Controls (N = 30)  
Criteria Mean SD Mean SD 
 
T(1,58) 
 
p 
Age 
Training (N Years) 
Gender (Female) 
Intimate relationship¹ 
Life situation 
  With partner 
  With partner & siblings 
  Alone 
  Alone with siblings 
  With parents 
  Institution 
WAI² 
GSI² ³ 
Mania (BRMS)² 
Depression (MADRS)² 
46.14 
12.37 
67% 
37% 
 
30% 
3% 
43% 
10% 
7% 
7% 
63.04 
1.24 
3.10 
12.87 
11.20 
1.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.96 
0.87 
2.94 
10.40 
41.90 
12.87 
67% 
40% 
 
30% 
7% 
40% 
10% 
13% 
0% 
 
0.48 
14.33 
1.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.23 
1.28 
-1.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.47 
.12 
.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.00 
Note. WAI: Working Alliance Inventory; GSI : General Symptom Index of Symptom 
Checklist SCL-90-R; RCI: Reliable Change Index (Change on GSI between the two sessions) 
¹Considered as stable intimate relationship when lasting longer than 2 years 
² Measured at first interview 
³N(patients) = 13 ; N(controls) = 18 
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Table 2 
Defense Specificities in Bipolar Affective Disorder (N = 30) 
Patients Controls Defense 
M SD M SD 
F (1, 58) ES 
DMRS 
Number of defenses 
ODF 
Mature : 
Affiliation 
Altruism 
Anticipation 
Humour 
Self-Assertion 
Self-Observation 
Sublimation 
Suppression 
Obsessional : 
Isolation 
Intellectual. 
Undoing 
Neurotic : 
Repression 
Dissociation 
React. Formation 
Displacement 
 
32.77 
3.77 
 
1.32 
0.29 
0.47 
0.18 
1.39 
0.95 
0.09 
0.00 
 
1.87 
11.00 
1.25 
 
1.47 
2.07 
0.29 
7.86 
 
9.32 
0.38 
 
2.19 
1.26 
1.63 
0.72 
2.18 
2.11 
0.49 
0.00 
 
3.20 
9.04 
2.19 
 
2.70 
3.16 
0.88 
10.38 
 
31.20 
4.80 
 
2.62 
2.75 
1.12 
1.10 
8.25 
4.50 
0.32 
1.22 
 
2.17 
21.48 
1.55 
 
2.15 
1.27 
1.44 
3.13 
 
10.12 
0.57 
 
3.38 
3.26 
2.43 
2.19 
7.29 
4.85 
1.05 
2.61 
 
4.57 
9.72 
2.61 
 
2.83 
2.72 
2.09 
3.92 
 
0.39 
67.36** 
 
3.14 
14.87** 
1.45 
4.82* 
24.39** 
13.52** 
1.25 
6.55* 
 
0.09 
18.70** 
0.24 
 
0.89 
1.08 
7.82** 
5.45* 
 
0.16 
2.13 
 
0.46 
1.00 
0.31 
0.56 
1.28 
0.95 
0.28 
0.66 
 
0.08 
1.12 
0.12 
 
0.25 
0.27 
0.72 
0.60 
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Narcissistic: 
Omnipotence 
Idealization 
Devaluation 
Disavowal: 
Denial 
Projection 
Rationalization 
Autistic fantasy 
Borderline: 
Splitting other 
Splitting self 
Proj.identificat. 
Action: 
Acting out 
Help-rejecting 
Passive-aggress. 
DSQ-60¹
ODF 
Image-Distorting 
Affect-Regulate 
Mature 
 
6.32 
6.66 
5.95 
 
10.62 
3.54 
18.38 
0.82 
 
2.69 
0.82 
4.54 
 
4.15 
1.38 
3.61 
 
4.30 
4.72 
4.91 
5.10 
 
9.70 
5.27 
5.29 
 
7.12 
4.30 
7.78 
1.72 
 
3.79 
1.60 
4.40 
 
3.96 
2.67 
3.66 
 
0.76 
1.81 
2.19 
1.46 
 
1.02 
5.07 
6.76 
 
11.24 
3.22 
9.81 
0.16 
 
0.57 
0.20 
2.26 
 
1.46 
0.41 
2.73 
 
5.04 
2.73 
3.14 
6.06 
 
2.24 
5.71 
6.56 
 
6.67 
2.74 
6.45 
0.87 
 
1.19 
0.77 
3.52 
 
2.99 
1.81 
4.11 
 
0.28 
0.72 
1.45 
0.87 
 
8.53** 
1.27 
0.28 
 
0.12 
0.12 
21.57** 
3.55 
 
8.61** 
3.58 
4.95* 
 
8.80** 
2.72 
0.76 
 
24.23** 
29.01** 
11.86** 
8.59** 
 
0.75 
0.29 
0.14 
 
0.09 
0.09 
1.20 
0.48 
 
0.75 
0.49 
0.57 
 
0.77 
0.43 
0.23 
 
1.37 
1.53 
0.98 
0.83 
Note. MANOVA: Mature: F (8; 51) = 6.90; p = .00; Obsessional: F ( 3; 56) = 6.62; p = .00; 
Neurotic: F (4; 55) = 3.51; p = .01;  Narcissistic: F (3; 56) = 2.90; p = .04; Disavowal: F (4; 
55) = 8.09; p = .00;  Borderline: F (3; 56) = 3.84; p = .01; Action: F (3; 56) = 3.67; p = .02; 
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DSQ: F (3; 47) = 14.83; p = .00. DMRS: Defense Mechanism Rating Scales; ODF: Overall 
Defensive Functioning; DSQ: Defense Style Questionnaire; Bonferroni’s correction applied 
where necessary (significance level .01/7 or .05/7). 
¹ n = 22 for patients; n = 29 for controls 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 3 
 Defense Specificities in Bipolar Affective Disorder: Second Session (n = 18) 
Patients Controls Defenses 
M SD M SD 
F(1, 35) ES 
DMRS 
Number defenses 
ODF 
Mature: 
Affiliation 
Altruism 
Anticipation 
Humour 
Self-Assertion 
Self-Observation 
Sublimation 
Suppression 
Obsessional: 
Isolation 
Intellectual. 
Undoing 
Neurotic: 
Repression 
Dissociation 
React.Formation 
Displacement 
 
33.61 
4.01 
 
3.48 
0.76 
1.02 
0.39 
2.47 
1.45 
0.00 
0.98 
 
1.08 
10.45 
2.42 
 
1.83 
2.66 
0.47 
8.27 
 
21.12 
0.52 
 
3.34 
1.48 
1.98 
1.12 
3.06 
2.61 
0.00 
3.42 
 
2.48 
10.86 
3.46 
 
2.82 
5.29 
1.15 
9.22 
 
35.61 
4.70 
 
2.85 
2.21 
1.48 
1.28 
6.93 
4.02 
0.19 
0.34 
 
2.08 
20.94 
1.15 
 
1.02 
1.99 
0.88 
3.17 
 
11.81 
0.57 
 
3.25 
5.02 
2.03 
2.38 
5.18 
4.27 
0.81 
1.43 
 
4.14 
8.21 
1.59 
 
1.52 
2.72 
1.35 
4.39 
 
0.12 
12.02** 
 
0.32 
5.79 
0.47 
2.09 
9.91 
4.72 
1.00 
0.55 
 
0.77 
10.68** 
1.99 
 
1.15 
0.23 
0.95 
4.47 
 
0.12 
1.27 
 
0.19 
0.39 
0.23 
0.48 
1.05 
0.73 
.033 
0.24 
 
0.29 
1.09 
0.47 
 
0.36 
0.16 
0.33 
0.71 
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Narcissistic: 
Omnipotence 
Idealization 
Devaluation 
Disavowal: 
Denial 
Projection 
Rationalization 
Autistic Fantasy 
Borderline: 
Splitting other 
Splitting self 
Proj. Identific. 
Action: 
Acting out 
Help-rejecting 
Passive-aggress. 
DSQ-60 
ODF 
Image-Distorting 
Affect-Regulate 
Mature 
 
1.17 
5.67 
6.21 
 
11.48 
2.80 
19.24 
0.94 
 
1.89 
0.09 
4.81 
 
2.28 
2.79 
2.89 
 
4.77 
3.89 
4.86 
5.59 
 
1.84 
5.16 
6.95 
 
5.87 
3.09 
8.54 
2.55 
 
4.51 
0.38 
4.12 
 
2.82 
5.19 
3.89 
 
0.34 
1.46 
1.61 
2.06 
 
2.16 
3.94 
4.36 
 
13.82 
2.93 
14.52 
0.17 
 
0.57 
0.00 
3.83 
 
0.86 
0.08 
2.19 
 
5.05 
2.68 
3.14 
6.12 
 
3.85 
4.19 
5.38 
 
9.33 
4.13 
5.49 
0.74 
 
2.44 
0.00 
5.81 
 
1.50 
0.38 
3.09 
 
0.21 
0.72 
1.58 
0.86 
 
0.96 
1.22 
0.80 
 
0.82 
0.01 
3.89 
1.50 
 
1.19 
1.00 
0.34 
 
3.55 
4.84 
0.36 
 
8.32** 
9.38** 
9.12** 
1.00 
 
0.33 
0.37 
0.30 
 
0.30 
0.03 
0.66 
0.41 
 
0.36 
0.33 
0.19 
 
0.63 
0.74 
0.20 
 
0.99 
1.05 
1.08 
0.35 
Note. MANOVA: Mature: F (8; 27) = 1.92; p = .10; Obsessional: F (3; 32) = 4.44; p = .01; 
Neurotic: F (4; 31) = 1.92; p = .13;  Narcissistic: F (3; 32) = 1.42; p = .26; Disavowal: F (4; 
31) = 1.23; p = .32;  Borderline: F (3; 32) = .82; p = .50; Action: F (3; 32) = 2.57; p = .07; 
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DSQ: F (3; 28) = 4.94; p = .01. DMRS: Defense Mechanism Rating Scales; ODF: Overall 
Defensive Functioning; DSQ: Defense Style Questionnaire; Bonferroni’s correction applied 
where necessary (significance level .01/7 or .05/7). 
** p < .01 
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Table 4 
Regression Analyses for Immature Defenses predicting Manic Symptoms : First Session  
(N = 30)  
Variable B SE B β 
Narcissistic: 
Omnipotence 
Idealization 
Devaluation 
Disavowal: 
Denial 
Projection 
Rationalization 
Autistic Fantasy 
Borderline: 
Splitting other 
Splitting self 
Proj. Identific. 
Action: 
Acting out 
Help-rejecting 
Passive-aggress. 
 
0.11 
-0.02 
0.22 
 
-0.12 
-0.20 
-0.10 
-0.37 
 
0.08 
-0.16 
-0.06 
 
0.04 
-0.12 
-0.10 
 
0.05 
0.10 
0.09 
 
0.09 
0.15 
0.08 
0.35 
 
0.16 
0.38 
0.13 
 
0.15 
0.22 
0.16 
 
.36* 
-.03 
.40* 
 
-.29 
-.29 
-.27 
-.22 
 
.11 
-.09 
-.09 
 
.05 
-.11 
-.13 
Note. Narcissistic: R² = .29; p = .03; Disavowal: R² = .13; p = .48; Borderline:  R² =  .02; p = 
.91; Action: R² = .04; p = .80; Bonferroni’s correction applied (significance level .05/4) 
* p < .05 
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Table 5 
Regression Analysis for Mature Defenses predicting Level of Therapeutic Alliance in First 
Session (N = 30) 
Variable B SE B β 
Affiliation 
Altruism 
Anticipation 
Humour 
Self-Assertion 
Self-Observation 
Sublimation 
1.41 
-3.67 
2.78 
0.61 
2.27 
3.04 
11.59 
0.10 
2.67 
1.83 
2.81 
1.27 
2.38 
8.01 
.24 
-.37 
.34 
.04 
.32* 
.49 
.43 
Note. Suppression was excluded due to absence in this session 
R² = .67; p = .01. 
* p < .05

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter D 
 
Defense and Coping in Bipolar Affective Disorder: Stability and Change of Adaptational 
Processes 
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ABSTRACT 
 Many studies on psychotherapy and psychopathology have investigated separately 
defense mechanisms and coping as adaptational processes. In recent years, several integrative 
models on adaptational processes have been proposed (see Cramer, 1998a) but only a few 
studies have attempted to validate these theoretical assumptions. Our study aims at comparing 
30 inpatients presenting Bipolar Affective Disorder to 30 matched controls. All participants 
were interviewed twice, coping and defense were rated based on the session-transcripts by 
means of independent observer-rater methodology (DMRS and CAP). It appears that Overall 
Defensive Functioning remains stable over a three-month period, whereas Overall Coping 
Functioning increases over the same period in patients, as they are discharged from inpatient 
treatment. These results are discussed within the context of trait- and state-aspects of 
adaptational processes; further theoretical and clinical implications for crisis intervention with 
BD patients are presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key-Words: Defense Mechanisms, Coping, Bipolar Affective Disorder, Crisis 
Intervention, Observer-Rater Method 
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DEFENSE AND COPING IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER: STABILITY AND 
CHANGE OF ADAPTATIONAL PROCESSES 
 
 Defense mechanisms and coping processes have both aroused increasing interest in 
recent research on personality, psychopathology and psychotherapy (Cramer, 1998a; Lazarus, 
2000; Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). Even if they stem from different 
conceptual backgrounds, the question has been posed as to whether one can differentiate the 
underlying psychological processes (Cramer, 1998a).  The question of one or two distinct 
underlying processes will be evoked in the introduction with regard to several criteria, then 
we will present empirical evidence on the question and finally apply these issues to the 
clinical crisis situation of Bipolar Affective Disorder cases undergoing inpatient treatment. 
We refer to classical definitions of defense by A. Freud, 1936 (cited by Cramer, 1998a, p. 
920) and coping by Fleishman, 1984 (cited by Holahan, & Moos, 1987, p. 946). According to 
Cramer (1998a), both processes can be called adaptational, since they serve the individual’s 
need for adaptation to reality. 
  
 Differences between Coping and Defense: A Case like Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde? 
 The question of differentiation between defense and coping may be discussed with 
regard to several criteria: consciousness, adaptiveness, stability v change and degree of 
association with psychopathology (Cramer, 1998a).  
The assumption of the unconscious status of defenses (A. Freud, 1936) has been 
discussed (Cramer, 1998a; Erdelyi, 2001; Newman, 2001; Perry, 1993a) and we may 
conclude that, although the defensive process is generally unconscious, there are conscious 
correlates of defenses, as well as the possibility of the subject’s raised awareness of his/her 
defensive processes, e.g., after psychoanalytic treatment. This opposes Cramer’s advocating 
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in favor of strictly unconscious status (Cramer, 1998a; 2001).  Similarly, consciousness of 
coping processes has been discussed controversely (Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984; Erdelyi, 
1990; Parker, & Endler, 1996; Cramer, 1998a). Steffens and Kächele (1988; Newman, 2001) 
do not exclude conceptually non-conscious coping processes, since they tend to occur in an 
automatized way. The presence of non-conscious aspects leads us to prefer the use of 
observer-rater methodology for the assessment of both defense mechanisms and coping 
processes, since they compensate optimally for limitations in self-report measures, such as 
social desirability and self-deceptive tendencies (Lazarus, 2000; Perry, 1993a; Tennen, 
Affleck, Armeli, & Carney, 2000; Tschuschke, Pfleiderer, Denzinger, Hertenstein, Kächele, 
&, Arnold, 1994), and take into account these non-conscious aspects of adaptational 
processes.  
The question of adaptiveness of defense and coping has been addressed by several 
researchers (for coping: Carver, & Scheier, 1994; Costa, Somerfield, & McCrae, 1996; 
Lazarus, 2000; Reicherts, 1999; Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003; for defense: 
Perry, 1993a; Vaillant, 1977). Defenses are ranged according to a hierarchy of adaptiveness, 
from the least adaptive to the highly adaptive (see also the developmental perspective of 
defensive maturation: A. Freud, 1936; Labouvie-Vief, Hakim-Larson, & Hobart, 1987; 
Whitty, 2003), whereas for coping, adaptiveness is more complex: the use of certain types of 
coping, e.g., maladaptive coping, i.e., coping where the stress is appraised as threat, might put 
the individual “at developmental risk” (Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003, p. 231). The same 
is true for a rigidly prolonged use of any coping process across dissimilar situations 
(Summerfeldt, & Endler, 1996). Several researchers (Cramer, 1998a; Fenichel, 1945) do not 
exclude the quantitative criterion also being applied to defense mechanisms. 
 The question of stability and change over time of defenses and coping refers to the 
underlying question of trait- and state-aspects in defense and coping. Defenses, in line with 
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Cooper (1998) and Perry (1993a; see also the afore-mentioned definition by A. Freud), are 
generally elicited by intra-psychic or individual-related external conflicts, which means that 
there is a trait- as well as a state-aspect. Nevertheless, stability of overall defensive 
functioning – or of an idiosyncratic profile of defensive patterns across situations - is 
characteristic of the concept of defense (Bergeret, 1984; Kernberg, 1984); short-term changes 
being limited (Drapeau, de Roten, Perry, & Despland, 2003; Perry, & Cooper, 1989; Cramer, 
1998b; Vaillant, 1976). With regard to coping, even if data and theoretical elaborations have 
appeared on the subject of personality variables influencing coping processes (Beutler, 
Harwood, Alimohamed, & Malik, 2002; Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Costa, & 
McCrae, 1990), coping is theoretically conceived as highly situation-dependent, thus referring 
more narrowly to the aspect of state in personality psychology (Cramer, 1998a; Lazarus, & 
Folkman, 1984; Steffens & Kächele, 1988; see also the afore-mentioned definition offered by 
Fleishman, 1984). Within behavior theory, “stable” coping processes in the same individual 
can be explained by the short-term benefits of a strategy, i.e., by referring to negative 
reinforcement. Empirical evidence encompassing coping and defense concepts using self-
report measures supports the distinction between state- and trait-aspects (Whitty, 2003). 
Much empirical work has already been realized separately on defenses and coping in 
clinical contexts. Thus, the association of both adaptational processes with psychopathology 
(on single measures and over time) is established; their clinical usefulness is also shown 
(Cramer, 1998a). Based on the conclusions regarding the state-trait-debate, we may assume 
that a specific clinical context, e.g., a symptomatic decompensation necessitating inpatient 
treatment as crisis intervention or a specific diagnosis function as situational variables 
inducing changes in adaptational processes, irrespective of the presence or efficacy of any 
therapeutic intervention. Since coping is conceived as state-dependent, compared to defenses, 
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it seems sensible to postulate that coping processes are more closely related to these 
situational parameters and change more rapidly than defenses. 
 To sum up, the metaphor used in the title of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (R. L. Stevenson, 
1886), where the same person has two very different appearances, does not apply, on a 
conceptual level at least, to the debate on the differentiation between defense and coping. We 
are probably dealing with two distinct underlying psychological processes in the form of  two 
different – and certainly at times one single - manifestations (Chabrol, & Callahan, 2004; 
Cramer, 1998a). 
 
Empirical Evidence concerning Defense and Coping 
Thus far, only very few empirical studies have investigated potential linkages between 
defenses and coping, with respect to the afore-mentioned theoretical elaborations. Callahan 
and Chabrol’s research (2004), based on the assumptions detailed in Chabrol and Callahan 
(2004), found in a questionnaire-study on a student sample (N = 190) moderate 
correspondence between mature defenses and adaptive coping, as well as between immature 
defenses and maladaptive coping (Callahan, & Chabrol, 2004). Similarly, Grebot, Paty, and 
Girard Dephanix (2006) have investigated specific relations between defense and coping in a 
questionnaire-study on a sample of psychology students (N = 184) and found partial 
confirmation of the link between mature defenses and adaptive coping (activity, self-control, 
responsibility) and partial confirmation of the link between neurotic, immature defenses and 
maladaptive coping (evasion, escape). Unfortunately, these results are based only on a series 
of Spearman correlations, which are sensitive to the multiplication of measurement errors, if 
Bonferroni corrections are not strictly applied. Since this has apperently not been done, it 
cannot be excluded that certain correlations were obtained by chance; Labouvie-Vief, Hakim-
Larson, and Hobart (1987) controlled for this bias by using canonical correlations. No 
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observer-rater method has been applied in these studies, which is a serious disadvantage, due 
to the limited face-validity of questionnaires when non-conscious aspects of a individual’s 
functioning are measured (Cramer, 1998a; the same criticism applies to the study on 
adolescents by Erickson, Feldman, & Steiner, 1997, as well as those on age-differences and 
maturation by Whitty, 2003 and by Labouvie-Vief, Hakim-Larson, & Hobart, 1987). Using 
the Defense Mechanism Rating Scales as observer-rater scale based on session-transcripts 
(DMRS; Perry, 1990a; see Method section), Hersoug, Sexton, and Hoglend (2002) found 
positive correlations between adaptive coping (measured by the questionnaire WCCL; 
Vitaliano, Russo, Carr, Maiuro, & Becker, 1985) and overall defensive functioning (ODF). 
Finally, Küchenhoff and Manz (1993) have conducted a study inspired by the Steffens and 
Kächele’s (1988) integrative model on defense and coping. The authors devised their own 
model based on several layers of consciousness associated with coping (situated on a fully 
conscious level of the individual’s functioning; measured by a self-report questionnaire) and 
defenses (situated on a fully unconscious level; measured by a observer-rater scale), as well as 
presumably pre-conscious derivates of defenses (situated in-between; measured by a 
questionnaire). The multi-layer model seemed confirmed on a sample of N = 118 patients 
presenting Morbus Crohn illness in the acute phase, but was not confirmed for the same 
patients in the rehabilitation phase.  
While the differentiation in terms of consciousness is disputed (see above), 
Küchenhoff and Manz’s study underlines the relevance of a clinical crisis situation for the 
application of research questions related to adaptational processes. In an acute crisis situation, 
the individual’s habitual adaptational profile is overwhelmed – under stress – thus, old and 
new ways of facing the situation need to be recruited by the individual, in addition to those 
used in everyday life. It can be postulated that in crisis situations, such as depressive or manic 
decompensation necessitating inpatient treatment in Bipolar Affective Disorder, the subject’s 
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defensive processes are used to regulate the individual’s internal conflicts and coping 
processes are used to regulate situation-oriented behaviors and cognitions. These processes 
need to enter a dynamic transactional relationship in a synergistic manner (Küchenhoff, & 
Manz, 1993; see also Chabrol, & Callahan, 2004; Steffens, & Kächele, 1988). A prospective 
design, similar to the Küchenhoff and Manz (1993) study, should allow the investigation of 
the impact of crisis situation on adaptational processes. This would help to understand better 
and disentangle stability from change in these processes and their links with symptomatology. 
By doing this, we would admit that the predominant symptomatology per se (either mania or 
depression) has little influence on these psychological processes partly related with 
personality, but it is the diagnosis as a whole which influences adaptational processes. Finally, 
by investigating the psychological stakes of the crisis, clinically relevant data would be 
obtained on adaptational processes for patients presenting Bipolar Affective Disorder and 
psychological treatments as adjunct to pharmacological treatments would be improved. 
 This leads us to our research hypotheses: (1) Coping and defense are two different 
processes, with limited overlap; (2) If overlap there is, adaptive defenses are related to 
adaptive coping, and maladaptive defenses are related to maladaptive coping; (3) Patients 
presenting Bipolar Affective Disorder (BD) practice less adaptive coping and less adaptive 
defenses than matched controls; (4) Defenses are stable between inpatient treatment and after 
three months, whereas coping changes over time; (5) Coping is related to either symptom 
level (mania or depression), whereas defenses are not. 
 
METHOD 
Sample 
A total of 30 inpatients with Bipolar Affective Disorders (BD) were included in the 
study. A total of 20 (67%) were female, with a mean age of 46.1 years (SD = 11.2 ; ranging 
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from 21 to 60). Their socio-demographic level was assessed by means of the total number of 
years of education in any field. On average, the patients had 12.4 years of education (SD = 
1.1 ; range from 10 to 16). All had a DSM-IV-R diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder I (either 
F30.x[296.x], F31.x[296.4x or .5x] or F31.6[296.6x]) and were included in the study 
irrespective of the nature of the most recent phase or of the level of chronicity. Some (13; 
43%) presented co-morbid disorders, such as drug abuse (23% ; cannabis, alcool, cocaine), 
personality disorders cluster C (10%), compulsive-obsessive disorders (3%), acute suicidality 
(3%) and epilepsy (3%). Diagnoses were established by trained medical staff by means of 
DIGS (Diagnostic Interview for Genetic Studies; Preisig, Fenton, Matthey, Berney, & 
Ferrero, 1999). The number of inpatient treatments in psychiatry, including current treatment, 
varied between 1 and 29 (Mean = 7.7 ; SD = 7.0). 
A strictly matched control group was introduced; matching criteria were gender, age 
and years of education, as these have an influence on defensive functioning and coping 
(Labouvie-Vief, Hakim-Larson, & Hobart, 1987; Whitty, 2003). A total of N = 30 persons 
from a community sample were recruited for the study. Out of these, 20 (67%) were female, 
with a mean age of 41.9 (SD = 14.3 ; range from 23 to 65). Their mean number of years of 
education was 12.9 (SD = 1.4 ; range from 11 to 18), corresponding to intermediate education 
level. No inpatient treatment in psychiatry is known for these participants and general 
symptomatology was in the normal range for all control participants. T-tests yielded no 
significant differences in the matching variables between the groups (see table 1). All 
participants gave written consent. 
 
Instruments 
Defense Mechanism Rating Scales (DMRS; Perry, 1990a; French translation: Perry, 
Guelfi, Despland, & Hanin, 2004). The DMRS is an observer-rater scale assessing 28 defense 
DEFENSE AND COPING IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 118
mechanisms, based on the hierarchical conception of defensive functioning by Vaillant 
(1992). Seven levels ranged according to the criteria of adaptiveness are included, from the 
least adaptive to the highly adaptive: (1) Action (acting out, passive aggression, 
hypochondriasis), (2) Borderline (splitting of self/object images,  projective identification), 
(3) Disavowal (denial, rationalisation, projection) and autistic fantasy (for further 
computation, this defense will be considered on level 3, even if conceptually distinct) (4) 
Narcissistic (omnipotence, devaluation self/other, idealization self/other), (5) Neurotic 
(repression, dissociation, reaction formation, displacement), (6) Obsessional (isolation of 
affect, intellectualization, undoing) and (7) Mature (affiliation, altruism, anticipation, self-
assertion, humour, self-observation, sublimation, suppression). Quantitative scoring has been 
used, yielding relative frequency scores per defense level, as well as an Overall Defense 
Functioning (ODF) score which can be computed by weighting the absolute frequency of the 
defenses by their level. For the current study, reliability coefficients on 20% of the ratings 
were established among fully-trained raters and yielded satisfactory results in terms of intra-
class correlation coefficients (2,1; Wirz, & Caspar, 2002; APPENDIX B2) varying between 
.70 and .99 (Mean = . 86; SD = .09; APPENDIX D2). For these reliability analyses, the 
defense level was unit of analysis (7 categories). 
  
Coping Action Patterns (CAP; Perry, Drapeau, Dunkley, & Blake, 2005; French 
translation by Kramer, & Drapeau, 2005). CAP is an observer-rating system assessing coping 
processes based on interview transcripts (Drapeau, & Perry, 2005). The rating scale 
encompasses 12 categories of coping (based on Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). 
Three general domains have been identified (relatedness, competence, autonomy) 
encompassing each four categories (“families”)  of coping. Moreover, six of the coping 
categories are conceived as coping with stress appraised as challenge (problem-solving, 
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information-seeking, self-reliance, support-seeking, accommodation, negotiation) and the 
other half as coping with stress appraised as threat (helplessness, escape, delegation, isolation, 
submission, opposition). Therefore, 12 coping categories are assessed by this instrument. 
Relative frequences are computed for all coping processes. Based on Skinner, Edge, Altman, 
et al. (2003), an  Overall Coping Functioning (OCF) score can be computed (relative 
frequency of challenge-coping). Preliminary empirical validation data have been presented by 
D’Iuso, Blake and Drapeau (2007), Drapeau and Perry (2005), Drapeau, Perry, Blake, and 
D’Iuso (2007) and Perry, Drapeau, Dunkley, Foley, Blake and Banon (2007) for the original 
English version,  Kramer (2006), Kramer, Drapeau, Perry, Bodenmann, Despland and de 
Roten (2007) and Kramer and Drapeau (in prep.) for the French version used for this study. 
For the current study, reliability coefficients on 20% of the ratings were established among 
fully-trained raters and yielded satisfactory results in terms of intra-class correlation 
coefficients (2,1; Wirtz, & Caspar, 2002; APPENDIX B2) varying between .54 and .94 (M = 
.84; SD = .10; the .54 score is the only one below .60; APPENDIX D1). These coefficients 
have been established on coping category as the unit of analysis (12 categories). Intra-class 
correlation coefficients (2,1) with the CAP authors’ group of raters vary between .51 and .83 
(M = .71; SD = .11; the .51 score is the only one below .60; see APPENDIX B4).  
 
Symptom Check List SCL-90-R (Derogatis, 1994). This questionnaire includes 90 
items addressing various somatic and psychological signs of distress. These items are scored 
using a Likert-type scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Although the instrument is 
composed of 10 subscales, our study used only the General Symptomatic Index (GSI, score 
ranging from 0 to 4), which is a mean rated over all symptoms. Clinical cut-off score is 0.80. 
The French validation study has been carried out by Pariente and Guelfi (1990) and yielded 
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satisfactory coefficients. Cronbach alpha for this sample was .98.  Mean symptom level for 
patients is higher than for controls (see table 1; range of the patients’ scores is 0.12 – 3.17).  
 
Bech-Rafaelson Mania Scale (BRMS; Bech, Rafaelson, Kramp, & Bolwig, 1978). The 
BRMS is a clinician-rated scale for manic symptoms, based on 11 items tapping activity level, 
mood, and other characteristics of mania. The items are rated on a scale from 0 (normal) to 4 
(extreme). Clinical cut-off score for mania is 15 (hypomania 6). The range of our patients’ 
scores is 0 – 12. Inter-rater reliability has proven to be high (.80 - .95; Bech, Rafaelson, 
Kramp, &, Bolwig, 1978; Altman, 2004). BPRS is effective in assessing outcome in clinical 
trials on BD (Bech, 2002). The French translation has been realized by Chambon, Poncet and 
Kiss (1989). Cronbach alpha for our patient sample was .77. 
 
Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery, & Asberg, 
1979). MADRS is a clinician-rated scale for depressive symptoms, including among others 
items on sadness, internal tensions, insomnia, appetite reduction, cognitive impairment and 
suicidal ideation. The 10 items are anchored on a scale from 0  (absence of symptoms) to 6 
(invalidating presence of symptoms). Clinical cut-off score for depression is 15.  The range of 
our patients’ scores is 0 – 38. Several validation studies have reported satisfactory coefficients 
for the original version (Montgomery, & Asberg, 1979) and concurrent validity (Kearns, 
1982; Maier, & Philipp, 1985). The French translation has been realized by Lemperière, 
Lepine, Rouillon, Hardy, Ades, Luauté and Ferrand (1984) and validation studies on this 
version yield satisfactory coefficients on specificity, homogeneity and internal consistency 
(Pellet, Decrat, Lang, Chazot, Tatu, Blanchon, & Berlier, 1987). Cronbach alpha for our 
patient sample was .89. 
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Working Alliance Inventory (WAI; Horvath, 1981; Horvath, & Greenberg, 1989). The 
WAI is originally a 36-item self-report measure assessing the quality of the therapeutic 
alliance according Bordin’s conception (1975). Responses are reported on a 7-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (always). Construct validity has been established by 
Malinckrodt, & Nelson, 1991), reliability for the whole scale ranges between .84 and .93 
(Horvath, 1994). Concurrent and predictive validity have been established (Tichenor, & Hill, 
1989; Shick Tryon, & Kane, 1993). A 12-item short version has been developed by Tracey, & 
Kokotovic (1989), based on factor-analytic procedures. Its French translation has been 
validated by Corbière, Bisson, Lauzon and Richard (2006) who suggest one general score be 
considered for the evaluation of alliance. Cronbach alpha for this patient sample was .87. 
 
Procedure 
 All patients and controls were asked to participate in a dynamic interview (Perry, 
Fowler, & Semeniuk, 2005) lasting 50 minutes. Dynamic interview (DI) as a research tool has 
been developed from clinical practice of psychodynamic psychotherapy; thus, the context of 
DI is comparable to the context of an intake psychotherapy interview (Perry, personal 
communication). It has been widely used in psychotherapy research (Perry & Cooper, 1989 ; 
Hoglend & Perry, 1998). As shown by Perry, Fowler and Semeniuk (2005) and Fowler and 
Perry (2005), high-quality dynamic interviews are associated with Interviewer’s and Overall 
Dynamic Interview Adequacy (I-DIA and O-DIA). Five tasks of the interviewer compose the 
I-DIA : (1) Setting the interview frame : work-enhancing strategies ; (2) Offering support : 
questions, support strategies, associations ; (3) Exploration of affect : questions, reflections, 
clarifications, low-level defense interpretations ; (4) Trial interpretations : defense and 
transference interpretations; (5) Offering a synthesis. In particular, exploring affect and trial 
interpretations are highly correlated with O-DIA, when the patient’s contribution is controlled 
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for (Perry, Fowler, & Semeniuk, 2005). The author completed an intensive one-week-training 
at Austen Riggs Center, Stockbridge, USA, and later underwent regular supervision with 
senior supervisors in psychodynamic psychotherapy. All interviews were conducted in French 
by the author.  
All inpatients participated in the dynamic interview, as soon as their symptomatic state 
allowed it. This means that the patients were included in the final third of the duration of 
inpatient treatment, shortly before discharge. Only two patients had to be excluded from the 
study due to non-feasibility of the research interview; all other patients responding to the 
inclusion criteria and willing to participate were included. The patients were given treatment 
as usual, encompassing non-specific supportive therapy and medication. All patients were 
appointed for a second interview at a three-month interval. Only N = 18 patients respected 
this appointment, despite great efforts on the part of the researcher. At the second interview, 
the patients were all discharged from inpatient treatment. Along with the dynamic interview, 
the evaluation procedure encompassed clinician-ratings of depression and mania. The patients 
were given the questionnaires at the end of the interview and were asked to fill them in and 
send them back within two days. The study was endorsed by the expert ethical committee of 
the psychiatric hospital. 
 The control group was recruited by means of two local institutions : (1) School of 
Social Studies (n = 17) ; (2) Association promoting Community Activities and Service (n = 
13). Matching criteria were transparently issued at the outset of the control group recruitment. 
Therefore, only nine participants had to be refused from participation due to failure to meet 
the matching criteria. The control participants, unlike the patients who were not paid, were 
given a contribution (the equivalent of USD 16). The study was endorsed by the expert ethical 
committee of the School of Social Studies. 
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All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed by Master’s-level psychology 
students, according to the method defined by Mergenthaler and Stigler (1997).  
Interviews were rated based on the transcripts. All DMRS ratings were done by the 
author; reliability of these ratings was established with fully-trained colleagues and 
supervisors on a randomly chosen 20% of all interviews (for the results see under 
Instruments). For CAP, in-depth training during four months and supervision was organized 
for all raters. Four Master’s-level-psychology students were trained by the author and 
reliability was established on a dyadic basis among the student raters, between the student 
raters and the trainer and between the student raters and the authors of the CAP-method. A 
randomly chosen 20% of all interviews was rated by two raters independently, in order to 
establish inter-rater reliability checks (results see under Instruments).  
 
 Data Analytic Strategy 
Pearson’s and canonical correlations (Tabachnik, & Fidell, 1996) were carried out (on 
the patient’s first interviews only) in order to test our first and second hypotheses. For a more 
detailed understanding, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA; method PCA, Principal 
Components Analysis, results after VARIMAX rotation) on both interviews taken as a whole, 
separately for patients and controls, was carried out. Multivariate statistics were performed in 
order to test our third and fourth hypotheses, applying Bonferroni correction. In addition, we 
implemented Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM; Bryk, & Raudenbush, 1987), to deal 
optimally with data dependency between the first and second session; sessions (level 1) are 
nested within participants (level 2). In assessing change, HLM avoids the limiting 
assumptions of exploratory repeated measures MANOVA by taking into account each 
individual’s trajectory of scores over time. A mixed model (group as fixed factor) predicting 
alternatively ODF and OCF was carried out (for level 1: ODF or OCF = β0j + β1j + ε;  for level 
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2: β0j = γ00 + γ01 + u0j ; β1j = γ10 + γ11 + u1j). For computation, we used the program MixReg 
(Hedeker, & Gibbons, 1996). Finally, linear regression analyses were used to test the 
relationship between defenses and symptoms. 
 
RESULTS 
Comparison between Defense and Coping 
Canonical correlations on the patient’s first session showed a non-significant, however 
moderat, effect between DMRS-ODF and CAP-OCF (t = 2.00; p = .06; Pearson’s correlation: 
r = .45, ns) and a non-significant overall effect on 7 DMRS-levels and 12 CAP categories (t = 
1.02, ns; see table 2). Exploratory factor analytic procedures (after VARIMAX rotation) 
yielded for patients a first factor called “Maladaptive Processes” (significant item loadings for 
borderline defenses, helplessness coping; explaining 10.39% of the variance; Eigenvalue 
2.61) and a second factor called “Coping” (significant item loadings for isolation CAP, 
problem-solving CAP, accommodation CAP, submission CAP; explaining another 10.06% of 
the variance; Eigenvalue 2.36). These first two factors account for 20.46% of the variance 
(see table 3). For controls, the same procedure yielded a first factor called “Adaptive 
Processes” (significant item loadings for mature defenses and support-seeking CAP; 
explaining 10.69% of the variance; Eigenvalue 2.79) and a second factor called “Coping” 
(significant item loadings for escape CAP, delegation CAP, and accommodation CAP; 
explaining another 10.36% of the variance; Eigenvalue 2.14). These first two factors account 
for 21.04% of the variance (see table 4). 
 
Defense and Coping in BD  
Multivariate statistics carried out on the first session yielded several results in terms of 
between-group differences for defense and coping (table 5). Overall, ODF and OCF are both 
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lower in patients, compared to controls. At inpatient treatment, BD patients practice fewer 
mature, fewer obsessional, but more neurotic, more narcissistic, more borderline and more 
action defenses. With regard to coping, BD patients practice less self-reliance, less 
accommodation and more opposition in inpatient treatment.   
No effect for either of these variables was observed when we compared subgroups of 
patients according to their predominant symptomatology, mania or depression, at first session 
(median-split method applied). No effect was found with regard to the status of the patients 
(completers v non-completers). 
  
 Stability of Defense and Coping in BD 
Multivariate statistics carried out on the second session (N = 18 per group, see table 6) 
yielded also several between-group differences. First of all, ODF remains significantly 
different, whereas there is no longer any difference in OCF. With regard to defenses at second 
session, mature and obsessional ones are less practiced by the patients, whereas neurotic and 
action are more practiced by the patients, compared to controls. For coping, support-seeking 
is more practiced by the patients, whereas self-reliance is less practiced by the patients, 
compared to controls. In exploratory MANOVA repeated measures (not reported in the 
tables) encompassing the same sets of variables, no session main (within-subject) effect was 
found, several between-group main effects were found (for all variables yielding an ES 
greater than .32, according to table 6) and only one interaction effect was found: Overall 
Coping Functioning (within-subject effect: F(1, 34) = 0.08, ns; between-group effect: F(1, 34) 
= 8.80, p = .01; interaction effect: F(1, 34) = 2.98, p = .05) . In order to deal with the potential 
shortcomings of MANOVA repeated measures, i.e., equivalence and non-correlatedness of 
error variances, a nested design as used in HLM is preferable for testing the evolution of 
coping and defensive functioning over time. Table 7 reports the results on sessions nested 
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within participants. It appears that there is, for both ODF and OCF, a highly significant group 
effect; patients present lower scores. Moreover, similar to the repeated measure statistic, OCF 
shows a significant interaction effect (group x session) meaning that, in the second session, 
the patients present similar OCF scores to the controls, unlike in the first session. This 
interaction effect was not found for ODF, meaning that the patients present invariably lower 
scores in both sessions, compared to controls. 
 
Defense and Coping in BD and Symptom Level 
Linear regression analysis (method enter) on ODF and OCF predicting general (GSI) 
and specific (BRMS and MADRS) symptomatology yielded no significant relationship 
whatsoever between the variables (GSI: R² = .06; p = .60; BRMS: R² = .02; p = .81; MADRS: 
R² = .00; p = .94). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The results corroborate parts of our hypotheses. First of all, as far as the links between 
defenses and coping are concerned, we have found marginal significance for overall 
adaptational functioning and a limited number of correlations between specific processes. If 
there are significant linkages, they all go in the direction postulated: immature defenses 
pertain to maladaptive coping, (e.g., action, borderline and narcissistic defenses with 
opposition coping); mature defenses with adaptive coping (e.g., with self-reliance and 
accommodation coping). Most importantly, there are many non-significant links suggesting 
that we are probably dealing with two separate underlying psychological processes (Cramer, 
1998a; see also the results from the factor analysis), even if there is some limited overlap. By 
and large, these results tend to confirm convergent validity for general indices of adaptiveness 
(ODF and OCF) and tentative divergent validity for the specific adaptational processes. 
DEFENSE AND COPING IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 127
 The application of the adaptiveness concepts to the clinical diagnosis of Bipolar 
Affective Disorder has yielded several other noteworthy results. Immature defenses are 
convincingly associated with BD, compared to matched controls. Furthermore, maladaptive 
processes, such as borderline defenses and helplessness coping also had the highest item 
loadings for the patient’s first factor (in EFA), unlike in controls, where adaptive processes 
define the first factor (e.g., mature defenses, support-seeking coping). However, only one 
coping category when stress is appraised as threat, opposition, was linked with the diagnosis. 
We hypothesize that this is an argument in favor of coping as a state-concept, implying 
situation-induced micro-fluctuations that we were not completely able to detect by means of 
our design. 
Our hypothesis regarding stability and change in overall defensive and coping 
functioning is tentatively confirmed. The afore-mentioned picture regarding between-group 
differences is highly relevant for the crisis situation of inpatient treatment, but is less 
convincing for the second session. The importance of the symptomatic decompensation 
leading up to inpatient treatment as a moment of crisis for the patients, not only on a 
symptomatic level, but also on the level of adaptational processes, suggests a breakdown in 
habitual adaptational patterns (Chabrol, & Callahan, 2004; Küchenhoff, & Manz, 1993). 
Steffens and Kächele (1988; see also Hartman, 1958) would add that in such situations, the 
individual has a double agenda: (1) Contain negative affect related to internal conflicts based 
on the presence of neurotic fear; in other words, use defense mechanisms to create a conflict-
free zone where the Ego can (2) Engage in concrete strategies to reduce the stress (elicited 
this time by realistic anxiety; “Realangst”), as a coping process. On the one hand, as also 
suggested by preliminary multivariate analyses, defensive functioning remains overall stable 
in BD patients, irrespective of the presence of a crisis. On the other hand, the level of coping 
functioning increases after the resolution of the crisis situation and once again comes within 
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the range of the controls’ functioning at the second interview. Hence, stability is associated 
with defenses and change with coping in BD patients undergoing inpatient treatment. This 
probable validation of our fourth assumption leads to the distinction between trait- and state-
aspects in adaptational processes (Cramer, 1998a). Coping as situation-induced competence 
variable is sensitive to input variables (such as type of stressor, context), whereas defenses as 
a personality-related variable depend mainly on the presence of internal idiosyncratic conflicts 
to be contained. Thus, parts of Steffens and Kächele’s (1988) integrative model is 
corroborated by our data.  
This study did not confirm our last hypothesis regarding relations between 
adaptational processes and level of symptoms. Two explanations might be at stake: (1) 
Adaptational processes and symptoms are linked on the contextual level in terms of group-
differences, but not on the micro-level in terms of specific associations, suggesting 
independency and limited confounds between these variables; (2) Symptom level in BD is 
highly biologically determined and not related to psychological-adaptational processes as 
such. These explanations warrant further studies, especially by comparing with other clinical 
situations and diagnoses, e.g. personality disorders. 
Finally, in what respect are these results useful for a clinician working on the ward to 
enhance inpatient crisis intervention for BD patients? It is noteworthy that opposition coping 
increases in the crisis situation. Dysphoric mood and aggression – such as related to 
opposition coping – are vulnerability factors associated with increased suicide risk in BD 
(Newman, 2004; see also for suicide prevention in BD: Ellis, & Newman, 1996; Rizvi, & 
Zaretsky, 2007). Thus, in-depth assessment of suicidality level is indicated in these 
oppositional inpatients. Moreover, for psychotherapy, it is important for the clinician to know 
about the stability of overall defensive functioning, irrespective of the crisis. It is also of 
relevance for the clinician to be aware that coping functioning changes more rapidly than 
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defensive functioning. Short-term treatment strategies should therefore focus on the former, 
with skills-training being proposed (Linehan, 1993), whereas defensive functioning would 
need long-term rehabilitative treatment strategies, with interpretative or clarification-oriented 
work being used (Yeomans, Clarkin, & Kernberg, 2002; Sachse, 2003). 
There are several limitations to this study. Whereas the number of subjects in the first 
session is certainly acceptable for our analyses, the lower number in the second limits the 
validity of its results. In relation to this, EFA yielded a limited percentage of variance 
explained by the first two factors. Co-morbidity limits internal validity of the trial. 
Furthermore, participants in the control group were not randomly chosen due to matching 
criteria and the voluntary status of participation and thus, their adaptational profiles are not 
representative of the population; generalizations need to be applied with great care. 
Adaptational processes depend on the type and level of stress (Vaillant, 1977) which we did 
not completely control for, as we used an observer-rater methodology that takes into account 
all types of stress and conflicts, without further distinction. Finally, the data yielded by 
observer-rater methods applied on transcripts have been analysed on a session level; a 
sequential within-session micro-analysis of adaptational processes (Chabrol, & Callahan, 
2004 for theoretical assumptions) has not been conducted. 
DEFENSE AND COPING IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 130
Table 1 
Socio-Demographics and Symptoms for Patients and Controls  
Patients (N = 30) Controls (N = 30)  
Criteria Mean SD Mean SD 
 
T(1,58) 
 
p 
Age 
Education (N Years) 
Gender (Female) 
Intimate relationship¹ 
Life situation 
  With partner 
  With partner & siblings 
  Alone 
  Alone with siblings 
  With parents 
  Institution 
GSI² ³ 
Mania (BRMS)² 
Depression (MADRS)² 
46.14 
12.37 
67% 
37% 
 
30% 
3% 
43% 
10% 
7% 
7% 
1.24 
3.10 
12.87 
11.20 
1.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.87 
2.94 
10.40 
41.90 
12.87 
67% 
40% 
 
30% 
7% 
40% 
10% 
13% 
0% 
0.48 
14.33 
1.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.23 
1.28 
-1.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.47 
.12 
.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.00 
Note. GSI : General Symptom Index of Symptom Checklist SCL-90-R 
¹Considered as stable intimate relationship when lasting longer than 2 years 
² Measured at first interview 
³N(patients) = 13 ; N(controls) = 18 
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Table 2 
Canonical Correlations (t-values) between Defense and Coping (N = 30) 
DMRS 
CAP 
Mat Obses Neur Narc Disav Border Act 
PS 
IS 
H 
E 
SR 
SS 
D 
I 
A 
N 
S 
O 
1.66 
0.77 
-0.02 
-1.66 
4.00** 
-0.78 
-1.08 
-0.54 
3.31** 
1.92 
-0.16 
-2.86** 
1.35 
0.64 
1.26 
1.09 
1.19 
-0.69 
-0.55 
-0.55 
-0.45 
1.06 
-1.70 
-1.60 
-1.53 
-0.07 
-0.35 
0.53 
-1. 58 
-0.37 
-0.42 
0.29 
-1.11 
-0.42 
1.45 
-0.36 
0.21 
-1.03 
-0.91 
-0.90 
-1.44 
0.30 
1.14 
-1.14 
-0.11 
-1.16 
-0.17 
2.33* 
-0.06 
-0.42 
-0.57 
0.58 
-0.42 
0.25 
0.15 
1.96 
0.26 
-0.41 
1.24 
-1.27 
-1.34 
-0.32 
0.66 
0.39 
-1.63 
1.82 
0.51 
0.37 
-1.37 
-1.52 
-0.29 
4.15** 
2.52* 
0.34 
0.21 
0.78 
-2.01* 
0.50 
0.85 
0.19 
-2.55** 
-0.66 
-0.12 
3.09** 
Note. CAP: Coping Action Patterns; PS: Problem-solving; IS: Information-seeking; H: 
Helplessness; E: Escape; SR: Self-reliance; SS: Support-seeking; D: Delegation; I: Isolation; 
A: Accommodation; N: Negotiation; S: Submission; O: Opposition. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 3 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), Principal Component Analysis, both Sessions, after 
VARIMAX Rotation, on Patients 
Patients (N = 48) Items 
I: Maladaptive II: Coping 
Obsessional Defenses 
Borderline Defenses 
CAP Helplessness 
CAP Negotiation 
CAP Opposition 
CAP Accommodation 
CAP Problem-solving 
CAP Isolation 
CAP Info-seeking 
CAP Submission 
-.21 
.91 
.84 
-.37 
.20 
-.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.58 
-.72 
.68 
.22 
.64 
Note. Item loadings below |.20| not reported and item loadings above |.50| in italics.  
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Table 4 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), Principal Component Analysis, both Sessions, after 
VARIMAX Rotation, on Controls 
 
 
 
 
 
Controls (N = 48) Items 
I: Adaptive II: Coping 
Mature Defenses 
CAP Info-seeking 
CAP Opposition 
Obsessional Defenses 
CAP Escape 
CAP Support-seeking 
CAP Accommodation 
Neurotic Defenses 
CAP Helplessness 
CAP Delegation 
.81 
-.29 
 
  
-.38   
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.40 .36 
.64 -.36 
.81 .26 
-.56 .31 
 -.23 
 .43 
.82  
Note. Item loadings below |.20| not reported and item loadings above |.50| in italics. 
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Table 5 
Between-Group Differences with regard to Defense and Coping: First Session (N = 30) 
Patients Controls Defense/Coping 
M SD M SD 
F (1, 59) 
 
ES 
DMRS 
N (defenses) 
ODF 
Mature  
Obsessional 
Neurotic 
Narcissistic 
Disavowal 
Borderline 
Action 
CAP 
N (coping) 
OCF 
Problem-solving 
Info-seeking 
Helplessness 
Escape 
Self-Reliance 
Support-Seeking 
Delegation 
Isolation 
 
32.77 
3.77 
4.70 
14.12 
11.68 
18.94 
33.36 
8.06 
9.14 
 
19.60 
.46 
1.84 
7.49 
6.63 
14.94 
11.53 
12.10 
6.28 
3.17 
 
9.32 
0.38 
6.10 
9.38 
11.10 
12.91 
9.24 
6.87 
6.40 
 
7.04 
.17 
3.45 
7.60 
5.91 
11.68 
9.41 
7.32 
6.48 
4.59 
 
31.20 
4.80 
21.89 
25.20 
8.00 
12.84 
24.43 
3.03 
4.61 
 
22.80 
.67 
4.13 
10.04 
5.10 
11.49 
22.76 
9.78 
3.80 
2.86 
 
10.12 
0.57 
12.17 
12.29 
4.80 
8.73 
8.50 
4.69 
5.42 
 
9.36 
.18 
6.77 
9.01 
6.21 
8.81 
12.57 
13.54 
5.71 
4.24 
 
0.39 
67.36** 
47.83** 
15.42** 
2.79 
4.59* 
15.21** 
10.98** 
8.78** 
 
2.24 
22.34** 
2.74 
1.40 
0.95 
1.67 
15.37** 
0.68 
2.47 
0.07 
 
0.16 
2.13 
1.79 
1.02 
0.43 
0.55 
1.01 
0.86 
0.76 
 
0.39 
1.20 
0.43 
0.31 
0.25 
0.33 
1.01 
0.21 
0.41 
0.07 
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Accommodation 
Negotiation 
Submission 
Opposition 
10.08 
2.82 
7.84 
15.26 
8.93 
4.25 
8.06 
12.11 
15.60 
5.06 
5.21 
4.17 
10.82 
5.71 
6.86 
4.78 
4.63* 
2.97 
1.86 
21.79** 
0.56 
0.45 
0.35 
1.20 
Note. MANOVA: Defenses: F (7, 52) = 10.43; p = .00; Coping: F (12, 47) = 3.94; p = .00. 
DMRS: Defense Mechanisms Rating Scales; ODF: Overall Defensive Functioning; CAP: 
Coping Action Patterns; OCF: Overall Coping Functioning; Bonferroni’s correction applied 
(significance level .05/2 or .01/2). 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 6 
Between-Group Differences with regard to Defense and Coping: Second Session (n = 18) 
Patients Controls Defenses/Coping 
M SD M SD 
F (1, 35) ES 
DMRS 
N (defenses) 
ODF 
Mature  
Obsessional 
Neurotic 
Narcissistic 
Disavowal 
Borderline 
Action 
CAP 
N (coping) 
OCF 
Problem-solving 
Info-seeking 
Helplessness 
Escape 
Self-Reliance 
Support-Seeking 
Delegation 
Isolation 
 
33.61 
4.01 
10.55 
13.95 
13.23 
13.06 
34.45 
6.79 
7.96 
 
19.89 
.55 
2.54 
13.28 
6.54 
15.65 
10.29 
13.22 
8.97 
3.02 
 
21.12 
0.52 
9.48 
11.83 
8.19 
7.75 
8.44 
5.13 
7.95 
 
7.90 
.16 
5.04 
6.84 
10.14 
10.06 
6.20 
8.90 
13.68 
4.72 
 
35.61 
4.70 
19.30 
24.18 
7.07 
10.46 
31.45 
4.40 
3.14 
 
23.78 
.61 
3.55 
12.35 
9.21 
13.98 
16.86 
7.04 
3.87 
2.52 
 
11.81 
0.57 
12.27 
8.49 
5.49 
7.96 
10.09 
7.76 
3.57 
 
8.38 
.17 
4.83 
7.52 
11.55 
9.22 
10.31 
5.95 
4.70 
4.03 
 
0.12 
12.02** 
4.77* 
8.87** 
7.04* 
0.99 
0.94 
1.19 
5.50* 
 
2.05 
1.53 
0.37 
0.15 
0.55 
0.27 
5.37* 
5.99* 
2.24 
0.11 
 
0.12 
1.27 
0.80 
0.99 
0.88 
0.33 
0.32 
0.36 
0.78 
 
0.48 
0.36 
0.20 
0.13 
0.25 
0.17 
0.77 
0.82 
0.50 
0.11 
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Accommodation 
Negotiation 
Submission 
Opposition 
11.81 
3.41 
2.65 
8.62 
9.21 
4.46 
4.00 
9.25 
14.68 
6.84 
4.04 
5.05 
9.22 
8.67 
5.40 
6.10 
0.87 
2.24 
0.76 
1.87 
0.31 
0.50 
0.29 
0.46 
Note. MANOVA: Defenses: F (7, 28) = 4.33; p = .00; Coping-Challenge: F (6, 29) = 2.40; p 
= .05; Coping-Threat: F (6, 29) = 1.21; p = .33. DMRS: Defense Mechanisms Rating Scales; 
ODF: Overall Defensive Functioning; CAP: Coping Action Patterns; OCF: Overall Coping 
Functioning; Bonferroni’s correction applied (significance level .05/3 or .01/3). 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 7 
Mixed model predicting Changes in ODF and OCF between First and Second Session, as a 
function of Group 
Variable Estimate SE Z p-value 
ODF 
 Session 
 Group 
 
-0.25 
-0.93 
 
0.23 
0.26 
 Interaction 0.38 0.34 
 
-1.05 
-3.59 
1.12 
 
.29 
.00 
.26 
OCF 
 Session 
 Group 
    
-0.05 0.05 -1.05 .30 
-0.19 0.05 -3.51 .00 
 Interaction 0.12 0.07 1.79 
Note. Nested design using Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM). ODF: Overall Defensive 
Functioning; OCF: Overall Coping Functioning; SE: Standard Error. 
.05 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter E 
 
 Too much Positive Thinking? Cognitive Errors in Bipolar Affective Disorder: Relations with 
Symptoms and Therapeutic Alliance 
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ABSTRACT 
 The construct of cognitive errors is clinically relevant for cognitive treatment of Mood 
Disorders. Beck’s universality hypothesis postulates the relevance of negative cognitions in 
all subtypes of Mood Disorders, as well as positive cognitions for manic states. This 
hypothesis has rarely been empirically addressed for patients presenting Bipolar Affective 
Disorder (BD). Inpatients (N = 30) presenting BD were interviewed twice, as were 30 
participants of a matched control group. Valid and reliable observer-rater methodology for 
cognitive errors was applied to the session-transcripts. Overall, patients make more cognitive 
errors than controls. When manic and depressive patients were compared, parts of the 
universality hypothesis were confirmed. Manic symptoms are related to positive and negative 
cognitive errors, whereas depressive symptoms hinder only the production of positive 
cognitive errors. Finally, the therapeutic alliance was impeded by the presence of selective 
abstraction errors. These results are discussed with regard to the main assumptions of the 
cognitive model for depression; thus adding an argument for extending it to the BD diagnostic 
group, by taking into consideration specificities in terms of cognitive errors. Clinical 
implications for cognitive therapy of BD are suggested. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key-Words: Cognitive Errors, Bipolar Affective Disorder, Observer-Rater Method, 
Cognitive Therapy 
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TOO MUCH POSITIVE THINKING? COGNITIVE ERRORS IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE 
DISORDER: RELATIONS WITH SYMPTOMS AND ALLIANCE 
 
 Introduced in 1963 by A. T. Beck, the concept of cognitive errors (or more generally 
cognitive distorsion) has become one of the central features of cognitive theory and therapy 
for depression (J. Beck, 1995; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). Beck (1963) observed that the  
main suffering in depressive patients is not caused by affective disturbances, but by 
pervasiveness of inaccuracy in interpreting reality – errors in logic - in such a way that the 
result is a generalized negative bias against themselves; this assumption was called 
“negativity hypothesis” (see also Beck, 1991; Peterson & Seligman, 1984). According to the 
constructivist cognitive theory (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Beck, 1991), normal 
functioning, on the contrary, would not mean complete accuracy to reality, the latter being 
always an individual’s construction, but an “adaptive” way of information processing. Hence, 
theoretically, normal cognitive functioning is characterized by a slightly positive bias which, 
when the individual shifts into depressive mood (called “negative cognitive shift”; Beck, 
1967), fades away and, little by little, is replaced by a negative bias. Finally, along with a 
series of other hypotheses, Beck (1967; 1976; 1991; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999) defines the 
“universality hypothesis” as follows: “Heightened negative cognition, reduced positive 
thinking, and self-referent negativity processing bias are evident in all subtypes of 
depression” (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; p. 159). With more detail for Bipolar Affective 
Disorders, Beck (1991) postulates overly positive biases in individuals in manic episodes and 
overly negative biases when they are in depressive episodes (see also Leahy, 2003; Newman, 
Leahy, Beck, Reilly-Harrington, & Gyulai, 2001). The present study aims at testing part of 
the universality hypothesis, by focusing on cognitive errors in Bipolar Affective Disorder 
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(BD). Empirical evidence on this hypothesis will be reviewed and methodological issues 
related to assessment of cognitive processes discussed, before we address our specific 
research questions related to BD. 
 Results from previous empirical work on cognitive errors (CE) confirm Beck’s 
hypotheses (Clark, Beck & Alford, 1999) for patients presenting unipolar depression. 
Depressed persons show more CE than non-depressed (Hammen, 1978; Hammen & Krantz, 
1976; Krantz & Hammen, 1979). More specifically, the category of selective abstraction (SA) 
yielded a particularly great between-group difference, greater than the category of 
personalization (P). For patients presenting low-back pain, overgeneralization (OG) is most 
often reported, compared to all other errors (Lefebvre, 1981). However, the author 
acknowledges that the latter result may possibly be induced by the formulation of the 
questionnaire, which focuses on contents related to low-back pain. As shown by Weintraub, 
Segal, and Beck (1974), CE are persistent across phases of unipolar depression and remission, 
and function thus as a vulnerability factor in relapse in depression-prone individuals. An 
experimental-mood-induction study on non-depressed subjects was conducted by Henriques 
and Leitenberg (2002), who found that the ratio of negative-to-positive CE predicted best the 
outcome variables (e.g., self-esteem, mood change). Focusing on information-processing 
underlying cognitive distortions, experimentally-controlled research designs using various 
tasks investigated mood biases in depressives: Matthews and Antes (1992) found a difference 
in eye fixations in dysphorics, who tend to fix the sad regions of a pictural stimulus longer 
and more often, compared to controls. A widely-studied argument for attentional biases in 
depression (and anxiety) is the Stroop inference effect, which has been replicated many times, 
although yielding contradictory results (inference effect found: see Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997 ; no inference effect found: Doost, Taghavi, Moradi, Yule, & 
Dalgleish, 1997; for a critical discussion see Eells, Fridhandler, Stinson, & Horowitz, 1993). 
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Mood-congruency between encoding and retrieval has also been found to be an important 
context-variable for the retrieval of words (Davis, 1979; Ingram, Partidge, Scott, & Bernet, 
1994), supporting Beck’s selective processing hypothesis (Clark, Beck, Alford, 1999). Even if 
these studies tend to confirm Beck’s assumptions and more generally the cognitive model of 
unipolar depression, it is doubtful that the results of such laboratory studies are directly 
applicable to clinical contexts, such as enhancement of the cognitive case conceptualization 
and the psychotherapeutic intervention (see below). 
 With regard to patients presenting Bipolar Affective Disorder (BD) I or II, there is 
some tentative evidence that Beck’s universality hypothesis concerning the presence of 
negative cognition across all subtypes of depression, holds true (Clark, Beck & Alford, 1999). 
A questionnaire has been devised aiming at assessing hypomanic cognitions (Mansell & 
Jones, 2006), which succeeded in differentiating BD patients from controls: the former 
present higher scores related to hypomania, compared to the latter. Weingartner, Miller, and 
Murphy (1977) conducted a word-encoding study on 8 BD patients and showed that the recall 
is better in the case of mood-congruency, compared to mood-incongruency. Eich, Macaulay, 
and Lam (1997) were unable to reproduce the congruency-effect on word-recall (N = 10 BD 
rapid-cyclers), but reproduced it on auto-biographical events. Although statistical power of 
these studies is limited, it can be tentatively concluded that there may be cognitive specificity 
in BD patients in terms of cognitive errors. However, especially in the case of hypomanic and 
manic symptoms, it is not clear if these symptom phases are characterized by an increased 
level of positive errors or a decrease in negative ones, or any other cognitive pattern. 
Consequently, the same doubt persists for depressive symptoms in BD. 
 Assessment of cognitive errors has traditionally been done by means of self-report 
measures (e.g., Lefebvre, 1981); these methods might be useful in some contexts, on 
condition that the individual is aware of his or her own errors in cognitive processing (for 
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other limitations of self-report measures, such as social desirability, tendency to acquiescing 
and self-deception, see Cramer, 1998a; Tschuschke, Pfleiderer, Denzinger, Hertenstein, 
Kächele, & Arnold, 1994). In highly disturbed patients, this is rarely the case. This has led 
recent researchers to devise standardized experimental testing procedures (see above, for 
depression see Jermann, Van der Linden, Adam, Ceschi, & Perroud, 2005). These tests, 
inspired by neuropsychological research paradigms, might be useful for testing a specific 
hypothesis in fundamental research, but suffer from a lack of external validity and are 
therefore of limited direct relevance for psychotherapeutic practice, also because they are 
based on aggregated data sets (see the limitations of application of neuropsychological 
research to psychotherapy practice outlined by Eells, Fridhandler, Stinson, & Horowitz, 1993 
and by Clark, Beck, & Altman, 1999). Finally, the CE Rating Scale (Drapeau, Perry, & 
Dunkley, 2005) was devised, in order to compensate optimally for the shortcomings of the 
two afore-mentioned research paradigms, i.e., self-reports and neuropsychological tests, and 
to offer valid conceptualization of CE by using observer ratings of CE, based on transcripts of 
psychotherapy sessions (see Method section). 
Taking Beck’s negativity and universality hypotheses as a basis, we can formulate the 
following research hypotheses: (1) BD display more cognitive errors, in total and per 
category, than controls; (2) Patients with predominantly manic symptoms display more 
positive cognitive errors, whereas patients with predominantly depressive symptoms more 
negative cognitive errors; (3) A higher proportion of cognitive errors in patients is associated 
with higher symptom level and negative symptom evolution; (4) A higher proportion of 
cognitive errors in patients is associated with lower levels of therapeutic alliance. 
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METHOD 
Sample 
A total of 30 inpatients with Bipolar Affective Disorders (BD) were included in the 
study. A total of 20 (67%) were female, with a mean age of 46.1 years (SD = 11.2 ; ranging 
from 21 to 60). Their socio-demographic level was assessed by means of the total number of 
years of education in any field. On average, the patients had 12.4 years of education (SD = 
1.1 ; range from 10 to 16). All had a DSM-IV-R diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder I (either 
F30.x[296.x], F31.x[296.4x or .5x] or F31.6[296.6x]) and were included in the study 
irrespective of the nature of the most recent phase or of the level of chronicity. Some (13; 
43%) presented co-morbid disorders, such as drug abuse (23% ; cannabis, alcool, cocaine), 
personality disorders cluster C (10%), compulsive-obsessive disorders (3%), acute suicidality 
(3%) and epilepsy (3%). Diagnoses were established by trained medical staff by means of 
DIGS (Diagnostic Interview for Genetic Studies; Preisig, Fenton, Matthey, Berney, & 
Ferrero, 1999). The number of inpatient treatments in psychiatry, including current treatment, 
varied between 1 and 29 (Mean = 7.7 ; SD = 7.0). 
A strictly matched control group was introduced; matching criteria were gender, age 
and years of education,  as these have an influence on cognitive functioning (Labouvie-Vief, 
Hakim-Larson, & Hobart, 1987; Whitty, 2003). A total of N = 30 persons from a community 
sample were recruited for the study. Out of these, 20 (67%) were female, with a mean age of 
41.9 (SD = 14.3 ; range from 23 to 65). Their mean number of years of education was 12.9 
(SD = 1.4 ; range from 11 to 18), corresponding to intermediate education level. No inpatient 
treatment in psychiatry is known for these participants and general symptomatology was in 
the normal range for all control participants. T-tests yielded no significant differences in the 
matching variables between the groups (see table 1). All participants gave written consent. 
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Instruments 
Cognitive Errors CE (Drapeau, Perry, & Dunkley, 2005; French translation by 
Kramer, & Drapeau, 2005; APPENDIX E1) is an observer-rating system assessing cognitive 
errors in interview transcripts (Drapeau, & Perry, 2005). It assesses 14 different cognitive 
errors, based on J. Beck (1995) and A. T. Beck (1976): (1) Fortune-telling, (2) Labeling, (3) 
Overgeneralizing, (4) All-or-nothing, (5) Discounting the positive/negative, (6) Emotional 
reasoning, (7) Magnification/minimization of positive/negative, (8) Mental filter, (9) Should 
and must, (10) Tunnel vision, (11) Jumping to conclusions, (12) Mind-reading, (13) 
Personalization, (14) Inappropriate blaming of self. All errors are broken down according to 
their valence: positive and negative. According to Lefebvre (1981), they can be classified in 
four higher-order categories: fortune-telling (error 1); overgeneralizing (errors 2 and 3); 
selective abstraction (errors 4 through 11); personalization (errors 12 through 14). According 
to Henriques and Leitenberg (2002), an overall ratio can be computed by dividing the 
proportion of negative CE by the proportion of positive CE. For all computations, relative 
frequencies are used, by weighting the absolute frequency of each error by the number of 
words emitted by the patient (excluding therapist interventions and patient’s hesitations) 
yielding a score for each error per 1000 words. Preliminary empirical validation data have 
been presented by D’Iuso, Blake and Drapeau (2007), Drapeau and Perry (2005), Drapeau, 
Perry, Blake, and D’Iuso (2007) and Perry, Drapeau, Dunkley, Foley, Blake and Banon 
(2007)  for the original English version, Kramer (2006a) and Kramer and Drapeau (in prep.; 
see APPENDICES E3 and E4) for the French version used for this study. For the current 
study, reliability coefficients on 20% of the ratings were established among fully-trained 
raters and yielded satisfactory results in terms of intra-class correlation coefficients (2,1; 
Wirtz, & Caspar, 2002; APPENDIX B2) varying between .48 and .95 (M = .80; SD = .12; the 
.48 ICC value being an exception, the second-lowest value in this distribution was .62; 
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APPENDIX E2). These coefficients were established on single errors broken down into 
positive and negative valence as unit of analysis (28 categories). Intra-class correlation 
coefficients (2,1) with the CE authors’ group of raters vary between .51 and .83 (M = .71; SD 
= .11; the .51 rating is the only one below .60; APPENDIX B4).  
 
Symptom Check List SCL-90-R (Derogatis, 1994). This questionnaire includes 90 
items addressing various somatic and psychological signs of distress. These items are scored 
using a Likert-type scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Although the instrument is 
composed of 10 subscales, our study used only the General Symptomatic Index (GSI, score 
ranging from 0 to 4), which is a mean rated over all symptoms. Clinical cut-off score is 0.80. 
The French validation study has been carried out by Pariente and Guelfi (1990) and yielded 
satisfactory coefficients. Cronbach alpha for this sample was .98.  Mean symptom level for 
patients is higher than for controls (see table 1; range of our patients’ scores is 0.12 – 3.17).  
 
Bech-Rafaelson Mania Scale (BRMS; Bech, Rafaelson, Kramp, & Bolwig, 1978). The 
BRMS is a clinician-rated scale for manic symptoms, based on 11 items tapping activity level, 
mood, and other characteristics of mania. The items are rated on a scale from 0 (normal) to 4 
(extreme). Clinical cut-off score for mania is 15 (hypomania 6). The range of our patients’ 
scores is 0 – 12. Inter-rater reliability has proven to be high (.80 - .95; Bech, Rafaelson, 
Kramp, &, Bolwig, 1978; Altman, 2004). BPRS is effective in assessing outcome in clinical 
trials on BD (Bech, 2002). The French translation has been realized by Chambon, Poncet and 
Kiss (1989). Cronbach alpha for our patient sample was .77. 
 
Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery, & Asberg, 
1979). MADRS is a clinician-rated scale for depressive symptoms, including among others 
COGNITIVE ERRORS IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 148
items on sadness, internal tensions, insomnia, appetite reduction, cognitive impairment and 
suicidal ideation. The 10 items are anchored on a scale from 0  (absence of symptoms) to 6 
(invalidating presence of symptoms). Clinical cut-off score for depression is 15. The range of 
our patients’ scores is 0 – 38. Several validation studies have reported satisfactory coefficients 
for the original version (Montgomery, & Asberg, 1979) and concurrent validity (Kearns, 
1982; Maier, & Philipp, 1985). The French translation has been realized by Lemperière, 
Lepine, Rouillon, Hardy, Ades, Luauté and Ferrand (1984) and validation studies on this 
version yield satisfactory coefficients on specificity, homogeneity and internal consistency 
(Pellet, Decrat, Lang, Chazot, Tatu, Blanchon, & Berlier, 1987). Cronbach alpha for our 
patient sample was .89. 
 
Working Alliance Inventory (WAI; Horvath, 1981; Horvath, & Greenberg, 1989). The 
WAI is originally a 36-item self-report measure assessing the quality of the therapeutic 
alliance according Bordin’s conception (1975). Responses are reported on a 7-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (always). Construct validity has been established by 
Malinckrodt, & Nelson, 1991), reliability for the whole scale ranges between .84 and .93 
(Horvath, 1994). Concurrent and predictive validity have been established (Tichenor, & Hill, 
1989; Shick Tryon, & Kane, 1993). A 12-item short version has been developed by Tracey, & 
Kokotovic (1989), based on factor-analytic procedures. Its French translation has been 
validated by Corbière, Bisson, Lauzon and Richard (2006) who suggest one general score be 
considered for the evaluation of alliance. The short version was used for our study. Cronbach 
alpha for this patient sample was .87. 
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Procedure 
 All patients and controls were asked to participate in a dynamic interview (Perry, 
Fowler, & Semeniuk, 2005) lasting 50 minutes. Dynamic interview (DI) as a research tool has 
been developed from clinical practice of psychodynamic psychotherapy; thus, the context of 
DI is comparable to the context of an intake psychotherapy interview (Perry, personal 
communication). It has been widely used in psychotherapy research (Perry & Cooper, 1989; 
Hoglend & Perry, 1998). As shown by Perry, Fowler and Semeniuk (2005) and Fowler and 
Perry (2005), high-quality dynamic interviews are associated with Interviewer’s and Overall 
Dynamic Interview Adequacy (I-DIA and O-DIA). Five tasks of the interviewer compose the 
I-DIA : (1) Setting the interview frame : work-enhancing strategies ; (2) Offering support : 
questions, support strategies, associations ; (3) Exploration of affect : questions, reflections, 
clarifications, low-level defense interpretations ; (4) Trial interpretations : defense and 
transference interpretations; (5) Offering a synthesis. In particular, exploring affect and trial 
interpretations are highly correlated with O-DIA, when the patient’s contribution is controlled 
for (Perry, Fowler, & Semeniuk, 2005). The author completed an intensive one-week-training 
at Austen Riggs Center, Stockbridge, USA, and later underwent regular supervision with 
senior supervisors in psychodynamic psychotherapy. All interviews were conducted in French 
by the author.  
All inpatients participated in the dynamic interview, as soon as their symptomatic state 
allowed it. This means that the patients were included in the final third of the duration of 
inpatient treatment, shortly before discharge. Only two patients had to be excluded from the 
study due to non-feasibility of the research interview; all other patients responding to the 
inclusion criteria and willing to participate were included. The patients were given treatment 
as usual, encompassing non-specific supportive therapy and medication. All patients were 
appointed for a second interview at a three-month interval. Only N = 18 patients respected this 
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appointment, despite great efforts on the part of the researcher. At the second interview, the 
patients were all discharged from inpatient treatment. Along with the dynamic interview, the 
evaluation procedure encompassed clinician-ratings of depression and mania. The patients 
were given the questionnaires at the end of the interview and were asked to fill them in and 
send them back within two days. The study was endorsed by the expert ethical committee of 
the psychiatric hospital. 
 The control group was recruited by means of two local institutions : (1) School of 
Social Studies (n = 17) ; (2) Association promoting Community Activities and Service (n = 
13). Matching criteria were transparently issued at the outset of the control group recruitment. 
Therefore, only nine participants had to be refused from participation due to failure to meet 
the matching criteria. The control participants, unlike the patients who were not paid, were 
given a contribution (the equivalent of USD 16). The study was endorsed by the expert ethical 
committee of the School of Social Studies. 
 All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed by Master’s-level psychology 
students, according to the method defined by Mergenthaler and Stigler (1997).  
Interviews were rated based on the transcripts. CE ratings were done by fully trained 
raters, including the author. Four Master’s-level psychology students were trained during four 
months by the author and reliability was established on a dyadic basis among the student 
raters, between the student raters and the trainer and between the student raters and the 
authors of the CE-method. A randomly chosen 20% of all interviews were rated by two raters 
independently, in order to establish inter-rater reliability checks (results see under 
Instruments).  
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 Data Analytic Strategy 
 ANOVA and MANOVA statistics were carried out in order to answer the first two 
questions. For both hypotheses, univariate testing was used for number of words, number of 
CE and the ratio negative-to-positive. For the first hypothesis, patients were compared to 
controls, for the second, two subgroups of patients were compared among each other. These 
subgroups were obtained by median-split method of the ratio BRMS-to-MADRS (in order to 
be able to perform the variable transformation for all 30 cases, the MADRS score was 
transformed by adding 1 to the initial score, thus preventing the exclusion of two cases with 
the score of zero on MADRS). Multivariate statistics were applied to the four categories per 
error valence. In order to test hypotheses three and four, linear regression models (method 
Enter) were performed. For the first session for predicting symptoms, the error valence was 
broken down into the four categories, whereas for the second, we only tested one single 
model including both valences as predictors, due to lower sample size. Bonferroni’s 
corrections were applied where necessary. 
 
RESULTS 
 Preliminary Analyses 
 Total number of words was constantly higher for controls, compared to patients. For 
the first interview, the latter had a mean of 5955 words (SD = 1903), the former 7810 words 
(SD = 2514; F (1, 59) = 10.61; p = .00). For the second interview, patients had a mean of 
4418 words (SD = 1927), controls 7116 words (SD = 1800; F (1, 35) = 18.84; p = .00). 
Comparing the depression subgroup to the mania subgroup (both n = 15, first session), the 
latter produced more words (mean = 6835; SD = 1903) than the former (mean = 5037; SD = 
1207; F (1, 29) = 8.38; p = .01).  
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Cognitive Errors in BD Patients v Controls 
After a control for the number of words produced, only one between-group effect 
remains significant: patients overall make more errors of any type than controls (p <  .05). No 
effect was found with regard to the specific categories, nor the valence ratio negative-to-
positive (see table 2). 
 
Cognitive Errors in BD patients: Mania v Depression 
When splitting up the patient group according to the predominant symptomatology, 
mania or depression, it appears that the valence ratio negative-to-positive is highly significant: 
BD patients with depressive symptoms have a higher ratio, compared to BD patients with 
manic symptoms. Moreover, in line with the first result, patients with manic symptoms 
display more positive errors, compared to patients with depressive symptoms. The category of 
selective abstraction, e.g., emotional reasoning, jumping to conclusions, magnification of the 
positive, is different in the two subgroups. However, no difference was found in negative 
errors (see table 3). These differences are not attributable to between-group differences as 
regards socio-demographic variables (gender: χ2(1; n = 15) = 3.33, ns; age: t(1, 28) = -1.11, 
ns; level of education: t(1, 28) = 0.17, ns).  
 
CE and Level of Symptoms 
Regression analysis on the first session yields a clear picture for manic symptoms: 
they are predicted by positive and negative errors. In particular, selective abstraction positive 
and overgeneralizing negative predict manic symptoms. Note that both links are positive, 
irrespective of the error valence. Depressive symptoms are predicted by positive errors, but 
not by negative ones. In particular, selective abstraction positive is inversely related to 
depression (see table 4). 
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In the second session, we were able to reproduce the afore-mentioned results on a 
restricted sample (n = 18). Mania is predicted by positive and negative errors, whereas 
depression is marginally inversely linked to positive errors (see table 5). 
 
CE and Therapeutic Alliance 
A linear regression analysis (method Enter) was performed on the first session 
predicting WAI by the four categories (fortune-telling, overgeneralizing, selective abstraction, 
personalization), irrespective of the valence. This method is used to avoid losing power due to 
lowered sample size for WAI (n = 23). We found that selective abstraction is inversely 
associated with WAI (R² = .44, p = .02). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Our hypotheses were partially confirmed by the results. By testing a first sub-version 
of the universality hypothesis, we have shown that patients presenting BD display more CE in 
their spontaneous in-session discourse than matched controls. However, no effect was found 
per error valence between the groups. These results indicate that a diagnosis does suffice for 
detection of an overall heightened level of CE, but not for the detection of a CE specificity 
(Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999); potential effects are neutralized in such group comparisons by 
partially exclusive symptom patterns. The latter are particularly decisive in BD patients, as 
mania and depression fluctuate highly, sometimes rapidly; in consequence, such state-
dependent parameters need to be entered analyses separately. In this way, the symptomatic 
subgroups being compared between themselves, the effect of overall frequency of errors 
disappears, but the valence ratio of negative-to-positive yields an effect which tends to 
confirm the universality hypothesis for bipolar depression (Henriques, & Leitenberg, 2002; 
see also Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). More specifically, selective abstraction positive is 
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more frequent in manic patients, but no between-group difference was found for negative CE, 
probably due to a relatively high level of negative CE in mania. This picture is confirmed by 
regression analyses, where mania is predicted by both types of errors (consistently in both 
interviews), whereas depression only yields marginal effects (mainly the inverse association 
with positive errors). Manic symptoms in BD patients are, therefore, not only characterized by 
cognitive-symptomatic interactions due to heightened positive thinking (i.e., selective 
abstraction), but may also be maintained by heightened negative thinking (i.e., 
overgeneralizing). 
 This result partially confirms Beck’s universality hypothesis, in that it states the 
relevance of cognitive errors as correlates of BD symptomatology, whether mania or 
depression. It tends also to confirm Beck’s exclusivity hypothesis for BD (Clark, Beck, &, 
Alford, 1999) stating that depression is characterized by the exclusion of positive self-referent 
thinking. However, the absence of effect related to negative CE in the depressive phase – 
probably due to heightened negative CE in mania rendering this likely effect insignificant – 
questions the generalizability to BD of Beck’s negativity hypothesis. Biases towards 
particularly negative information processing and content are widely confirmed for unipolar 
depression, but negativity in depressive states in BD patients is not heightened when 
compared to mania, and also when compared to matched controls. Heightened negative 
valence errors in manic states might be due to persistence of negativity across phases, 
representing a vulnerability factor for relapse into depression (see also the comparable results 
on unipolar depression by Weintraub, Segal, & Beck, 1974). Finally, this study also indicates 
that controls make a significant amount of specific CE, probably also induced by the 
relatively stressful dynamic interview situation. The absence of symptoms in this group tends 
to confirm Beck’s assumption of “adaptive” CE, generally conceived as a bias towards the 
positive in normalcy, but here also suggesting that the construction of reality in these 
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individuals is always slightly biased, positively or negatively, without it being an immediate 
vulnerability factor for manifest psychopathology. 
 With regard to the therapeutic alliance, we were able to confirm our hypothesis. In 
particular, the presence of higher levels of selective abstraction hinders the construction of a 
positive therapeutic alliance. This is important information for clinicians confronted with 
patients making this type of error. On the one hand, SA contributes to maintaining the BD 
symptomatology, on the other, it might impede the establishment of a constructive relational 
context with these patients. Of course, on the contrary, low levels of therapeutic alliance may 
also contribute to heightened levels of selective abstraction in the patient.  
 There are at least two clinical implications ensuing from the present study. First, 
clinicians should be aware of the occurrence of CE in their BD patients, since higher levels of 
symptoms are related to some types of CE. While the observation in manic patients of their 
discounting negative information is probably a truism for clinicians, the underlying presence, 
in the same patients, of a set of negative CE also related to mania, is certainly counter-
intuitive and needs to be repeated in the training of cognitive psychotherapists, to avoid the 
latter remaining seduced by the positivity of the patient’s narrative and making him-/herself 
positively valenced errors by discounting negative information! The second implication is the 
clinician’s awareness of SA as a possible hindrance in the construction of a positive 
therapeutic alliance. Even if BD patients show many positive SA errors, including with regard 
to the therapeutic relationship, the clinician needs to address them systematically, i.e., by 
means of cognitive restructuring. It goes without saying that the latter procedure does not 
imply replacing positivity by negativity (or vice-versa), but it implies the collaborative 
therapeutic negotiation of a nuanced and adaptive view of the self and the self-in-interaction 
(Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). 
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 To sum up, BD patients display a higher frequency of CE than controls. Manic 
symptoms are associated with more positive CE, as well as negative CE, compared to 
depressive symptoms where less positive CE has been found, thus adding an argument for 
corroboration of Beck’s universality and exclusivity hypotheses. No effect was found for 
depressive symptoms in BD and negative CE. This study suggests therefore that the 
interrogation in the title of “too much positive thinking” is too simplistic and that a more 
complex cognitive pattern with regard to CE holds true in BD; further studies are needed in 
order to draw final conclusions with regard to cognitive errors in BD. 
There are several limitations to this study. While the sample size is acceptable at the 
time of the first session, the lack of power in the second session limited further in-depth data 
analyses, i.e., robust predictive analyses. Co-morbidity in the patient sample limits somewhat 
internal validity of the trial. We found a high relevance of the CE rating scale for the BD 
population, but the question can be posed as to whether the high frequency of SA might be 
partially due to the number of item endorsements of this category, as it itself encompasses  8 
of all 14 errors. Its variance might be partially “blown up” due to this irregularity within the 
scale, but our main conclusions are certainly not jeopardized by this eventuality, since the 
effects found for SA are sufficiently high; moreover, the same problem would arise for the 
control group which tends to neutralize this bias. The post-hoc median-split method for 
determining subgroups is bound to be biased; it would have been preferable to control initially 
for symptom subtype, e.g., by introducing a matching procedure within the patient group. It 
needs to be acknowledged that no patient presented full manic symptoms according to the 
clinical cut-off, thus confining the relevance of our results to patients in sub-manic or 
hypomanic states. Finally, participants in the control group were not randomly chosen, due to 
matching criteria and the voluntary status of participation and thus, their error profiles are not 
representative of the general population; much care with generalizations need to be applied. 
COGNITIVE ERRORS IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 157
Table 1 
Socio-Demographics and Symptoms for Patients and Controls  
Patients (N = 30) Controls (N = 30)  
Criteria Mean SD Mean SD 
 
t(1,58) 
 
p 
Age 
Education (N Years) 
Gender (Female) 
Intimate relationship¹ 
Life situation 
  With partner 
  With partner & siblings 
  Alone 
  Alone with siblings 
  With parents 
  Institution 
WAI² 
GSI² ³ 
Mania (BRMS)² 
Depression (MADRS)² 
46.14 
12.37 
67% 
37% 
 
30% 
3% 
43% 
10% 
7% 
7% 
63.04 
1.24 
3.10 
12.87 
11.20 
1.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.96 
0.87 
2.94 
10.40 
41.90 
12.87 
67% 
40% 
 
30% 
7% 
40% 
10% 
13% 
0% 
 
0.48 
14.33 
1.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.23 
1.28 
-1.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.47 
.12 
.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.00 
Note. WAI: Working Alliance Inventory; GSI : General Symptom Index of Symptom 
Checklist SCL-90-R 
¹Considered as stable intimate relationship when lasting longer than 2 years 
² Scores from first interview reported here 
³N(patients) = 13 ; N(controls) = 18 
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Table 2 
Cognitive Errors/1000 Words in Bipolar Affective Disorder 
Patients (N = 30) Controls (N = 30) Errors 
M SD M SD 
F (1, 59) ES 
Number Errors 
Ratio neg/pos 
Positive Errors 
Fortune-Telling 
Over-generalizing 
Selective Abstraction 
Personalization 
Negative Errors 
Fortune-Telling 
Over-generalizing 
Selective Abstraction 
Personalization 
15.87 
2.53 
 
0.17 
5.54 
36.87 
1.02 
 
0.60 
13.90 
35.61 
5.60 
6.60 
2.82 
 
0.46 
7.43 
44.34 
2.75 
 
0.89 
11.49 
17.38 
8.03 
12.50 
1.77 
 
0.27 
8.45 
28.48 
0.53 
 
0.33 
13.72 
27.79 
5.39 
4.88 
1.51 
 
0.58 
8.67 
24.18 
2.05 
 
0.61 
11.64 
31.22 
7.42 
5.04* 
1.55 
 
0.54 
1.95 
0.83 
0.62 
 
1.83 
0.00 
1.44 
0.01 
0.58 
0.34 
 
0.19 
0.36 
0.24 
0.20 
 
0.35 
0.02 
0.31 
0.03 
Note. MANOVA: Positive Errors: F (4; 55) = 1.44; p = .23; Negative Errors: F (4; 55) = 0.85; 
p = .50; Bonferroni’s correction applied. 
* p < .05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE ERRORS IN BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 159
Table 3 
Cognitive Errors/1000 Words as a function of Symptomatic Sub-Samples 
Depression (n = 15) Mania (n = 15) Errors 
M SD M SD 
F(1, 29) ES 
Number Errors 
Ratio neg/pos 
Positive Errors 
Fortune-Telling 
Over-generalizing 
Selective Abstraction 
Personalization 
Negative Errors 
Fortune-Telling 
Over-generalizing 
Selective Abstraction 
Personalization 
14.93 
4.04 
 
0.07 
4.25 
15.56 
0.97 
 
0.73 
12.37 
28.93 
6.35 
5.64 
3.43 
 
0.26 
8.53 
12.30 
2.71 
 
1.10 
11.42 
10.70 
6.71 
16.80 
1.12 
 
0.27 
6.82 
58.18 
1.07 
 
0.47 
15.07 
26.66 
4.43 
7.52 
0.74 
 
0.59 
6.17 
54.30 
2.89 
 
0.64 
11.80 
22.55 
9.30 
0.59 
10.37** 
 
0.89 
0.89 
8.79** 
0.01 
 
0.66 
0.41 
0.12 
0.42 
0.28 
1.18 
 
0.44 
0.35 
1.08 
0.04 
 
0.29 
0.23 
0.13 
0.24 
Note. MANOVA: Positive Errors: F (4, 25) = 2.29; p = .05; Negative Errors: F (4; 25) = 0.43; 
p = .78; Bonferroni’s correction applied (significance level .01/2 or .05/2). 
** p < .01 
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Table 4 
Regression Analyses for Cognitive Errors predicting Symptomatology at First Session  
(N = 30) 
Variable B SE B β 
Predicting BRMS 
Positive Errors 
  Fortune-Telling 
  Overgeneralizing  
  Selective Abstraction 
  Personalization 
Negative Errors 
  Fortune-Telling 
  Overgeneralizing  
  Selective Abstraction 
  Personalization 
 
 
-0.35 
-.04 
0.04 
-0.13 
 
-0.74 
0.15 
0.02 
-0.11 
 
 
1.06 
0.07 
0.01 
0.18 
 
0.55 
0.04 
0.03 
0.07 
 
 
-.06 
-.09 
.63** 
-.12 
 
-.22 
.59** 
.11 
-.29 
Predicting MADRS 
Positive Errors 
  Fortune-Telling 
  Overgeneralizing  
  Selective Abstraction 
  Personalization 
Negative Errors 
  Fortune-Telling 
  Overgeneralizing  
  Selective Abstraction 
 
 
-2.01 
0.00 
-0.12 
-0.57 
 
4.59 
-0.24 
-0.01 
 
 
3.90 
0.26 
0.04 
0.64 
 
2.23 
0.18 
0.13 
 
 
-.09 
.00 
-.51** 
-.15 
 
.40 
-.27 
-.01 
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  Personalization -0.04 0.27 -.03 
Note. BRMS: Positive Errors: R² = .36; p = .02; Negative Errors: R² = .38; p = .02; MADRS: 
Positive Errors: R² = .31; p = .04; Negative Errors: R² = .18; p = .29; BMRS: Bech-Rafaelson 
Mania Scale; MADRS: Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale; Bonferroni’s 
correction applied (significance level .01/2). 
** p < .01 
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Table 5 
Regression Analyses for Cognitive Errors predicting Symptomatology at Second Session  
(N = 18) 
Variable B SE B β 
Predicting BRMS 
Positive Errors 
Negative Errors 
 
0.05 
0.03 
 
0.01 
0.01 
 
.66** 
.39** 
Predicting MADRS 
Positive Errors 
Negative Errors 
 
-0.13 
0.05 
 
0.07 
0.09 
 
-.51± 
.14 
Note. BRMS: R² = .88; p = .00; MADRS: R² = .19; p = .20; BMRS: Bech-Rafaelson Mania 
Scale; MADRS: Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale. Bonferroni’s correction 
applied (significance level .10/2 or .01/2) 
± p < .10; ** p < .01 
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Psychotherapeutic Case Conceptualization using Plan Analysis for Bipolar Affective Disorder 
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ABSTRACT 
 Valid individualized case conceptualization methodologies, such as Plan Analysis, are 
rarely used for the psychotherapeutic treatment conceptualization and planning of Bipolar 
Affective Disorder (BD), even if data do exist showing that psychotherapy interventions 
might be enhanced by applying such analyses for treatment planning for several groups of 
patients. We applied Plan Analysis as a research tool (Caspar, 1995) to N = 30 inpatients 
presenting Bipolar Affective Disorder, who were interviewed twice. Our study aimed at 
producing a prototypical Plan structure encompassing the most relevant data from the 30 
individual case conceptualizations. Special focus was given to links with emotions and coping 
Plans. Inter-rater reliability of these Plan Analyses was considered sufficient. Results suggest 
the presence of two subtypes based on plananalytic principles: emotion control and 
relationship control, along with a mixed form. These subtypes are discussed with regard to 
inherent plananalytic conflicts, specific emotions and coping Plans, as well as symptom level 
and type. Finally, conclusions are drawn for enhancing psychotherapeutic practice with BD 
patients, based on the motive-oriented therapeutic relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key-Words: Plan Analysis, Case Conceptualization, Bipolar Affective Disorder, 
Emotion 
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PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC CASE CONCEPTUALIZATION USING PLAN ANALYSIS 
FOR BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 
  
 In recent years, psychotherapeutic approaches began to offer theory-consistent clinical 
tools for practitioners to treat patients presenting Bipolar Affective Disorder (BD), as adjunct 
treatment to pharmacotherapy. Most of these tools are based on cognitive-behavioral and 
psychoeducation models (Basco & Rush, 2005; Lam, Jones, Hayward, & Bright, 1999; 
Leahy, 2003; Meyer & Hautzinger, 2004; Newman, Leahy, Beck, Reilly-Harrington, & 
Gyulai, 2001; Scott, 1995; Scott, Garland, & Moorhead, 2001), on interpersonal and social 
rhythm therapy (Frank, 2007; Frank & Swartz, 2004) and on various other models as 
extensions of the afore-mentioned (group therapy: Bauer & McBride, 2003; Bock & Koesler, 
2005; family therapy: Micklowitz, 2004; integrative-cognitive: Mansell, 2007). Recent 
reviews of treatment outcome studies confirmed overall efficacy for manual-based treatments 
(de Jong-Meyer, Hautzinger, Kühner, & Schramm, 2007; Jones, 2004; Rizvi, & Zaretsky, 
2007; Scott, 2004), for some treatments in the acute phase with highly severe symptom levels, 
and for all treatments in the remission phase. While these recent developments are 
encouraging and the structure of manualized treatments highly meaningful for the treatment 
of this challenging group of patients, to our knowledge no systematic psychotherapeutic case 
conceptualization approach – based on the individual case - has yet been applied to this 
population. The objectives of this article are to contribute to the question of psychotherapeutic 
case conceptualization by using the Plan Analysis approach (Caspar, 2007; Caspar, 1996), 
more specifically, to (1) Enhance the psychotherapist’s conceptualization of patients’ 
problems presenting BD and (2) Optimize treatment planning, including effective 
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implementation of manualized treatment strategies and the construction of a tailor-made 
therapeutic relationship. 
 
Plan Analysis 
Plan Analysis is based on the works by Grawe & Dziewas in 1976 (Grawe, 1980) who 
observed in behavior group therapy that basic behavioral concepts were not sufficient to 
explain difficult interpersonal patterns presented by the patients. The patient’s verbal and non-
verbal behavior is not solely influenced by external contingencies, but also by internal 
determinants, such as intentions, motives, schemas of the self and the self-in-interaction 
leading the individual to actions and perceptions congruent with his/her basic assumptions 
(Grawe, 1998). The basic principle of Plan Analysis is the instrumental vantage point: the 
patient’s behavioral (self-reported or in-session clinician-observed verbal and non-verbal) 
patterns are related to Plans and higher-order motives (or goals and needs) responding to the 
question: “Which purpose, conscious or unconscious, underlies an individual’s behaviors and 
experiences?” (Caspar, 1997, p. 260). Generally, the presence of countless specific answers to 
this question, related to a patient’s situation and interactional behavior, oblige the 
psychotherapist to prioritize, structure and hierarchize the information within a framework of 
instrumental connections, i.e., as a Plan structure. Later, developments of Plan Analysis drew 
on the schema concept and information-processing approaches (Caspar, 1984; 1995; 2007; 
Caspar, & Moix, 2006; Grawe, 1986; 1992b; 1998).  Although complexity (and the 
correlating time investment) may be the price to pay for such detailed case conceptualizations, 
we would advocate, especially for clinical diagnoses such as BD, that a detailed case 
formulation might reflect in a reasonably accurate way the psychological and 
psychopathological complexity of such disorders. The payoff is certainly the adoption of a 
radical constructivist perspective, leading to – by means of reliable and valid single-case 
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qualitative methodology – a greater range of treatment possibilities (Caspar, 1997; Grawe, 
Caspar, & Ambühl, 1990; Kramer, & Caspar, 2007). 
 
Emotions and Plans 
 The notion of Plan refers to the individual’s adaptational processes and, as such, to the 
concepts of emotions and emotional processes from the instrumental perspective. Four cases 
are envisaged by the approach as regards the linkage between emotions and Plans (Caspar, 
1997; 2007): (1) A negative emotion arises when Plans are threatened or blocked; (2) Plans 
shape emotions; (3) Plans are used as coping to face emotions; (4) Emotion has itself an 
instrumental function. We will focus more fully on the first and third aspect. (1) As long as 
the (internal and external) context allows the individual to act according to his/her main Plans, 
no negative emotional appraisal is noticed. However, the latter emerges when important Plans 
(e.g., related to life goals) are blocked – e.g., by life changes or internal conflicts. Negative 
emotional arousal might be observed in patients undergoing psychotherapy, either as a 
reaction to (internal or external) circumstances blocking Plans, or specifically as a reaction to 
therapeutic interventions blocking Plans. Inversely, positive emotions result from favoring 
important Plans or goals within the interaction or the release of blocked or threatened Plans. 
(3) Plans may function as coping with negative emotional arousal, which in its turn can be 
due to blocked or threatened Plans, but not necessarily. For example, a person who has just 
lost a loved one, to avoid confronting the emotions of sadness or anger caused by blocked 
Plans related to the need of companionship, might start to drink as emotion-soothing coping 
Plan. This means that adaptational processes – the way the individual aims at eliminating or 
avoiding unpleasant emotional arousal – are conceptualized by Plan Analysis.  
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Plans and Psychopathology 
Since they are based on individual case studies, Plan structures may differ greatly from 
one individual to another within the same diagnostic category. Nevertheless, the notion of 
“prototypical Plan structure” has been offered by Caspar (1996), to assist the trainee-
psychotherapist in learning to do case conceptualizations. The purpose of prototypical Plan 
structures is after all to give a general idea, by no means a constraint for Plan Analyses on 
individuals with the same diagnosis or clinical problem. These prototypical Plan structures 
aim at describing typical Plan and motive dynamics related to groups of patients. As such, the 
prototypical Plan structure for depression (Caspar, 1995) shows that these patients have 
difficulty in controlling aggression and anger; they produce many avoidance Plans (e.g., Plans 
like “Avoid further deceptions in relationships” and “Avoid social contacts”); they have high 
expectations (e.g., a Plan like “Be a perfect mother for your children”), which serve to replace 
certain needs (e.g., the need for proximity and affection), along with an argument for 
avoidance of the pursuit of related goals (e.g., resulting a conviction such as “I am too 
vulnerable to be a perfect mother, so I’d rather not even try to”). Depressives may also present 
Plans related to expressing vulnerabilities, to obtain from a significant other, including the 
therapist, particular consideration or attention (similar to patients suffering from 
psychosomatic difficulties; Caspar, 1996). Prototypical Plan structures are, inexhaustively, 
available for Anxiety Disorders (Caspar, & Tuschen, 1987), Borderline Personality Disorder 
(Ansmann, 2002) and child molesters (Drapeau, Körner, Brunet, Granger, de Roten, & 
Caspar, 2003). 
METHOD 
Sample 
A total of 30 inpatients with Bipolar Affective Disorders (BD) were included in the 
study. A total of 20 (67%) were female, with a mean age of 46.1 years (SD = 11.2 ; ranging 
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from 21 to 60). Their socio-demographic level was assessed by means of the total number of 
years of education in any field. On average, the patients had 12.4 years of education (SD = 
1.1 ; range from 10 to 16). All had a DSM-IV-R diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder I (either 
F30.x[296.x], F31.x[296.4x or .5x] or F31.6[296.6x]) and were included in the study 
irrespective of the nature of the most recent phase or of the level of chronicity. Some (13; 
43%) presented co-morbid disorders, such as drug abuse (23% ; cannabis, alcool, cocaine), 
personality disorders cluster C (10%), compulsive-obsessive disorders (3%), acute suicidality 
(3%) and epilepsy (3%). Diagnoses were established by trained medical staff by means of 
DIGS (Diagnostic Interview for Genetic Studies; Preisig, Fenton, Matthey, Berney, & 
Ferrero, 1999). The number of inpatient treatments in psychiatry, including current treatment, 
varied between 1 and 29 (Mean = 7.7 ; SD = 7.0). All patients gave written informed consent. 
 
Instruments  
Plan Analysis (Caspar, 1996). Plan Analysis is an individual-based qualitative method 
yielding a complete case conceptualization for each patient. Data analysis for each patient 
follows a three-step procedure: (1) Conduct of tape-recorded clinical interviews (see under 
procedure), including post-session note-taking by the interviewer regarding the patient’s in-
session non-verbal behavior; (2) Establishment of chronologically-structured “extensions” on 
relevant instrumental manifestations (Breuer, 1985, cited by Caspar, 1996) for each patient, 
based on verbal and non-verbal cues in the recording and in the sessions notes (this 
intermediate step is specific to the research context and enhances transparency in the process 
of inferring Plans from concrete behaviors); (3) Construction of an individualized Plan 
Analysis based on the extensions, as well as of emotion frames for each rated emotion, 
encompassing the four aspects of emotion from an instrumental perspective (see Introduction 
section). At this point, reliability analyses were carried out by fully-trained Plan Analysis 
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raters, based on independent analyses on 10% of the cases (3 out of 30 cases; only the 
material detailed under step one was available for both raters) focusing on the 10 (judged by 
the rater) most important Plans in one structure, compared to all Plans in the second structure 
(Benkert, 1997; Ansmann, 2002). For each of the ten compared Plans, the following 
correspondence criteria and ratings were applied: 1 point for correspondence in the Plan itself, 
2 points for correspondence in hierarchically superior Plans and 2 points for correspondence 
in hierarchically inferior Plans, yielding a possible total of 5 points. Percentages of the total 
correspondence of the ten main Plans between the two Plan structures were computed and 
averaged. An overall correspondence of 60% was defined as sufficient. For emotion frames, a 
similar procedure was applied: the total number of emotions submitted to reliability analysis 
for each case corresponded to the lower number of emotions rated between the two raters. 
Each component obtained a rating of 1 for perfect correspondence: type of emotion, 
blocked/threatened Plan and coping Plan (the aspects of emotion shaping Plans and of 
instrumentality of emotion were left aside for reliability analysis and also for further 
examination), yielding a possible total of 3 for each emotion. Percentages of total 
correspondence between each emotion of the two emotion frame structures were computed 
and averaged. An overall correspondence of 60% was defined as sufficient.  
 
Symptom Check List SCL-90-R (Derogatis, 1994). This questionnaire includes 90 
items addressing various somatic and psychological signs of distress. These items are scored 
using a Likert-type scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Although the instrument is 
composed of 10 subscales, our study used only the General Symptomatic Index (GSI, score 
ranging from 0 to 4), which is a mean rated over all symptoms. Clinical cut-off score is 0.80. 
The French validation study has been carried out by Pariente and Guelfi (1990) and yielded 
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satisfactory coefficients. Cronbach alpha for this sample was .98 and General Symptom Index 
averaged on 1.24 (SD = .87; range 0.12 – 3.17). 
 
Bech-Rafaelson Mania Scale (BRMS; Bech, Rafaelson, Kramp, & Bolwig, 1978). The 
BRMS is a clinician-rated scale for manic symptoms, based on 11 items tapping activity level, 
mood, and other characteristics of mania. The items are rated on a scale from 0 (normal) to 4 
(extreme). Clinical cut-off score for mania is 15 (hypomania 6). Inter-rater reliability has 
proven to be high (.80 - .95; Bech, Rafaelson, Kramp, &, Bolwig, 1978; Altman, 2004). 
BPRS is effective in assessing outcome in clinical trials on BD (Bech, 2002). The French 
translation has been realized by Chambon, Poncet and Kiss (1989). Cronbach alpha for our 
patient sample was .77 and the mean of this sample 3.10 (SD = 2.94; range = 0 - 12). 
 
Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery, & Asberg, 
1979). MADRS is a clinician-rated scale for depressive symptoms, including among others 
items on sadness, internal tensions, insomnia, appetite reduction, cognitive impairment and 
suicidal ideation. The 10 items are anchored on a scale from 0  (absence of symptoms) to 6 
(invalidating presence of symptoms). Clinical cut-off score for depression is 15. Several 
validation studies have reported satisfactory coefficients for the original version 
(Montgomery, & Asberg, 1979) and concurrent validity (Kearns, 1982; Maier, & Philipp, 
1985). The French translation has been realized by Lemperière, Lepine, Rouillon, Hardy, 
Ades, Luauté and Ferrand (1984) and validation studies on this version yield satisfactory 
coefficients on specificity, homogeneity and internal consistency (Pellet, Decrat, Lang, 
Chazot, Tatu, Blanchon, & Berlier, 1987). Cronbach alpha for our patient sample was .89 and 
the mean of the sample 12.87 (SD = 10.40 ; range = 0 - 38). 
 
PLAN ANALYSIS FOR BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 172
Procedure 
 All patients were asked to participate in a dynamic interview (Perry, Fowler, & 
Semeniuk, 2005) lasting 50 minutes. Dynamic interview (DI) as a research tool has been 
developed from clinical practice of psychodynamic psychotherapy; thus, the context of DI is 
comparable to the context of an intake psychotherapy interview (Perry, personal 
communication). It has been widely used in psychotherapy research (Perry & Cooper, 1989 ; 
Hoglend & Perry, 1998). As shown by Perry, Fowler and Semeniuk (2005) and Fowler and 
Perry (2005), high-quality dynamic interviews are associated with Interviewer’s and Overall 
Dynamic Interview Adequacy (I-DIA and O-DIA). Five tasks of the interviewer compose the 
I-DIA : (1) Setting the interview frame : work-enhancing strategies ; (2) Offering support : 
questions, support strategies, associations ; (3) Exploration of affect : questions, reflections, 
clarifications, low-level defense interpretations ; (4) Trial interpretations : defense and 
transference interpretations; (5) Offering a synthesis. In particular, exploring affect and trial 
interpretations are highly correlated with O-DIA, when the patient’s contribution is controlled 
for (Perry, Fowler, & Semeniuk, 2005). The author completed an intensive one-week-training 
at Austen Riggs Center, Stockbridge, USA, and later underwent regular supervision with 
senior supervisors in psychodynamic psychotherapy. All interviews were conducted in French 
by the author.  
All inpatients participated in the dynamic interview, as soon as their symptomatic state 
allowed it. This means that the patients were included in the final third of the duration of 
inpatient treatment, shortly before discharge. Only two patients had to be excluded from the 
study due to non-feasibility of the research interview; all other patients responding to the 
inclusion criteria and willing to participate were included. The patients were given treatment 
as usual, encompassing non-specific supportive therapy and medication. All patients were 
appointed for a second interview at a three-month interval. Only N = 18 patients respected this 
PLAN ANALYSIS FOR BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 173
appointment, despite great efforts on the part of the researcher. At the second interview, the 
patients were all discharged from inpatient treatment. Along with the dynamic interview, the 
evaluation procedure encompassed clinician-ratings of depression and mania. The patients 
were given the questionnaires at the end of the interview and were asked to fill them in and 
send them back within two days. The study was endorsed by the expert ethical committee of 
the psychiatric hospital. 
All Plan Analyses were done by the author; reliability was established with fully-
trained colleagues and students on a randomly chosen 10% of all cases (for the results see 
under Results section). The establishment of a prototypical Plan structure respected the 
following 4 steps (inspired by Ansmann, 2002): (1) An inventory of all Plans was established, 
encompassing Plans and goals, excluding related observed behaviors. Clearly-overlapping 
Plan formulations were aggregated into one Plan and counted as such. Finally, a total of 198 
different Plans were found (from a total of 483 Plans over the 30 patients; APPENDIX F3). 
(2) A threshold of absolute frequency of 5 occurrences in the whole sample per Plan was 
defined; a total of 26 Plans were found. These Plans were investigated concerning the relevant 
instrumental connections among them: we took into account only those instrumental linkages 
which presented at least 5 occurrences out of 30 cases. Finally, we composed an overall 
prototypical Plan structure. (3) For subtypes, an exploratory thematic analysis of the 
prototypical Plan structure allowed grouping based on frequency of instrumental links 
between the Plans and goals; two basic subtypes were found. Unlike Ansmann (2002) who 
performed a confirmatory study on theory-driven plananalytic subtypes of Borderline 
Personality Disorder, to our knowledge, BD has not been investigated with regard to 
subtypes. Thus, subtype formation in this study was exploratory and the strategy differed 
slightly from that used by Ansmann. For each subtype, in order to ensure non-ambiguous 
classification of all cases, one reference-Plan was defined, which was (a) present in all the 
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cases of the related subtype and (b) absent in all cases of the other subtype. The two 
subgroups taken together also had to cover more than 60% of all cases (at least 18 out of 30 
cases). Two reference-Plans were found; the labels of the subtypes were derived from the 
labels of these two reference-Plans. Subjects presenting both reference-Plans were classified 
as mixed. (4) Inventories of emotion frames and specific coping Plans were established.  
 
RESULTS 
Reliability Analysis for Plan Analysis 
  Reliability analysis (Benkert, 1997) investigated two aspects of 3 randomly chosen 
Plan Analyses: (1) Plan structure; (2) Emotion frames. (1) For Plan Analyses, an overall 
acceptable average concordance between the author and three fully-trained raters was 64% 
(Case 1: 81%; Case 2: 64%, Case 3: 48%; APPENDIX F1). One case yielded insufficient 
reliability. However, since the overall average was higher than 60%, we decided to include 
this case. Furthermore, three other cases from this sample rated by the author were presented 
in supervision classes and were approved by the senior supervisor. Thus, we decided not to 
add a supplementary case for reliability. (2) For emotion frames, similar results were found: 
i.e., a sufficient average of 66% concordance (Case 1: 66%; Case 2: 77%; Case 3: 55%; 
APPENDIX F2). 
 
 Prototypical Plan Structures 
 The main prototypical Plan structure is shown in figure 1; figures 2 & 3 depict the 
subtypes. A drawn line depicts a direct instrumental relationship between Plans and goals in 
the order of hierarchy: lower-level Plans in the hierarchy serve higher-order Plans, goals, 
motives and needs; Plans are formulated in the imperative; specific behaviors at the service of 
low-level Plans are all left out of the presentation (Caspar, 1995). The two subtypes are each 
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related to a prototypical reference-Plan: (1) Figure 2 depicts the left part of the main structure 
and was called “(Internal) Emotion control” (reference-Plan 1: “Avoid being harmed”). A 
total of 10 patients presented reference-Plan 1, but not reference-Plan 2 in their Plan structure. 
(2) Figure 3 depicts the right part of the main structure and was called “Relationship control” 
(reference-Plan 2: “Control relationships”). A total of 8 patients presented reference-Plan 2, 
but not reference Plan 1 in their Plan structure. Finally, 12 patients presented both reference 
Plans and were classified as mixed (the main Plan structure representing this group best; see 
figure 1). The numbers in brackets in Figures 2 and 3 represent the occurrence of each Plan 
and the total number of subjects included in each subgroup. 
 
 Emotions and Coping Plans 
 With respect to emotions, which were all linked to specific Plans (to save space, these 
linkages will not be presented here), a total of 116 emotion events were rated in the whole 
sample, distributed into 27 distinct emotion categories. The three most frequently found 
emotions in the sample as a whole, as well as in both subgroups, are despair, fear and anger. 
In addition, in the subtype 1 emotion control, shame, guilt, joy, mistrust and disgust are more 
frequent than 5%, and in the subtype 2 relationship control the same can be said for sadness, 
shame, regret and hostility (see table 1). In terms of coping Plans, the inter-subject variability 
was very high: a total number of 126 different coping Plans were found in the sample as a 
whole. Because the frequencies per subtype were therefore all very low and the between-
group differences not noteworthy, we present only the overall results. The main coping Plans 
used by BD patients are “Avoid talking about difficult events”, “Present yourself as 
competent” and “Search for help”. The remaining labels for coping Plans can be found in 
table 2. 
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 Prototypical Plan Structures and Symptoms 
 Comparing subtype emotion control (n = 10) with subtype relationship control (n = 8), 
we found the following between-group differences: the former is associated with higher 
depressive symptoms and a higher general symptomatic level (GSI), than the latter. Both 
subgroups display the same clinically non-significant level of mania (see table 3). These 
differences are not attributable to between-group differences in socio-demographic variables 
(gender: χ2(1; n = 8) = .22, ns; age: t(1, 16) = 0.55, ns; level of education: t(1, 16) = -1.83, ns). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Our application of Plan Analysis as a method of psychotherapeutic case 
conceptualization to a sample of patients presenting Bipolar Affective Disorders yields an 
overall prototypical Plan structure. We will first discuss the characteristics and implications of 
this structure in detail, then elaborate on ensuing possible psychotherapeutic attitudes and 
interventions.  
 
 Prototypical Plan Structure for Bipolar Affective Disorder 
The main Plan structure related to BD can reliably and meaningfully be divided into 
two parts, yielding two subtypes, emotion control and relationship control. These are 
abstractions of “pure” subtypes from a plananalytic perspective, represented by two rather 
small parts of our sample (respectively 10 and 8 patients), and a mixed type exists which 
presents Plan characteristics from both subtypes. Thus, all further considerations need to be 
interpreted with care within this context; the presence of two subtypes does certainly not 
suggest an all-or-nothing principle but rather a continuum between two abstracted and 
simplified extremes. 
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As positively formulated approach Plans, one can identify for the emotion subtype 
“Take care of yourself” and “Assert yourself”, whereas for the relationship subtype “Realize 
yourself”, “Be an  achiever”, “Search for help” and “Be close”. As negatively formulated 
avoidance Plans, the emotion subtype presents many, e.g., “Avoid being hurt”, “Avoid 
negative emotions”, “Avoid conflict” and “Avoid mentioning difficult events”, whereas there 
is only one for the relationship subtype “Avoid losing the other”. Thus, the relationship 
control subtype presents more positively formulated Plans – resulting in more approach 
behavior generally known as resources -  than emotion control patients, who may be qualified 
as “arousal avoiders”. In our sample, this subtype yields higher levels of depression and 
general symptomatology which underlines the lower level of resources in these patients.  
Similar avoidance Plans (including the superior Plan of “Avoid negative emotions”) have 
been found by Ansmann on a small sample of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), 
irrespective of the BPD subtypes (dependent v autonomous subtype; Ansmann, 2002). 
Avoidance of negative emotions in BD patients might also be more prevalent due to 
heightened levels of internal emotional arousal in these patients and the presence of more 
intense or subjectively more disturbing affects. 
Several abstracted conflicts may be inferred based on the prototypical Plan structure. 
For patients from the emotion subgroup, the main conflict is situated between emotion 
activation (arousal) and avoidance of arousal (emotional distantiation; see also Zorn, Roder, 
Kramer, & Pomini, 2007). The first term of the conflict (emotion activation) is not directly 
mentioned in the Plan structure and is based on related emotion frames, where specific 
(external) situations or consequences of the Plan “Assert yourself “ elicit unwanted emotions 
in the patient (e.g., guilt); the second term of the conflict (emotion distantiation) summarizes 
one of the goals of the prototypical Plans in this subtype (e.g., “Avoid being overwhelmed by 
emotion”). This might lead to a vicious circle which tends to affect symptom intensity, e.g., 
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depressive symptoms, as shown by the higher levels of symptoms in the emotion control 
subgroup. For patients from the relationship subgroup, the main conflict is situated between 
proximity seeking and autonomy seeking. The former is represented by a Plan such as 
“Attract the other’s attention”, the latter by “Be yourself”. Finally, for patients with mixed 
Plan structures, an additional conflict might arise between consequences of Plans such as 
“Transgress rules”, which probably tend to elicit unwanted emotions (e.g., anger or guilt) and 
“Avoid negative emotions”. As shown in table 3, these conflicts tend to influence 
differentially symptom intensity and might be assumed as psychological core determinants for 
symptomatic evolution in BD. 
Compared to the study on BPD (Ansmann, 2002), invalidation of self was not found as 
a prototypical Plan in BD. Moreover, the goal “Maintain your self-esteem” was only present 
in 6 out of 30 BD cases (1 out of 8 for the relationship subtype). This relative absence of self-
esteem Plans and goals (either expressed in a negative or positive sense) in a large part of the 
sample underlines the fragility of BD patients, self-esteem being generally one of the main 
resource aspects of human functioning (see Grawe, 1998). Compared to the prototypical Plan 
structure of Major Depression (Caspar, 1995), BD patients develop more Plans related to the 
fear of loss of control over oneself and one’s emotions. Such fears find their expression in 
Plans such as “Avoid negative emotions”. In such patients, these fears might be based on 
previous experiences of loss of control due to heightened levels of emotional arousal, i.e., in 
manic states, or when a significant other has lost self-control, e.g., a parent’s violent behavior 
as traumatic childhood experience. High expectations and eliciting consideration from others  
are reserved to the prototypical Plan structure for unipolar depression and was not found in 
the BD sample. This emphasizes the importance of prototypical Plan structures indicating 
specific dynamics for each group of patients and, ultimately, of tailor-made disorder-specific 
interventions.  
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With regard to emotions, in addition to what one might call the “BD emotional triad” 
despair, fear and anger, the most frequently observed emotions irrespective of the subtype, 
several others are elicited in the patients in this context. Since no difference-testing was made, 
due to low frequencies, we will not interpret these scant between-group differences. However, 
it is remarkable that in BD, almost all rated emotions are negative, even if some patients 
present hypomanic symptoms. There are several exceptions, including joy. It can be 
hypothesized that the occasionally observed positive mood in these patients does not imply 
the presence of underlying positive affects and emotions; on the contrary, it might hide - 
defensively concealed -  underlying emotion negativity in BD. This assumption can be 
exemplified by the two most frequently used coping Plans in BD: “Avoid talking about 
difficult events” and “Present yourself as competent”. Both Plans might elicit positive 
emotions in the short term – or on the surface - but as shown by the instrumental 
embeddedness of these two Plans in the Plan structure (and related negative emotions when 
the Plans are blocked), their real long-term effects might not always be helpful for an 
individual presenting these Plans (see Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003, for a 
detailed definition of coping adaptiveness).  
 
Motive-Oriented Therapeutic Relationship and Tailor-made Interventions 
The motive-oriented psychotherapeutic relationship (Caspar, Grossmann, Unmüssig, 
& Schramm, 2006; Caspar, 2007) was introduced by Grawe (1992a) under the label of 
Complementary Therapeutic Relationship. The principle is based on Plan Analysis and allows 
the clinician to adopt a constructive and malleable stance to deal with the Plan dynamics in 
the specific patient. In a radically instrumental perspective, the clinician asks the following 
questions (1) “Which Plans and motives in the patient may I fully endorse within the 
therapeutic relationship?” (the response as Plan is generally found in the upper third of the 
PLAN ANALYSIS FOR BIPOLAR AFFECTIVE DISORDER 180
Plan structure, where more motive-related Plans are located) and (2) “How should I as the 
therapist behave in each clinical situation, to respect this Plan and underlying motive and to 
show the patient that I respect the Plan and motive?” 
For the emotion control subtype, possible therapeutic attitudes include reassuring to 
the patient that the therapist will do everything to avoid for the patient being psychologically 
harmed during therapy (see the Plan “Avoid being harmed”), conveying to the patient that it is 
perfectly acceptable for him/her to want to protect him-/herself (see the Plan “Protect 
yourself”) and, finally, convey to the patient that therapy is a safe place (Reddemann, 2001). 
Motive-orientedness with the over-arching Plan “Avoid being harmed”, if it is realized by the 
therapist as avoidance of negative arousal in the patient, might be accurate in the initial 
sessions, but therapy would probably fail if aimed only at avoiding talking about negative 
events, since we assume with our case conceptualizations that there are real negative – in 
some cases probably traumatic (see also above) - events to work through with such patients. 
Hence, trauma-related interventions, such as imagination techniques and carefully planned 
exposure therapy (Reddemann, 2001; Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs, & Murdock, 1991 ; for a tailor-
made application of such standardized methods, see Kramer, accepted for publication) might 
be indicated for this subgroup, as they would enable the patient to experience safely emotion 
activation related to trauma-related contents. Finally, a well-tailored skills-training focusing 
on emotion regulation (Linehan, 1993) is an important therapeutic ingredient for patients from 
this subtype.  
For the relationship control subtype, with slightly higher resources, the therapist might 
adopt the following attitudes according to the principles of the motive-oriented therapeutic 
relationship: the therapist must show the patient that the latter can completely count on the 
former within the limitations of the therapeutic relationship (see the Plan “Avoid losing the 
other”). In addition, the therapist should show that it is possible to realize one’s own dreams 
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and ideas and yet be dependent on significant others (see the conflict between “Realize 
yourself” and “Avoid losing the other”). The therapist may also, where appropriate, pay great 
attention to the patient’s discourse (e.g., by showing that he/she remembers what was said in 
the previous session). However, we also know from the Plan structure, that there are clinical 
situations where the patient tends to attract the therapist’s attention by using unacceptable or 
less helpful means, e.g., by transgressing rules, by playing the role of a victim. If such 
behavior or low-order Plans are part of an “intransparent interactional play-structure” (Sachse, 
2004), the therapist should point it out and, if the timing is correct, clarify it within the 
therapeutic relationship (Sachse, 2003). The therapist can at the same time reassure the patient 
of his/her presence as a therapeutic caregiver and a genuinely attentive listener, which would 
again be motive-oriented.  
Finally, we mention several limitations of this study. First, by aggregating a host of 
individualized case conceptualizations into one single – broken down into two parts – 
prototypical Plan structure, we run the risk of ignoring clinically important information for 
individual cases, features that were observed rarely and which did not yield the significance 
level to be included the prototypical structure. Likewise, a complete case conceptualization 
and therapy planning for an individual patient needs to encompass far more detail in an 
individualized language adapted to the patient (see Caspar, 2007; for practical guidelines see 
Grawe, Grawe-Gerber, Heiniger, Ambühl, & Caspar, 1996; for a clinical example see 
Heiniger, Grawe-Gerber, Ambühl, Grawe, & Braun, 1996, and also Kramer, accepted for 
publication). As our aim is to apply Plan Analysis to an entire sample of BD patients and 
explore their similarities in terms of prototypicality, rather than their inter-individual 
differences, our suggestions for treatment planning can be understood as only a tentative 
illustration of the concept of motive-oriented therapeutic relationship. Our results of a 
prototypical case conceptualization based on individual clinical material may be particularly 
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useful in clinically challenging situations with BD patients, where a negative emotional 
reaction in the therapist (e.g., irritation) is involved, in situations when the manual-based set 
of interventions shows its limitations (Basco, & Rush, 2005) or when the therapeutic 
relationship with a patient is at stake. We believe these results are encouraging for the clinical 
work and we hope they may help clinicians to conduct even more efficient psychotherapeutic 
interventions as the adjunct to state-of-the-art pharmacological treatments for BD patients. 
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Table 1 
Frequencies of Emotions in Total and per Subtype 
Emotion 
 
Total 
(N = 30) 
Emotion Control 
(n = 10) 
Relationship  Control 
(n = 8) 
Despair 
Fear 
Anger 
Sadness 
Shame 
Guilt 
Joy 
Regret 
Mistrust 
Hostility 
Pride 
Satisfaction 
Disgust 
20 (17%) 
15 (13%) 
14 (12%) 
11 (9%) 
11 (9%) 
6 (5%) 
6 (5%) 
5 (4%) 
4 (3%) 
3 (3%) 
3 (3%) 
2 (2%) 
2 (2%) 
7 (19%) 
5 (14%) 
4 (11%) 
1 (3%) 
2 (5%) 
3 (8%) 
4 (11%) 
1 (3%) 
2 (5%) 
1 (3%) 
0 
0 
2 (5%) 
5 (19%) 
4 (15%) 
5 (19%) 
4 (15%) 
2 (7%) 
0 
1 (4%) 
2 (7%) 
0 
2 (7%) 
0 
0 
0 
Note. The following emotions were found once in the whole sample: Anxiety, Self-pity, 
Discouragement, Embarrassment, Apprehension, Inhibition, Irritation, Enthusiasm, Vexation, 
Fear, Worry, Admiration, Resentment, Emotional Fatigue. Total for Emotion Control: 37 
Emotions; Total for Relationship Control: 27 Emotions; Grand Total: 116 Emotions. 
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Table 2 
Frequencies of Coping Plans 
Coping Plan Frequency 
Avoid talking about difficult events 
Present yourself as competent 
Search for help 
Avoid remaining alone 
Accuse your environment of causing your problems 
Conform with rules 
Take your responsibility 
Distract yourself 
Do everything to satisfy other people 
Do everything to impress the therapist 
Seduce a loved person 
Do everything to avoid being asked uncomfortable questions 
Isolate yourself 
Present yourself as a victim 
Minimize your difficulties 
Avoid engaging in too close relationships 
Avoid stressful situations 
Provoke a dispute 
Emphasize your need of a special treatment 
14 (11%) 
11 (9%) 
10 (8%) 
9 (7%) 
8 (6%) 
8 (6%) 
8 (6%) 
7 (6%) 
6 (5%) 
5 (4%) 
3 (2%) 
3 (2%) 
3 (2%) 
3 (2%) 
3 (2%) 
3 (2%) 
2 (2%) 
2 (2%) 
2 (2%) 
Note. Only frequencies greater than 1 reported in the table. Total Coping Plans for the 30 
patients: 126. 
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Table 3 
Between-Group Differences with regard to Symptoms 
Emotion Relationship Variable 
M SD M SD 
T(1,17) ES 
GSI 
MADRS 
BRMS 
1.69 
19.10 
2.30 
0.98 
12.64 
2.05 
0.91 
12.00 
4.13 
0.38 
7.19 
3.44 
2.91* 
1.99* 
1.96 
1.05 
0.69 
0.65 
Note. Emotion: Plananalytic subgroup characterized by internal stress regulation (n = 10); 
Relationship: Plananalytic subgroup characterized by stress regulation by using interpersonal 
relationships (n  = 8); GSI: General Symptom Index from the Symptom Checklist 90-R; 
MADRS: Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale; BRMS: Bech-Rafaelson Mania 
Scale. Bonferroni’s correction applied. 
* p < .05 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
Figure 1 
Prototypical Plan Structure for Bipolar Affective Disorder (N = 30 patients) 
 
Figure 2 
Prototypical Plan Structure for the Subtype “Emotion Control” (n = 10 patients) 
 
Figure 3 
Prototypical Plan Structure for the Subtype “Relationship Control” (n = 8 patients) 
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Early Change in Defense Mechanisms and Coping in Successful Short-Term Dynamic 
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ABSTRACT 
 Several patient-related variables have already been investigated as predictors of 
change in psychodynamic psychotherapy. Defensive functioning is one of them. However, 
few studies have investigated adaptational processes, encompassing defense mechanisms and 
coping, from an integrative or comparative viewpoint. This pilot study includes 18 patients 
undergoing successful time-limited psychodynamic psychotherapy lasting up to 40 sessions 
and will focus on early change in defense and coping. Observer-rater methodology is applied 
to the transcripts of two sessions of the first part of the psychotherapeutic process. It is 
assumed that the contextual-relational variable of therapeutic alliance intervenes as moderator 
on change in adaptational processes. Results corroborate the hypothesis, but only for coping, 
whereas for defenses, overall functioning remains stable over the first 20 sessions of 
psychotherapy. These results are discussed within the framework of disentangling processes 
underlying adaptation, i.e., related to issues on trait- and state-aspects, as well as the role of 
the therapeutic alliance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key-Words: Defense Mechanism, Coping, Short-Term Psychodynamic 
Psychotherapy, Therapeutic Alliance 
 
DEFENSE AND COPING IN SHORT-TERM DYNAMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 193
EARLY CHANGE IN DEFENSE MECHANISMS AND COPING IN SUCCESSFUL 
SHORT-TERM DYNAMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY: RELATIONS WITH SYMPTOMS AND 
ALLIANCE 
 
In psychotherapy research, in order to predict outcome, studies generally distinguish 
between patient-related variables and context-related variables, among others (Lambert, 2004; 
Wampold, 2001). From among these groups of variables, we will concentrate on two facets of 
adaptational processes – defense mechanisms and coping – as patient-related characteristics, 
and on the therapeutic alliance as a contextual variable in psychotherapy.  
 
Adaptational Processes 
 Defense mechanisms and coping – both serve the individual’s need for adaptation to 
reality – have aroused increasing research and clinical interest in recent years. This is 
certainly due to greater conceptual and methodological maturity in this domain, as regards 
research on both coping and defenses (e.g., Cramer, 1998a; Kramer, 2005a; Lazarus, 2000; 
Perry, & Ianni, 1998; Skinner, Edge, Altman, &, Sherwood, 2003; Steffens, & Kächele, 
1988). An important issue is the adaptiveness of specific defenses and coping. As regards 
defenses, the question has been resolved with the suggestion of a hierarchical organization of 
defenses according to their adaptiveness, maturity or degree of reality distortion (Perry, 
1993a; Vaillant, 1977). In the case of coping, adaptiveness is more complex: quantitative and 
qualitative criteria have been formulated. The first show that the prolonged use of any coping 
process over dissimilar situations impede the individual’s adaptation to reality (Summerfeldt, 
& Endler, 1996). Qualitative criteria, similar to defenses (Skinner, Edge, Altman, et al., 2003) 
differentiate maladaptive coping, as a reaction to stress appraised as threat, from adaptive, as a 
reaction to stress appraised as challenge. Previous studies suggest the importance of 
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disentangling defenses from coping (Cramer, 1998a), not without admitting some overlap, 
generally according to the qualitative criteria of adaptiveness of the singular processes. In this 
regard, Grebot, Paty and Girard Dephanix (2006) have found linkages between mature 
defenses and specific adaptive coping and between immature defenses and specific 
maladaptive coping.  
 An important question related to defense and coping is that of stability and change in 
these processes over time (Cramer, 1998a). Regardless of the presence or the efficacy of any 
therapeutic intervention, one can assume that defenses, as a personality-related concept 
(Bergeret, 1985; Kernberg, 1984), encompass stable trait-aspects along with some state-
aspects. This allows minimal fluctuation of an established pattern of defense (Perry, 2001; 
Drapeau, de Roten, Perry, & Despland, 2003). Coping as a situation-determined concept 
(Lazarus, Averill, & Option, 1974; Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984; Steffens, & Kächele, 1988) is 
best described as a state-concept. Thus, theoretically and extraneous to the therapeutic 
intervention context, coping should be more prone to change over time than defenses. 
 The association of adaptational processes with psychopathology and 
psychotherapeutic outcome has already been investigated several times. Generally, 
maladaptive processes are moderately related to higher symptom levels and unfavorable 
outcome (Cramer, 1998a; Maffei, Fossati, Lingiardi, & Maleddu, 1995; Noam & Recklitis, 
1990; Perry, 1993a). Especially in neurotic disorders, such as Adjustment Disorder, Panic 
Disorder, Major Depression – without the underlying presence of chronic Personality 
Disorders – , symptom level and evolution should be closely related to coping as state-
dependent variable. Defenses should not vary greatly as a function of these symptoms, since 
the core personality structure, from which defensive functioning is a surface derivative, is less 
globally affected by this type of disorder, unlike in long-standing Personality Disorders 
(Perry, 1993a; Perry, 2001).  
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With regard to psychotherapy, adaptational processes – whether coping or defense -  
have been examined in several studies (Drapeau, de Roten, Perry, & Despland, 2003; Perry, 
2001; Perry, Drapeau, Dunkley, Foley, Blake, & Banon, 2007). Over the course of brief 
psychotherapeutic crisis intervention in four sessions (N = 61 patients), Drapeau, de Roten, 
Perry and Despland (2003) have shown a shifting effect in defenses from narcissistic (first 
session) to obsessional (fourth session). These changes have been interpreted as state-changes 
in defenses due to the resolution of the crisis over the course of ultra-brief intervention - or 
the intellectualization of narcissistic stakes related to the crisis - rather than profound 
restructuring of defensive functioning in the patients. Long-term changes in defenses have 
been documented by means of a case study (Perry, 2001): a patient presenting passive-
aggressive Personality Disorder undergoing psychodynamic psychotherapy for four years 
presented profound defensive restructuring, i.e., fewer action defenses, fewer narcissistic 
defenses, after treatment. This case study also confirms the clinical assumption of the 
patient’s regression with regard to defenses at mid-treatment: Overall Defensive Functioning 
(ODF) decreased slightly in the first two years of treatment, before reaching healthier neurotic 
levels at third and fourth years, and moved up to adaptive and mature defensive functioning 
during follow-up. Hence, concentrating on short-term psychodynamic psychotherapy (STDP) 
and investigating early change in adaptational processes, we would hypothesize that if 
changes in defense and coping can be observed in the initial 20 sessions of STDP, they would 
be related to state-variables, i.e., be found in specific defense categories, and not represent 
profound restructuring of defensive functioning, as measured by Overall Defensive 
Functioning. In this early stage of therapy of predominantly neurotic patients, coping should 
be more closely related to symptom level and change and should change itself more rapidly, 
whereas symptom level and change should be independent from personality-related variables, 
such as defenses. 
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Therapeutic Alliance as Moderator 
Theoretically, the therapeutic alliance intervenes as a contextual variable in 
influencing the effects of psychotherapy (Wampold, 2001). This is demonstrated by moderate 
effect sizes relating alliance to outcome across various treatment settings (Martin, Garske, & 
Davis, 2000; Horvath & Symonds, 1991). Whereas these meta-analyses are based on alliance 
measures at one point in time – or on mean alliance - , recent research tends to prefer the use 
of the clinically relevant description of evolution of alliance patterns (de Roten, Fischer, 
Drapeau, Beretta, Kramer, Favre, &, Despland, 2004; Kivlighan, & Shaughnessy, 1995; 
Kramer, de Roten, Beretta, Michel, & Despland, in revision). This may particularly hold true 
for time-limited treatments, where the process of  relationship construction is at least as 
important as the technical aspects, due to the restricted time-frame potentially eliciting in the 
patient a high degree of emotionality and issues related to pre-transference and transference 
(Gilliéron, 1997). Thus, alliance may have an impact on the evolution of adaptational 
processes in patients undergoing short-term psychodynamic psychotherapy; we would 
postulate the presence of a moderator effect of alliance (Baron, & Kenny, 1986) in this regard. 
Consistent with our interest in early change in adaptational processes, we have concentrated 
on alliance construction processes taking place during approximately the first two months of 
treatment, i.e., the eight initial sessions. This time-frame is based on the study on alliance 
patterns by Stiles, Glick, Osatuke, Hardy, Shapiro, Agnew-Davies, Rees and Barkham (2004). 
This leads us to our research hypotheses: (1) Coping and defense are two different 
processes; if overlap there is, mature defenses are related to adaptive coping and immature 
defenses are related to maladaptive coping; (2) Over the course of the initial sessions of 
psychodynamic psychotherapy, a) coping changes, whereas defenses remain stable, b) Overall 
Coping Functioning increases, whereas Overall Defensive Functioning remains stable; (3) 
Patterns of alliance construction operate as moderator variable for the early changes in 
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defenses and coping in psychodynamic psychotherapy; (4) Coping is related to symptom level 
and change over therapy, whereas defenses are not. 
 
METHOD 
 Participants 
 The patients (N = 18) were self-referred university students at a French-speaking 
University Consultation Center, consulting for Adjustment Disorder, either with anxious or 
depressive mood. DSM-IV-diagnoses (APA, 1994) were established by using the SCID I and 
II (Spitzer, Williams, & Gibbon, 1997). Patients presenting Psychosis, Addictions and Bipolar 
Disorder were excluded from this study. A total of 7 (39%) presented co-morbid Personality 
Disorders (cluster B). Their mean age was 24 years (SD = 4.3; range = 20-39); 11 (61 %) 
were female. They were recruited for the study after their intake session by a member of the 
research staff. Upon approval, they were referred to one of the therapists. All participants 
gave written informed consent for their data to be used for research; the present study was 
approved by the ethical commission of the Department of Psychiatry involved. For our 
exploratory analysis on defense and coping, we selected 18 patients with clinically reliable 
symptom decrease on General Symptom Index (SCL-90-R; see below) over the course of 
short-term dynamic psychotherapy. For this exploratory study, we made a selection drawn 
from a larger sample encompassing N = 50 participants2. 
 The therapists (N = 10) were experienced psychiatrists and psychotherapists, all with 
over 10 years of clinical experience in the field of psychodynamic psychotherapy. The 
therapists did not have access to research data until the whole set was completed. 
 
 
                                                 
2 This study was supported by the FNRS Grant 3200BO-100706/1 
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Treatment 
Short-term dynamic psychotherapy (STDP) is a manual-based (Gilliéron, 1997), time-
limited form of psychotherapy based on psychoanalytic theory and developed in order to 
respond to the increasing demand for short-term efficient treatments in psychotherapy (Malan, 
1976; Sifneos, 1987; Gilliéron, 1997). Its efficacy has been established by a number of studies 
(Leichsenring, & Leibing, 2003; Crits-Christoph, 1992; Beretta, de Roten, Kramer, Michel, & 
Despland, in revision). This study includes psychotherapeutic treatments lasting up to 40 
sessions, with a mean of 24 sessions (SD = 10.0; range 15 – 40). 
 
Instruments 
Defense Mechanism Rating Scales (DMRS; Perry, 1990a; French translation: Perry, 
Guelfi, Despland, & Hanin, 2004). The DMRS is an observer-rater scale assessing 28 defense 
mechanisms, based on the hierarchical conception of defensive functioning by Vaillant 
(1992). Seven levels ranged according to the criteria of adaptiveness are included, from the 
least adaptive to the highly adaptive: (1) Action (acting out, passive aggression, 
hypochondriasis), (2) Borderline (splitting of self/object images,  projective identification), 
(3) Disavowal (denial, rationalisation, projection) and autistic fantasy (for further 
computation, this defense will be considered on level 3, even if conceptually distinct) (4) 
Narcissistic (omnipotence, devaluation, idealization), (5) Neurotic (repression, dissociation, 
reaction formation, displacement), (6) Obsessional (isolation of affect, intellectualization, 
undoing) and (7) Mature (affiliation, altruism, anticipation, self-assertion, humour, self-
observation, sublimation, suppression). Quantitative scoring has been used, yielding relative 
frequency scores per defense level, as well as an Overall Defense Functioning (ODF) score 
which can be computed by weighting the absolute frequency of the defenses by their level. 
For the current study, reliability coefficients on 10% of the ratings were established among 
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fully-trained raters and yielded satisfactory results in terms of intra-class correlation 
coefficients (2,1, Wirtz, & Caspar, 2002; APPENDIX B2) varying between .76 and .98 (Mean 
= . 90; SD = .12; APPENDIX G2). For these reliability analyses, the defense level was the 
unit of analysis (7 categories). 
  
Coping Action Patterns (CAP; Perry, Drapeau, Dunkley, & Blake, 2005; French 
translation by Kramer, & Drapeau, 2005). CAP is an observer-rating system assessing coping 
processes based on interview-transcripts (Drapeau, & Perry, 2005). The rating scale 
encompasses 12 categories of coping (based on Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). 
Three general domains have been identified (relatedness, competence, autonomy) each 
encompassing four categories (“families”)  of coping. Moreover, six of the coping categories 
are conceived as coping with stress appraised as challenge (problem-solving, information-
seeking, self-reliance, support-seeking, accommodation, negotiation) and the other half as 
coping with stress appraised as threat (helplessness, escape, delegation, isolation, submission, 
opposition). Therefore, 12 coping categories are assessed by this instrument. Relative 
frequencies are computed for all coping processes. Based on Skinner et al. (2003), an Overall 
Coping Functioning (OCF) score can be computed (relative frequency of challenge-coping). 
Preliminary empirical validation data have been presented by D’Iuso, Blake and Drapeau 
(2007), Drapeau and Perry (2005), Drapeau, Perry, Blake and D’Iuso, 2007) and Perry, 
Drapeau, Dunkley, Foley, Blake and Banon (2007) for the original English version, Kramer 
(2006a), Kramer, Drapeau, Perry, Bodenmann, Despland, and de Roten (2007) and Kramer 
and Drapeau (in prep.) for the French version used for this study. In the case of the current 
study, reliability coefficients on 10% of the ratings were established among fully-trained 
raters and yielded satisfactory results in terms of intra-class correlation coefficients (2,1, 
Wirtz, & Caspar, 2002) varying between .73 and .88 (M = .79; SD = .08; APPENDIX G1). 
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These coefficients have been established on coping category as the unit of analysis (12 
categories). Intra-class correlation coefficients (2,1) with the CAP authors’ group of raters 
vary between .51 and .83 (M = .71; SD = .11; the .51 score is the only one below .60; 
APPENDIX B4).  
 
Symptom Check List SCL-90-R (Derogatis, 1994). This questionnaire consists of 90 
items addressing various somatic and psychological signs of distress. These items are scored 
using a Likert-type scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Although the instrument is 
composed of 10 subscales, our study used only the General Symptomatic Index (GSI, score 
ranging from 0 to 4), which is a mean rated over all symptoms. Clinical cut-off score is 0.80. 
The French validation study was carried out by Pariente and Guelfi (1990) and yielded 
satisfactory coefficients. Cronbach alpha for this sample was .96. Mean GSI at intake for this 
sample is 1.24 (SD = 0.52; ranging from 0.52 to 2.69). Symptom change was calculated 
according to Jacobson and Truax’ (1991) recommendation by means of Reliable Clinical 
Change Index (RCI; see also Beretta, de Roten, Drapeau, Kramer, Favre, & Despland, 2005). 
Negative numbers indicate symptom decrease. In our sample over the course of the whole 
psychotherapy, all patients included showed reliable symptom decrease (M(RCI) = -7.28; SD 
= 3.76; ranging from –14.04 to –2.02). 
 
Helping Alliance questionnaire HAq-I (Alexander & Luborsky, 1986). This self-report 
11-item questionnaire is rated by means of a 6-point-Likert scale (ranging from –3 “I strongly 
feel that this is not true” to +3 “I strongly feel that this is true”). The total score of HAq-I 
ranges theoretically between –33 and 33. Two factors have been identified in previous studies 
(Luborsky, 2000, for a review): the patient’s experience of being helped and the patient’s 
experience of making joint effort with the therapist to overcome difficulties. According to 
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Luborsky (2000), psychometric properties are as good as those of other current alliance 
questionnaires. The French validation study based on translation and back-translation was 
carried out by Bachelor and Salamé (2000). At the end of each psychotherapy session, the 
patient was asked to fill in the questionnaire. Cronbach alpha for the whole scale was .89. 
Mean alliance for our sample was 15.41 (SD = 9.11; ranging from –6.90 to 25.40). Recent 
research (de Roten, Fischer, Drapeau, Beretta, Kramer, Favre, & Despland, 2004; Kramer, de 
Roten, Beretta, Michel, & Despland, 2008, in press) has pointed out the relevance for 
outcome prediction of patterns of alliance construction over the course of psychotherapy. In 
the present sample over the initial eight sessions of therapy (corresponding to about the first 
two months of treatment), based on the methodology by Stiles, et al. (2004), the “Shape-of-
Change”, two distinct patterns of alliance construction were identified: increasing alliance 
pattern (n = 6) and decreasing pattern (n = 12; Kramer, de Roten, Beretta, Michel, & 
Despland, 2008, in press). 
 
Procedure 
All psychotherapy sessions were audio-taped. From each therapeutic process, two 
sessions were randomly chosen for DMRS and CAP ratings. The first was chosen out of 
sessions 2 to 5, the second was chosen out of sessions 12 to 15. The rationale for these 
intervals was (1) To choose a session from the alliance construction process, excluding the 
intake session; (2) To choose a session from mid-treatment, in order to study early change in 
STDP. This total of 36 sessions were transcribed according to the method defined by 
Mergenthaler and Stigler (1997). 
The ratings were based on the transcripts. DMRS ratings were carried out by fully-
trained raters, including the author; the reliability of these ratings was established with fully-
trained colleagues on a randomly chosen 10% of all sessions (for the results see under 
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Instruments). All CAP ratings were done by the author; reliability of these ratings were 
established with fully-trained Master’s-level psychology students, who were trained during 
four months by the author, on a randomly chosen 10% of all sessions (for the results see under 
Instruments). 
 
Data Analytic Strategy 
 In order to respond to the first hypothesis, we conducted canonical correlations 
between the two sets of variables, defenses and coping (on the first session), maximizing the 
possible links between the variables and controlling best for the multiplication of errors 
related to significance testing (Tabachnick, & Fidell, 1996). Furthermore, we carried out 
exploratory factor analysis (method PCA, Principal Components Analysis; results after 
VARIMAX rotation) on defenses and coping on both sessions taken as a whole. In response 
to the second hypothesis, we conducted a series of Paired-Sample t-tests between the first and 
the second session on a) specific coping and defense processes and on b) Overall Coping 
Functioning (OCF) and Overall Defensive Functioning (ODF); Bonferroni’s correction was 
applied. To validate the third hypothesis, a nested design offered only by Hierarchical Linear 
Modeling (HLM; Bryk, & Raudenbush, 1987; for computation the program MixReg, 
Hedeker, & Gibbons, 1997) is needed. This design takes optimally into account data 
dependency between the two sessions; sessions (level 1) are nested within patients (level 2). 
In assessing change, HLM avoids some limiting assumptions of Paired-Sample t-tests by 
taking into account each individual’s trajectory of scores over time. A mixed model predicting 
alternatively ODF and OCF, introducing alliance pattern as fixed factor, was carried out (for 
level 1: ODF or OCF = β0j + β1j + ε;  for level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01 + u0j ; β1j = γ10 + γ11 + u1j). 
Finally, linear regression analyses (method Enter) were conducted, including ODF and OCF 
predicting symptom level and change.  
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RESULTS 
 Difference between Coping and Defense 
Canonical correlation on the first session the CAP subscales and the DMRS levels 
yielded a non-significant overall effect (t-value = 0.95; see table 1). Only a few moderate 
links between specific processes; if correlation there is, immature defenses are correlated with 
coping when up against stress appraised as threat and mature defenses with coping when up 
against stress appraised as challenge. Canonical correlation between ODF and OCF yields for 
the first interview a t-value of 2.06 (p = .06; Pearson’s correlation r = .46;  p = .06) and for the 
second a t-value of 2.15 (p = .05; Pearson’s correlations r = .47; p = .05). Thus a moderate 
relationship between defense levels and coping processes has been found on the level of 
overall functioning. This result is corroborated by EFA (after VARIMAX rotation) where the 
first (bipolar) factor named “Maladaptive processes” yields high item loadings for borderline 
and action defenses, and opposition CAP (also with negative item loadings support-seeking 
CAP and accommodation CAP). This factor explains 16.23% of the total variance 
(Eigenvalue 3.08). The second factor is named “Defenses”: obsessional and neurotic defenses 
show high item loadings (together with negative loading for disavowal; explaining 13.22% of 
the variance; Eigenvalue 2.51). Total variance explained by the two factors was 29.45%. 
 
 Early Change of Defense and Coping over the course of STDP 
 In a Paired-Sample t-test, where Bonferroni’s correction was strictly applied, only one 
difference has been found for coping: negotiation CAP increases. This is also the only 
noteworthy category with a high effect size. Most importantly, both ODF and OCF remain 
stable (both ES in the moderate range). 
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 Alliance Construction Patterns Moderating Early Change of ODF and OCF 
 Using a mixed model (HLM), we did not find any main-effects for either session 
(confirming the overall stability of ODF and OCF over time) nor alliance pattern predicting 
ODF and OCF. However, there is a significant interaction effect (session x alliance pattern) 
for OCF: the increasing alliance construction pattern is associated with increasing OCF, 
whereas the decreasing alliance pattern with decreasing OCF (p = .05). No such interaction 
effect was found for ODF. 
 
 Coping, Defense, Symptom Level and Evolution 
 With regard to links with symptom level and outcome, double linear regression 
analyses yield a significant predictive link between OCF and symptom level at intake (p = 
.05); no such link was found for ODF. Neither variable predicts symptom evolution, when 
comparing GSI at intake with GSI at discharge. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The results corroborate parts of our hypotheses. First of all, the results suggest that 
defense and coping are probably two distinct psychological processes, sharing some overlap. 
In our sample, the latter is mostly related to maladaptive processes, as shown by EFA (e.g., 
borderline and action defenses with opposition coping) and correlational analyses (see also 
the results reported by Grebot, Paty, & Girard Dephanix, 2006). Overlap exists with regard to 
adaptiveness of defenses (ODF) and coping (OCF): at both sessions, a marginally significant 
effect was found. These results add an argument in favor of convergent validity of general 
indices of adaptiveness, i.e., ODF and OCF, and divergent validity on the level of specific 
adaptational processes. Of course, these results are tentative, since the number of observations 
is very low for the conduct of exploratory factor analysis, as is the variance explained by the 
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first two factors; thus, the stability of these factors and the observed low item loadings need to 
be confirmed in larger samples. 
 The second hypothesis investigating early change of defense and coping in STDP has 
yielded one single significant effect, when Bonferroni correction is strictly applied. Overall 
coping and defense functioning both remain stable over the first part of STDP. OCF stability 
over the initial sessions of STDP contradicts our second, part (b), hypothesis. A more 
complex model including the effect of contextual variables such as the therapeutic alliance 
will be discussed below. No specific defense level changes – nor ODF change - were noted 
during the initial sessions of STDP, thus confirming our second hypothesis, part (a), as well as 
part (b). For coping, negotiation increases, which might be an early behavioral or cognitive 
benefit from therapy which also tends to corroborate our second, part (a), hypothesis. It can be 
assumed that, as well as gaining more insight into his/her own functioning over the course of 
therapy, the patient might become increasingly aware of others’ wishes and he/she, even if 
contradicted, might be able to make a deal with anybody, without drawing on helpless or 
dominant interpersonal behaviors. In order to draw firm conclusions, coping changes in STDP 
should be investigated on larger samples. 
 When introducing alliance construction patterns into the model of early change in 
ODF and OCF, one notices an interaction effect in the case of OCF in the sense that 
increasing OCF is related to increasing alliance and vice-versa, but not for ODF. This 
confirms a differential moderating effect of alliance on OCF change and the relevance of 
alliance construction patterns in this regard. Patients constructing positive alliance over the 
initial sessions, do rapidly benefit from therapy in terms of a better overall state-dependent 
adaptation to reality, e.g. by the preferential use of negotiation coping, as shown above. In 
turn, the subject’s awareness of this increase in adaptation might incite him/her to engage 
even more fully in therapy, and might thus lead to an even more solid therapeutic alliance. As 
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such, the relevance of alliance, and in particular alliance construction patterns (Kramer et al., 
2008, in press), as a contextual variable for change in coping processes within the patient is 
tentatively confirmed. These hypothetical dynamics do not hold true for defenses (ODF), 
where no interaction effect has been observed in the mixed model. Hence, contextual 
variables, such as alliance construction patterns early in therapy seem to have a short-term 
effect on state-changes related to coping, but no such short-term effect on profound defensive 
functioning. In order to be able to observe the latter, we assume long-term psychotherapy or 
psychoanalysis to be the best treatment settings (Bond, & Perry, 2004; Perry, 2001). 
Alternatively, therapeutic effects on the defense level may only occur in the second half of 
short-term dynamic psychotherapy, as reported in a study by Hersoug, Sexton and Hoglend 
(2002). The effect of alliance on defensive functioning in these mid- to long-term processes is 
a necessary follow-up research question. 
 With regard to relations with symptom level and change, we were able to confirm our 
hypothesis that Overall Coping Functioning in the earliest sessions are linked to general 
symptomatology (GSI) at intake. Again, no such relationship was found for Overall Defensive 
Functioning. This is in line with the predominance of neurotic disorders in our sample 
producing symptoms which might be somewhat unrelated to defensive functioning. An 
argument against this surmise would be that the mean ODF is in the narcissistic range of 
defensive functioning, suggesting the presence of underlying immature defense patterns 
reflecting nevertheless a certain dysfunctionality in personality functioning. It becomes 
evident that immature defenses account for trait-aspects, in the same way as they might 
account for state-aspects. The absence of any relationship with symptoms would argue in 
favor of a complex interplay between therapeutic situation-induced  - at times due to 
regression within the therapeutic context - defenses and personality-related defensive patterns 
remaining stable in the same individual in dissimilar situations. Finally, the absence of any 
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link between adaptational processes and therapeutic outcome might suggest that neither trait- 
nor state-aspects of adaptation in the patient suffice to explain the therapeutic results, but a 
mediator or moderator model, including context, therapist and technique variables, is 
probably warranted to explain a relevant amount of variance in symptom change (see 
Despland, de Roten, Despars, Stigler, & Perry, 2001). The low statistical power of this 
exploratory study prevented our conducting such analyses. In addition, the reliable symptom 
reduction observed in all patients as selection criteria, diminishes outcome variance and might 
thus account for the lack of any relationship between adaptational processes and outcome. 
 To sum up, coping and defense draw probably on two different psychological 
processes; further studies on their disentangling are greatly needed. At the same time, there 
exists a moderate overlap between the two concepts, especially with regard to maladaptive 
processes and the overall adaptiveness (see also Grebot, Paty, & Girard Dephanix, 2006). By 
and large, defense and coping remain stable throughout the first half of short-term dynamic 
psychotherapy; an exception is an increase in negotiation coping. Therapeutic alliance 
construction processes operate as a moderator variable for change in coping, but not in 
defenses. Finally, coping is related to the level of symptoms, whereas defenses are not. These 
results add an argument in favor of stability in defenses, as well as in favor of coping as a 
more situation-dependent concept (Whitty, 2003). Profound restructuring of defensive 
functioning would require a much longer time-frame of treatment. 
Several limitations to this study have to be indicated. The small number of 
observations is certainly the main shortcoming; however, the data analytic strategy was 
adapted to the resulting low power and limitations are acknowledged. The sample presents a 
certain symptomatic heterogeneity, mainly neurotic disorders, such as adjustment disorder, 
but also several underlying personality disorders. While this is due to the naturalistic setting 
and increases external validity, it also limits the internal validity of the clinical trial, i.e., due 
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to the absence of a control condition. For adaptational processes, only two assessment points 
entered our analyses. To disentangle trait- and state-aspects completely, multiple measure 
points across the whole psychotherapy are needed (Perry, 2001; Drapeau, de Roten, Perry, & 
Despland, 2003). This would allow the conduct of full mediator or moderator analyses on 
indices of adaptational processes. Finally, our model focusing on early change in adaptational 
processes did not include the type, quality and level of therapeutic interventions. This can be 
achieved in the future by drawing on the concept of therapist responsiveness (Stiles, Honos-
Webb, & Surko, 1998; Norcross, 2002). 
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Table 1 
Canonical Correlations (t-values) Between Defense and Coping at First Session (N  = 18) 
DMRS 
CAP 
Mat Obses Neur Narc Disav Border Act 
PS 
IS 
H 
E 
SR 
SS 
D 
I 
A 
N 
S 
O 
-0.53 
0.38 
-0.93 
-0.40 
0.59 
-0.67 
-3.28** 
-1.29 
-0.46 
-0.53 
-0.39 
-0.05 
0.39 
-0.53 
0.39 
-0.26 
-0.27 
0.72 
-2.27** 
-0.71 
1.91 
-0.94 
0.11 
0.61 
-0.84 
1.53 
1.11 
-1.25 
-0.41 
2.90** 
-0.72 
1.32 
0.83 
-0.64 
-1.32 
-2.67* 
0.05 
0.11 
-1.44 
0.86 
-0.03 
-0.10 
0.25 
0.19 
-0.59 
1.40 
1.97 
-0.06 
0.25 
-1.00 
-0.40 
0.64 
1.15 
-2.68* 
1.32 
-0.13 
-1.61 
0.72 
0.50 
0.72 
1.04 
-1.43 
1.06 
2.66* 
-1.39 
-1.05 
-0.94 
0.84 
-1.55 
0.99 
-0.85 
2.22* 
0.64 
-0.21 
-0.14 
0.07 
-1.18 
-1.35 
0.09 
0.07 
-0.59 
0.76 
0.81 
1.28 
Note. CAP: Coping Action Patterns; PS: Problem-solving; IS: Information-seeking; H: 
Helplessness; E: Escape; SR: Self-reliance; SS: Support-seeking; D: Delegation; I: Isolation; 
A: Accommodation; N: Negotiation; S: Submission; O: Opposition. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 2 
Exploratory Factor Analysis on Defenses and Coping, Results after VARIMAX Rotation 
 Patients (N = 36) 
  I:Maladaptive  II:Defenses 
Borderline Defenses 
Action Defenses 
CAP Escape 
CAP Support-Seeking 
CAP Isolation 
CAP Opposition 
Mature Defenses 
Neurotic Defenses 
CAP Problem-solving 
CAP Helplessness 
CAP Self-Reliance 
CAP Delegation 
CAP Accommodation 
Obsessional  Defenses
Disavowal Defenses 
CAP Negotiation 
.63 
.59 
.23 
-.65 
.26 
.74 
-.31 
-.24 
.39 
.27 
-.47 
.44 
-.63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.34 
.58 
.25 
.48 
-.47 
-.40 
.32 
.77 
-.72 
-.30 
Note. Item loadings below |.20| not reported and item loadings above |.50| in italics. 
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Table 3 
Change in Defenses and Coping throughout Dynamic Psychotherapy (N = 18) 
First Session Second Session Defenses/Coping 
M SD M SD 
t(1, 17) ES 
DMRS 
N (defenses) 
ODF 
Mature  
Obsessional 
Neurotic 
Narcissistic 
Disavowal 
Borderline 
Action 
CAP 
N (coping) 
OCF 
Problem-solving 
Info-seeking 
Helplessness 
Escape 
Self-Reliance 
Support-Seeking 
Delegation 
Isolation 
 
35.11 
4.50 
8.63 
29.88 
18.38 
10.38 
18.89 
6.04 
7.79 
 
14.22 
.36 
0.86 
6.97 
17.79 
14.78 
13.58 
2.91 
9.42 
4.32 
 
17.10 
0.57 
10.58 
14.08 
14.39 
8.39 
10.37 
4.95 
6.05 
 
6.53 
.21 
1.99 
9.96 
16.55 
14.02 
13.43 
6.18 
12.87 
6.44 
 
35.11 
4.21 
9.00 
24.87 
13.52 
9.63 
25.36 
7.93 
10.59 
 
16.28 
.46 
0.00 
7.73 
12.32 
11.92 
19.42 
6.34 
12.68 
3.61 
 
18.17 
0.59 
11.77 
10.62 
8.70 
8.43 
9.21 
6.58 
9.30 
 
7.09 
.28 
0.00 
7.83 
14.11 
10.86 
22.42 
8.65 
14.70 
5.81 
 
0.00 
1.70 
-0.11 
1.55 
1.36 
0.29 
-1.85 
-0.95 
-1.25 
 
-1.41 
-1.59 
1.83 
-0.29 
1.02 
0.89 
-0.92 
-1.28 
-1.09 
0.45 
 
0.00 
0.50 
0.03 
0.40 
0.41 
0.09 
0.66 
.032 
0.36 
 
0.30 
0.40 
0.45 
0.08 
0.36 
0.23 
0.32 
0.46 
0.24 
0.12 
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Accommodation 
Negotiation 
Submission 
Opposition 
11.30 
0.21 
5.62 
12.24 
14.36 
0.87 
7.79 
10.30 
9.29 
3.42 
3.95 
9.33 
9.50 
5.27 
10.33 
10.83 
0.48 
-2.49* 
0.75 
0.90 
0.17 
0.85 
0.18 
0.28 
Note. Paired-Sample t-tests; DMRS: Defense Mechanisms Ratings Scales; ODF: Overall 
Defensive Functioning; CAP: Coping Action Patterns; OCF: Overall Coping Functioning; 
Bonferroni’s correction applied (significance level 05/2). 
* p < .05 
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Table 4 
Changes in ODF and OCF over the course of Dynamic Psychotherapy  
Variable Estimate SE Z p-value 
ODF 
 Session 
 Alliance pattern 
 Interaction 
 
-0.31 
0.10 
0.05 
 
0.20 
0.28 
0.35 
 
-1.51 
0.36 
0.14 
 
.13 
.71 
.89 
OCF 
 Session 
 Alliance pattern 
 Interaction 
 
0.02 
-0.18 
0.24 
 
0.07 
0.11 
0.12 
 
0.34 
-1.55 
1.94 
 
.73 
.12 
.05 
Note. Nested design (Hierarchical Linear Modeling; HLM); ODF: Overall Defensive 
Functioning; OCF: Overall Coping Functioning; SE: Standard Error. 
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Table 5 
Regression Analyses for ODF and OCF predicting GSI and RCI (N = 18) 
Variable B SE B β 
Predicting GSI 
  ODF 
  OCF 
 
-0.09 
-1.52 
 
0.20 
0.54 
 
-.09 
-.61* 
Predicting RCI 
  ODF 
  OCF 
 
-0.52 
6.25 
 
1.85 
5.43 
 
-.08 
.34 
Note. ODF: Overall Defensive Functioning; OCF: Overall Coping Functioning; GSI: General 
Symptom Index from Symptom-Checklist-90-R at intake; RCI: Reliable Clinical Change 
Index based on GSI 
GSI: R² = .44; p = .02; RCI: R² = .10; p = .51; Bonferroni’s correction applied (significance 
level .05/2) 
* p < .05 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
“The important thing is 
 not to stop 
 questioning.”  
Albert Einstein 
 
 
 
To make this set of chapters a coherent whole, we will discuss the results 
comprehensively. First, we will focus our attention on the theses ensuing from the material 
presented and discuss their theoretical and empirical validity. Some of these theses are 
illustrated by patient material (verbatims) from our samples chosen to support our theses. It 
was not our objective to choose and use clinical case material to challenge (Stiles, 2005), but 
to exemplify the assumptions. The reader mainly interested in conceptual issues may wish to 
skip these short illustrative paragraphs. We will discuss the methods used in our research and 
outline general limitations of the studies. Particular attention will be given to clinical 
implications ensuing from the conceptual and empirical results. Finally, we will outline 
several research perspectives and imperatives for future studies on adaptational processes in 
affective disorders and mental disorders in general. 
 
 Main Theses 
A total of 11 theses have been drawn from the conclusions of this series of chapters, as 
they are depicted in Table 1. Their main theoretical underpinning is presented, as well as 
empirical evidence from the current series of chapters. Each will be discussed separately. 
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Table 1 
 Synopsis of the 11 Theses, including References, Chapters and Empirical Support 
Thesis References Chapter Empirical support
(1) Defense and coping are two 
distinctive psychological processes 
(2) Defense and coping have both 
conscious and unconscious aspects 
(3) Coping is understood as a state-
concept, defense as state- and trait-
concept 
(4) Coping adaptiveness is related to 
symptom level, whereas defense 
adaptiveness is not 
(5) Only CAPs stress appraised as 
threat are prone to be high-frequency 
coping in BD 
(6) Immature defenses are related to 
BD functioning 
(7) Positive CE are related to manic 
symptoms, negative CE to depressive 
symptoms 
(8) Internal regulation of stress yields 
less optimal adaptation than 
relationship regulation 
(9) Coping and defense adaptiveness 
Cramer (1998a) 
 
Perry (1993a) 
Lazarus (2000) 
Cramer (1998a) 
Steffens & Kächele 
(1988) 
Cramer (1998a) 
 
 
Skinner et al. (2003)
 
 
Perry (1988) 
 
Clark & Beck 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
Cramer (1998a) 
A, D, G 
 
A, B, C 
 
A, D, G 
 
 
B, C, D, G 
 
 
B, D 
 
 
C, D 
 
E 
 
 
F 
 
 
B, C, D, G 
** 
 
** 
 
*** 
 
 
* 
 
 
** 
 
 
*** 
 
** 
 
 
*** 
 
 
* 
DISCUSSION 217
are both related to symptom evolution 
(10) Adaptational processes are 
related to the therapeutic alliance 
(11) The therapeutic alliance 
modulates the evolution of defense 
and coping over the course of 
treatment 
 
Zuroff, & Blatt 
(2006) 
Clarkin, & Levy 
(2004) 
 
 
B, C, E 
 
G 
 
 
* 
 
** 
 
* sparse empirical support; ** moderate empirical support; *** clear empirical support;  
**** full empirical support 
 
Thesis 1. Defense and coping are two distinctive psychological processes. As 
underlined in chapter A, this first assumption is the Achilles heel of our work, as well as of 
Cramer’s (1998a) review and underlies the integrative conceptions of Chabrol and Callahan 
(2004) and Steffens and Kächele (1988). The moderate corroboration of this hypothesis, as 
suggested in chapters D and G independently, adds an empirical argument in favor of 
maintenance of a clear-cut conceptual distinction between defense and coping and opens the 
way to integrative conceptualizations as postulated in chapter A. Both data sets, the BD 
patients with the matched controls and the psychotherapy patients, yield low to moderate 
overall relationships between defense and coping. The strongest of the reported relationships, 
although only marginally significant, were consistently those between ODF and OCF, 
representing overall functioning and adaptiveness. This means that the overall level of 
adaptiveness, as operationalized by defenses v coping, is consistent, whereas consistency is 
low on the level of specificities (i.e., specific defense or coping profile). This result adds a 
fairly convincing argument in favor of the convergent validity of ODF and OCF, compared to 
an even more convincing discriminant validity on the specificity level. These empirical results 
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suggest that we are dealing with two specific psychological processes, both serving the same 
goal, the individual’s adaptation to reality, as operationalized by the specific coping and 
defense concepts.  
On the specific levels, there are some associations between defense and coping: In the 
BD sample, mature defenses correlate with CAP where the stress is appraised as challenge, 
inversely, action defenses are related to CAP-threat. The picture is less clear in psychotherapy 
patients, but there are still some significant correlations in this sense. In all three EFAs (BD 
patients, controls, psychotherapy patients), the first factor is a common defense-coping factor, 
labelled either immature or mature processes; the second is consistently a specific factor 
labelled either defense or coping. Thus, some data point in the direction underlined by Grebot, 
Paty and Girard Dephanix (2006) that, if overlap on the specific level, it will be found 
according to the hierarchy of adaptiveness inherent in the concepts of defense and coping. 
Specifically for BD, a patient presenting mature defenses is likely to present at the same time 
self-reliance and accommodation CAP and less likely to present opposition CAP. On the 
contrary, a patient presenting action defenses is likely to present opposition and problem-
solving CAP and less likely to present self-reliance and accommodation CAP. Moreover, 
CAP opposition is linked with immature (narcissistic and borderline) defenses. For the 
psychotherapy patients, borderline defenses are linked with escape and opposition CAP; 
neurotic defenses are linked with support-seeking and negatively with opposition CAP.  
For coping concepts, Skinner, Edge, Altman and Sherwood (2003) systematize the 
qualitative differentiation between stress appraised as challenge and as threat, but are hesitant 
as regards clear prediction in terms of adaptiveness. Quantitative differences in coping, “high-
frequency coping”, seem as promising an operationalization of coping adaptiveness as 
qualititative ones (see chapter B). Our data suggest the use of both conceptions for coping 
adaptiveness and advocate in favor of a clear qualitative conception (“hierarchy”) for 
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adaptiveness of defenses (for an opposing view for defenses, see Fenichel, 1945). Overall, 
this first thesis is weakened by the small sample sizes and the observation that the factors in 
the EFAs are probably not stable; thus, further studies are needed on larger samples and other 
populations. However, if our hypotheses resist further empirical investigation, such research 
might be put forward as an argument in favor of the differentiation of defense and coping in 
the perspective of a separate dimension – encompassing two distinct subscales - in the fifth 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 4th ed., APA, 
1994; Hilsenroth, Callahan, & Eudell, 2003; Perry, Hoglend, Shear, Vaillant, Horowitz, 
Kardos, Bille, & Kagan, 1998). 
 
Thesis 2. Defense and coping have both conscious and unconscious aspects. Another 
important assumption of our work is the non-differentiation between coping and defense with 
regard to consciousness, thus opposing Cramer’s view (1998a, 2001) and Küchenhoff and 
Manz’s (1993). The clear confirmation of this hypothesis would argue in favor of multi-
method comparison within each field separately – research on coping and on defenses – and 
questions the face-validity of self-report measures as regards the assessment of complex 
adaptational processes. This question has already been raised several times (Lazarus, 2000; 
Perry, & Ianni, 1998; Tschuschke, Pfleiderer, Denzinger, Hertenstein, Kächele, Arnold, 
1994). The perspective of the evaluator on the process-to-be-evaluated is a methodological 
question that has been less discussed in fundamental psychology and psychotherapy research. 
Hoyt (2002) shows in an analogue study on the question that rater biases account for as much 
as 15% of the variance of a psychotherapy outcome measure (for a clinical study, see also 
Kramer, de Roten, Beretta, Michel, & Despland, 2008, in press). The idiosyncratic way the 
subject understands an item on a questionnaire needs to be controlled for by the systematic 
and in-depth training and subsequent ongoing calibration of raters, in the perspective of 
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observer-rater assessment, especially if the process-to-be-evaluated is complex (Perry, & 
Henry, 2004). Such training should reduce rater biases, due to the control of the perspective of 
the evaluator; these raters will have benefited from increased awareness of the concepts to be 
applied to clinical material. This effect is reflected by the rise in inter-rater reliability as a 
result of length of training in CE-CAP ratings, as reported by Drapeau, Perry, Blake and 
D’Iuso (2007), comparable training effects have been observed in the Lausanne group 
(Kramer, & Drapeau, in prep.). Unconscious adaptational processes in the rater him- or 
herself should become conscious during the training, which is the optimal control for rater 
biases. The latter are due to the unconscious status of idiosyncratic pre-conceptions in the 
rater. Such methodology also enables the dismantling of contradictions in the patient’s 
discourse and of self-deceptive tendencies in the patient due to Plans related to self-concept 
motives. All these biases cannot possibly be controlled for when using self-report 
questionnaires. There might be exceptions, measuring closely-behavior-related concepts, 
where such biases impede less on the validity of the data reported: descriptive self-report of 
life events, general information about the subject’s career and biographical data. We would 
conclude that data from self-report measures on defense and coping should therefore always 
be compared to observer-rater assessment, to control for such biases. Although our data tend 
to confirm the afore-mentioned, we should add that we did not use completely theory-driven 
self-report questionnaires, especially for coping. Low inter-correlations might therefore also 
be due to theoretical inconsistency between scales. Self-report assessment of exactly the same 
dimensions as in DMRS and CAP would add help drawing more firm conclusions regarding 
thesis 2. 
 
Clinical example (3006.1, alinea 741 - 745). This female patient, 55 years of age, is at 
her 20th inpatient treatment in psychiatry, this time motivated by a suicide attempt by 
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means of medication overdose. A few years ago, her husband died unexpectedly, a 
loss she has not yet overcome. Furthermore, she lost contact with her only son leading 
her to predominantly use, at the first interview, disavowal defenses on DMRS (32%), 
her ODF-DMRS was clearly in the immature range (2.95); furthermore, zero mature 
defenses were observed. However, on theory-consistent questionnaire investigation 
(DSQ-60), this patient reported one of the highest scores on mature defenses (6.40). 
Excerpt (rated as autistic fantasy): “She [her deceased mother] will reserve for me a 
little nest over there in paradise, because…there is always someone to get help from, 
my Daddy [deceased], my brother [deceased] and my husband [deceased], this nest 
will be beautiful”. This case illustrates the limitation of self-report questionnaires in 
assessing defensive functioning. 
Clinical example (3024.1, alinea 34 - 37). This female patient, 48 years of age, is at 
her second inpatient treatment in psychiatry, this time motivated by manic 
decompensation, predominantly with irritable mood. The patient feels threatened by 
the surrounding world and acts aggressively towards people she does not even know. 
Predominant coping processes at first interview are CAP escape and opposition; her 
OCF is .45. On CISS however, this patient scored rather high on task-oriented coping 
(t = 61) and in mid-range on emotion (t = 41) and escape (t = 47); CAP problem-
solving appeared very rarely throughout the first interview (was rated once). Excerpt 
(rated as escape behavioral): “I’m not concerned anymore about these things [the 
subject is talking about the police tracking her down], I will live my little life very 
calmly. I don’t let anybody in, except my family, that’s all, and the owner of the 
apartment, that’s all,….I had a lot of stress with all this.” This case illustrates the 
limitation of self-report questionnaires in assessing coping functioning. 
 
DISCUSSION 222
Thesis 3. Coping is understood as a state-concept, defense as a state- and trait-
concept. This assumption refers to the debate on state- and trait-components in defenses and 
coping, based on Cramer’s (1998a) review. If this assumption holds true, it is a corroboration 
of parts of Steffens and Kächele’s (1988) dynamic model on defense and coping. It would 
help in arguing for defenses in favor of a personality-derived process, quite stable over time, 
but still elicited by the situational stressor on the one hand, and for coping in favor of a 
complete situation-dependent state-variable on the other. The latter is particularly 
controversial, as some research has been done on coping “styles” conceived as personality 
factors (for reviews see Costa, & McCrae, 1990; Beutler, Harwood, Alimohamed, & Malik, 
2002). The assumption that coping is a pure state-variable would help to find a more clear-cut 
and empirically-based definition of the phenomenon as a situational-transactional process 
based on the interplay between the person and the environment (Lazarus, & Folkman, 1984). 
According to our data, this thesis is tentatively confirmed (chapters D and G). Therefore, we 
might argue that the field of adaptational processes would gain in clarity if personality-related 
aspects of adaptation were reserved for defensive functioning, and not called coping nor 
coping style, since this term should be reserved for situational-transactional processes. 
Change in coping as state-induced concept has only been confirmed on the BD patients, 
compared to controls; the psychotherapy patients show overall stability on both indices 
(chapter G). This result strongly confirms our hypothesis as regards a major crisis situation 
necessary for a breakdown in coping (Steffens, & Kächele, 1988; Küchenhoff, & Manz, 
1993). This means that, in order to observe a significant state-change, it is necessary to see 
great changes in the level and the quality of the potential stressor(s) as contextual-situational 
variables. The psychopathological crisis in BD patients, either in the form of a depressive or a 
manic decompensation, and the subsequent dwindling of the crisis situation after three months 
were enough to produce the expected state-changes; no trait-change (i.e. on overall defensive 
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functioning) was observed. On the level of specificity, we can hypothesize that the fluctuating 
aspects in defenses in BD patients are due to the state-aspects of defenses (and not trait-
aspects). This explanation is consistent with the results obtained by Drapeau, de Roten, Perry 
and Despland (2003) where a stability of ODF (as an operationalization of the trait-aspect) 
and fluctuation of the specific defense levels over the course of Brief Psychodynamic 
Intervention has been reported. In the psychotherapy patients (chapter G), we would argue 
that the level and quality of the stressor did not change as much as in the BD patients between 
the two investigated sessions of psychotherapy. At both times, the psychotherapy patients 
were still at an early stage of the treatment and presented the same type of symptoms on a 
comparable level. As a result, both sessions were comparable on an overall level in terms of 
quality and level of stress and no overall change in adaptational processes should be expected 
which was the case. Finally, the observation of relative low coping specificity for BD, 
compared to high defense specificity (see chapter D, and theses 5 and 6) might also be 
understood as an argument in favor of coping as a state-concept, as specificities linked to 
diagnoses are supposed to be rather stable over time. 
 
Clinical example (3017.1, alinea 66 and 3017.2). This female patient, 50 years old, has 
been hospitalized in psychiatry for the first time, due to manic decompensation. She 
lives in a house in the country with her enlarged family and is known as someone who 
does everything for others (i.e., cooking, cleaning, washing). Whereas ODF remains in 
the range of narcissistic defenses in both interviews (4.40, 4.44), OCF tends to rise to 
more adapted levels in the second interview (from .58 to .72). The most salient change 
in singular CAP is noted in submission (rated six times at the first interview and zero 
at the second), which is consistent with some of her main characteristics mentioned 
earlier. Excerpt (rated as submission behavioral): “I took everything out, and I sorted it 
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all out, everything, everything. I sorted out the basement, to make room for stuff. I 
also sorted out everything in Nathan’s room [her son], his clothing which has now got 
too small, so I gain more space. Because I would like Daddy to have his clothing in 
the other room.” This case illustrates the important positive change in CAP when the 
stress is appraised as threat between inpatient treatment and the follow-up interview. 
CAP when stress is appraised as threat diminishes greatly between the two assessment 
points for this patient which accounts for better coping adaptiveness at the follow-up 
interview, whereas overall defensive functioning remains stable. 
 
Thesis 4. Coping adaptiveness is related to symptom level, whereas defense 
adaptiveness is not. In relation to thesis 3, the linkage between OCF and symptoms should be 
higher than that between ODF and current symptom level. According to Steffens and Kächele 
(1988), the latter may be understood as an operationalization of outcome of the dynamic 
interplay between stress, defenses and coping – the transactional dynamics of the adaptational 
process (see Figure 2 in the Introduction section). Note that we are dealing here with 
symptom level as micro-outcome of adaptational processes (Vaillant, 1977), as opposed to 
(long-term) macro-outcome,  i.e., symptom evolution over the course of treatment, discussed 
under thesis 9. Defenses should not be strongly related to the state-dependent symptom level, 
as ODF tends to remain stable over time. However, OCF as a state-related concept of 
adaptiveness should be related to state-dependent symptom level. For the sample of BD 
patients, this hypothesis was not confirmed, however, for the psychotherapy patients at intake, 
a significant link was found for OCF, as opposed to ODF (see chapter G). The absence of link 
in BD patients might reflect the limitations of psychological models when symptom levels 
associated with BD should be explained. The results suggest that overall symptom intensity in 
BD is completely independent from adaptational processes. Biological (i.e., endocrinological 
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or genetic; Faraone, Glatt, Tsuang, 2003; Smoller, & Finn, 2003) determinants are probably at 
stake which explains the absence of the link. This line of explanation is confirmed by the fact 
that this same link is found as regards psychotherapy patients presenting mainly Adjustment 
Disorder, a neurotic disorder for which a link between symptom level and coping 
adaptiveness is more plausible due to the probable absence of biological mediators. 
 
Thesis 5. Only CAPs facing stress appraised as threat are prone to be high-frequency 
coping in BD. According to Skinner, Edge, Altman and Sherwood (2003) and Cramer 
(1998a), coping adaptiveness may be differentiated by using qualitative and quantitative 
criteria. The combination of both in a specific coping process would be a particular coping 
vulnerability for short- and long-term adaptation to reality (“developmental risk”; Skinner, 
Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003, p. 231). The observation of high-frequency coping 
categories where stress is appraised as threat would cross-validate the qualitative and 
quantitative criteria of coping adaptiveness. Our results tend to confirm this hypothesis, but 
only with some reservation (chapter B). First of all, it is noteworthy that all CAP specificities 
found do not differ as a function of predominant symptomatology, we are thus dealing with 
BD specificity and not with specificities of either manic or depressive episodes. Whereas 
thesis 5 holds true for opposition as BD-high-frequency CAP where stress is appraised as 
threat, the inverse is true for support-seeking as BD-high-frequency CAP (where stress is 
appraised as challenge). CISS distraction is usually associated with negative coping outcome; 
its high frequency corroborates therefore our hypothesis. Finally, our hypothesis is not true 
for all the other CAPs where stress is appraised as threat; these categories did not appear as 
highly frequent in BD. Several explanations might be relevant in the context of this mitigated 
picture. As suggested in chapter B, CAP support-seeking, if overused, might have a 
maladaptive character. Greater proportions of support-seeking might also have been induced 
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by the interview technique, as it requires the investigation of helping relationships, which are 
simply very low-frequent in controls, whereas highly-frequent in BD patients. However, these 
specific assumptions regarding support-seeking do not explain the occurrence of only one 
threat-coping as highly frequent in BD (opposition) and the absence of between-group 
differences in the other five categories (which are helplessness, escape, delegation, isolation 
and submission). This limited result in terms of threat-coping might reflect a basic problem in 
the formulation of the fifth thesis, a more restrictive formulation in terms of opposition as BD 
high-frequency CAP is more accurate.  
In addition to the complementary definitions of coping adaptiveness – in qualitative 
and quantitative terms -, we also need to acknowledge the great overlap between BD patients 
and control subjects in terms of adaptational processes. A heightened symptom level and a 
psychiatric diagnosis do not suffice for the complete corroboration of the hypothesis in terms 
of between-group differences. This underlines that overall coping specificity in BD is quite 
low which limits the relevance of thesis 5. Whether this pattern is related to the fact that 
coping adaptiveness is highly situation-dependent, at least more than defenses, and thus a 
radically individualized approach for the definition of adaptiveness is warranted (for a 
method, see Reicherts, 1999), or whether this pattern is a consequence of the fact that the 
diagnosis of Bipolar Affective Disorder has rather low specificity in terms of coping profile, 
remains to be tested by applying the same thesis with the same method to other psychiatry 
patients, ideally presenting some clinical characteristics of BD, such as Borderline Personality 
Disorder (Gunderson, Weinberg, Daversa, Kueppenbender, Zanarini, 2006). If it turns out that 
BD has rather low coping specificity, when compared to BPD, we may hypothesize that it is 
due to the important influence of biological determinants in BD, acting as mediators between 
stress and outcome (Faraone, Glatt, & Tsuang, 2003). This hypothesis is tentatively confirmed 
by the BD specificity of CAP opposition during inpatient treatment: this CAP is probably 
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related to specific stressors linked with inpatient treatment of the uncostumary crisis situation, 
and not with the BD diagnosis per se (see chapter D). 
 
Clinical example (3020.1, alinea 106 - 110). This female patient, 42 years of age, is at 
her 29th inpatient treatment in psychiatry. She has been forced to undergo the 
treatment, because of her aggressive behavior towards her boyfriend and her son. Her 
OCF is particularly low with .16. In the first interview, the patient predominantly used 
helplessness, escape and opposition. The patient did not respect the second 
appointment. When describing the situation which led to the hospitalization, she said 
(excerpt; rated as opposition behavioral): “Yes, because he [her son] didn’t want me to 
have the key!! The key! So he took the key, so that it was impossible for me to lock 
myself in the bathroom! […] On this day, I wanted to lock myself in the bathroom and 
that’s what I did!” This example shows the importance of opposition coping in this 
patient, not only possibly motivated by the contextual constraint of forced inpatient 
treatment, but by situational and internal constraints related to the interaction with her 
son. 
 
Thesis 6. Immature defenses are related to BD functioning. The role of immature 
defenses in various groups of highly impaired individuals – and groups of individuals – has 
already been established (Perry, 1993a; Perry, 1988). Similar to thesis 5, for these patients, no 
specificity effect has been found when testing as a function of the predominant 
symptomatology, adding an argument in favor of BD defense specificity. The relevance of 
immature defenses in BD patients, as confirmed by the results in chapter C, adds a clear 
argument in favor of the psychodynamic vulnerability of this patient group. In particular, a set 
of five immature defenses have been identified: omnipotence, rationalization, splitting of 
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other’s image, projective identification and acting out. Some of these defenses are known to 
be specificities in Recurrent Depression (e.g., acting out, narcissistic defenses), some others in 
Borderline Personality Disorder (e.g., splitting). Thus, we hypothesize two-fold psychological 
vulnerability  - defenses typical of Recurrent Depression and Borderline Personality Disorder 
– because of the presence of these defenses at the time when the BD patient is almost over the 
crisis episode, as in the case of our first interview. Omnipotence is related to symptom level, 
thus adding an argument in favor of thesis 6. Long-term studies need to be conducted to test 
these implications. 
 
Clinical example (3018.1, alinea 56 - 57). This male patient, 60 years old, is at his 
second inpatient treatment in psychiatry, this time because of manic decompensation. 
While in mania, he threatened his wife with an axe; thus the police enforced 
hospitalization. The patient did not come back for the second interview. Previously, he 
had had to appear in court because of another threat. While narrating the details, he 
presented himself as in complete control of the situation. ODF is in the immature 
range on the level of disavowal defenses (3.76). Excerpt (rated as omnipotence): “I 
told him ‘President of the Jury, may I tell you something. We live in a huge villa with 
seven rooms. We own cable-television, several cars, we have everything.’” This 
example shows the poor adaptation of the use of omnipotence within the situation of 
the clinical interview, as well as the probable poor long-term adaptation of the same 
defense when used in different situations, such as in a law court.  
 
Thesis 7. Positive CE are related to manic symptoms, negative CE to depressive 
symptoms. As suggested by Beck (1976; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999), cognitive functioning 
associated with manic states is biased towards the positive, and cognitive functioning 
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associated with depressive states is biased towards the negative. Full corroboration of this 
hypothesis would enable us to extend the negativity hypothesis and to confirm the 
universality hypothesis for BD. Although our results tend to confirm parts of these 
assumptions, a more complex thesis holds true. Whereas the total number of CE is increased 
in BD patients, moderate manic symptoms are related to heightened positive and negative 
biases; only statistical tendencies have been found in depressive symptoms. The presence of 
negative biases, along with positive ones, in patients with some manic symptoms, is 
consistent with clinical observation. Underlying the bias towards positive information, a 
negative bias is also found, resulting from an increasing awareness of the effects of previous 
manic symptoms and the increase in negative affects such as shame, guilt and sadness. 
Negative views of the self and the world might indeed be evident at the end of manic 
decompensation (Basco, & Rush, 2005), without the symptoms of full depression. These 
negative cognitive errors might contribute to inducing and exacerbating the subsequent low-
mood phase (depression). Unfortunately, our design did not allow the testing of this 
sequential hypothesis, which would require numerous assessment points. The absence of 
between-group effect regarding depressive symptoms (comparing the patients with 
predominantly manic symptoms to the patients with predominantly depressive symptoms) 
may be biased due to the post-hoc analyses and needs to be interpreted with care. Higher 
proportions of negative CE in the subgroup with manic symptoms (see above) might account 
for the non-significant effect. Thus, to confirm fully this particular thesis, we need to carry out 
a controlled trial, with patients from both subgroups being matched with each other, as well as 
with a control group. Furthermore, we must acknowledge that symptom levels were on 
average low to moderate, and do not represent the clinical situation of full decompensation, 
especially for mania.  
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Clinical example (3021.2, alinea 113 – 115). This male patient, 60 years old, is at his 
second inpatient treatment, this time for manic decompensation. The level of manic 
symptoms increases from a low at the first interview to a submanic level at the second 
interview (MAS = 10 at the second interview). However, he produces predominantly 
negative errors (in total 15; in particular selective abstraction) and some positive ones 
(in total 6). Excerpt (rated as all-or-nothing-thinking negative): “There are people 
who’ve got everything, they are young, they are beautiful, they are rich, they are 
famous, they are healthy, they’ve got everything. And there are others who do not 
have anything of all this!” Comparing in this way successful people with unsuccessful 
ones implicitly turns out to be unfavorable for the patient, which signifies all-or-
nothing-thinking. Negative cognitive errors are thus part of BD functioning, even in 
case of heightened manic symptoms. 
 
Thesis 8. Internal regulation of stress yields less optimal adaptation than relationship 
regulation. Two subtypes of stress regulation have been found by plananalytic methodology: 
internal emotion control and relationship control. At first glance, these two subtypes might be 
paralleled to Blatt’s (2004) two subtypes for unipolar depression, introjective and anaclitic, on 
the one hand, and to Ansmann’s (2002) two subtypes for Borderline Personality Disorder 
(BPD), autonomous and dependent, on the other. Blatt’s (2004) proposal of differentiation 
between anaclitic and introjective subtypes implies that the psychogenetic evolutionary stage 
of the latter be higher than the former. The author also observed that the introjective subtype 
did better in psychotherapy or analysis, whereas the anaclitic subtype was characterized by 
dependency-patterns towards the therapist or analyst, which might take more time to resolve. 
However, after a closer look, whereas the BD subtype relationship control and unipolar 
anaclitic subtype share common features, this is not true for the BD subtype emotion control 
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and the unipolar introjective subtype. Emotion control patterns (such as found by our data on 
BD) are observed in both subtypes of BPD (Ansmann, 2002). These observations tend to 
confirm the double psychological vulnerability of BD from a plananalytic perspective, due to 
the same psychological specificities as for Recurrent Depression and Borderline Personality 
Disorder, similar to what has been found for defensive functioning (see thesis 6). Plan 
Analysis yielded a higher level of resources in the BD relationship control subtype and a 
higher level of vulnerability in the BD emotion control subtype. These observations are 
corroborated by significance testing on CAP (not reported in chapter F3), comparing the 
plananalytic subgroups: CAP opposition is more often practiced by emotion control 
individuals, than by relationship control individuals (t(1, 16) = 2.68; p < .05;  Bonferroni 
corrections applied). In accordance with earlier considerations on the role of CAP opposition 
in BD dynamics, the higher levels of symptoms in the emotion control subtype (compared to 
the relationship control) is in line with our assumption. Thus, the presence of many avoidance 
Plans related to emotion control (“Avoid upsetting emotions”, “Avoid being harmed”, “Avoid 
talking about negative events”), as well as associated conflicts, are vulnerability factors for 
BD, and their role for prognostics, the course of illness and the treatment must be investigated 
and clinically monitored, keeping in mind the possibility of suicidality. These conclusions 
need to be confirmed by prospective studies within the context of psychotherapy; ours did not 
permit long-term within-subject comparison and follow-up. Finally, it would be interesting to 
investigate the above thesis for other patient groups, for instance by adopting a single case 
                                                 
3 We are aware that the Discussion section should not comprehend data presentation. For this 
exceptional case, the structure of the dissertation in seven independent chapters made it 
impossible to report this piece of data in a coherent way elsewhere than in the Discussion 
section. 
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methodology using Plan Analysis (Kramer, accepted for publication; Kramer, 2006b; Kramer, 
& Caspar, 2007). 
 
Thesis 9. Coping and defense adaptiveness are both related to symptom evolution. As 
predicted by the contextual model depicted in Figure 1 in the Introduction section, 
adaptational processes should be related to symptom change over time. Such a link may 
represent the long-term effects of defenses and coping over time and may indicate direct long-
term vulnerability factors, which would be relevant clinical and research information. Both 
types of processes should be related, based on the hypotheses of long-term effects for 
adaptive coping (Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003) and of mature defenses (Perry, 
1990a; Sjöbäck, 1973). In the case of the BD patients, we were able to partially confirm the 
hypothesis, but only for certain types of coping (chapter B), and not for defenses (chapter C). 
No links were found in successful psychotherapy patients with regard to therapeutic outcome 
after one year of treatment (chapter G). It should be pointed out that for such predictive 
analyses, the number of observations needs to be sufficiently high, which was not the case for 
the BD sample, nor the psychotherapy patients. Thus, underpowered analyses may partially 
be responsible for the absence of this link, but also sampling procedures centered on 
successful therapies for chapter G, diminishing outcome variance. In BD patients (chapter B), 
helplessness and opposition coping are related to symptom increase or less symptom decrease 
over three months, corroborating our hypothesis. Moreover, as opposition has previously been 
identified as high-frequency coping in BD (see thesis 5), we may conclude that its overuse is 
particularly prone to producing unfavorable outcome in the mid- and long-term.  
The absence of links between overall adaptational indices (ODF and OCF) and 
symptom evolution in BD might again be due to the relative independence of symptom 
evolution in BD from adaptational processes, due to an important biological component 
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intervening as determining context variable (see above, thesis 4). In future studies focusing on 
adaptational processes in BD, these determinants should be taken into account. For the 
psychotherapy patients, the model presented in the Introduction section (Figure 1) might be 
too simple: it would mean that psychotherapy outcome might depend solely on the patient’s 
and therapeutic relationship variables. However, therapist interventions, competence and 
personality (Beutler, Malik, Alimohamed, Harwood, Talebi, Noble, & Wong, 2004) intervene 
as one of the most promising mediator or moderator variables between the patient’s 
characteristics and therapeutic outcome. Thus, in future studies on adaptational processes, the 
question of the accuracy of the therapist intervention to specific patient adaptational processes 
(from a psychodynamic perspective: Kramer, de Roten, Michel, & Despland, 2005; Stigler, de 
Roten, Drapeau, & Despland, 2007; Winston, Winston, Wallner Samstag, & Muran, 1994) 
needs to be elucidated and related to the therapeutic outcome. Such research, when the 
patient’s characteristics are taken into account, allows the concept of therapist responsiveness 
to be operationalized (Stiles, Honos-Webb, & Surko, 1998; Norcross, 2002).  
 
Clinical example (3005.1 and 3005.2). This female patient, aged 40, is at her 8th 
inpatient treatment in psychiatry, this time for a suicide attempt in the context of a 
depressive phase. She suffers from co-morbid alcohol dependency. Her predominant 
coping process is submission, her OCF at the first interview is in the mid-range (.50 at 
the first interview, .40 at the second). The clinical change index between the two 
sessions (Reliable Clinical Change Index) is highly negative (-6.06), attesting the 
considerable decrease in general symptomatology over three months. At the first 
interview, she presents only one helplessness coping; this low score can be interpreted 
as a possible protective factor in subsequent symptom evolution. 
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Thesis 10. Adaptational processes are related to the therapeutic alliance. According 
to the basic assumption from the contextual model depicted in Figure 1 (Introduction section), 
adaptational processes should be related to the quality of the therapeutic alliance as a 
contextual variable of psychological treatment (Zuroff, & Blatt, 2006). In a psychotherapy 
setting, the meaning of the patient-rated alliance measure seems quite clear, i.e., the quality of 
the therapeutic alliance, the agreement with the therapist on goals, tasks and the quality of the 
bond with the therapist (Bordin, 1975); this alliance moderately predicts outcome (Martin, 
Garske, & Davis, 2000). However, with regard to the sample of BD patients undergoing 
treatment as usual (encompassing crisis intervention in inpatient treatment, pharmacological 
monitoring and supportive techniques in outpatient treatment), the question is more complex 
due to changing treatment contexts between the two assessment points. To ensure that the 
comparison  is meaningful (the same treatment context for all patients) and to avoid 
underpowered analyses in the second session, results on alliance were analysed on only the 
inpatient (first) session. Whereas no links were found for coping (chapter B), mature defenses 
(in particular self-assertion; chapter C) are related positively to the quality of the therapeutic 
alliance, and, finally, a higher proportion of cognitive errors (in particular selective 
abstraction; chapter E) is inversely related to the quality of the therapeutic alliance. We might 
speculate, in view of these results, that high-quality alliance as self-reported by the patient, is 
fostered by minimal reality-distortion in the individual, as operationalized by mature 
defenses, and hampered by heightened reality-distortion, as operationalized by cognitive 
errors. Increased distortion in perception and interpretation of the reality has been related to a 
number of indices of psychopathology, as well as relationship variables (Vaillant, 1977). The 
absence of links between alliance and coping would corroborate this explanation, as coping 
processes as competence-related concepts are understood to be minimally reality-distorting; it 
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is cognitive and emotional appraisal that is more specifically prone to cognitive distortions, 
but not coping directly.  
Of course, alliance in turn might also influence adaptational processes. Disentangling 
uni-directionality and ultimately causality in these linkages remains a research challenge 
which should be addressed by multiple measurement points of variables involved over the 
course of psychotherapy (Zuroff, & Blatt, 2006). 
 
Thesis 11. The therapeutic alliance modulates the evolution of defense and coping 
over the course of treatment. As proposed indirectly by the contextual model of 
psychotherapy (Figure 1, Introduction section) and also by the previous discussion on links 
between adaptational processes and symptom change, the therapeutic alliance as contextual 
variable might influence the evolution of adaptational processes over the course of treatment 
and, ultimately, moderate therapeutic outcome. The focus is laid on the influence of alliance 
on adaptational processes within psychotherapy. Such a moderating influence might add an 
argument in favor of complex interactions between patient characteristics and contextual 
relationship variables in psychotherapy. Our results (chapter G) partially corroborate the 
thesis: OCF is predicted by the interaction-effect between session and alliance pattern, 
whereas no such effect was found for ODF. OCF appears more directly “responsive” to the 
early patient-therapist-relationship dynamics in psychodynamic psychotherapy. This result 
also tends to support thesis 3 of coping as a rapidly changing state-variable, when taking into 
account alliance patterns. It can be postulated that a similar effect should be found in ODF 
with regard to long-term treatments; defensive patterns need long-standing and intense 
psychotherapy or analysis in order to be restructured and at the same time this change 
depends also on relationship variables such as therapeutic alliance (Perry, 2001; see also 
Hersoug, Sexton, & Hoglend, 2002).  
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Clinical example (334.5 and 334.15, alinea 75 - 76). This female patient, 22 years old, 
consults for Adjustment Disorder related to the break-up of a romantic relationship. 
During therapy, she finds a new boyfriend, but hesitates to commit herself more fully. 
The alliance pattern of the initial eight sessions is classified as increasing. Her ODF is 
in the narcissistic and neurotic range (between 4.85 and 5.11) and thus remains stable 
over the first 15 sessions of STDP. However, her OCF rises significantly between the 
two sessions analyzed from .50 to .81. One of the specific CAPs responsible for the 
rise is accommodation, which she practices more often in session 15 (an absolute 
frequency of 5), compared to session 5 (an absolute frequency of 2). Excerpt (rated as 
accommodation cognitive): “And finally I am telling myself, OK then, there is no 
prince charming in this world, no man is perfect.” This case example illustrates that in 
an increasing alliance construction pattern, Overall Coping Functioning rises, but 
Overall Defensive Functioning remains on the same level for the initial 15 sessions of 
short-term dynamic psychotherapy. 
 
 
By and large, we can be quite confident about the satisfactory validity of the 11 theses 
examined. Some need more study, on larger samples or other patient groups, in order to be 
completely confirmed, some need more data measure points, to be completely valid or 
refined. It also needs to be underlined that no thesis found full empirical support. 
 Ultimately, if these theses resist further empirical investigation, it would mean that we 
should continue to refer to defenses and coping from an integrative viewpoint. By doing this, 
we may be able to explain more outcome variance and, ultimately, enhance psychotherapeutic 
practice. Along with Chabrol and Callahan (2004), we would assume that coping-
enhancement trainings present inherent limitations, especially with regard to the 
conceptualization and treatment of internal determinants of adaptational processes. Similarly, 
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defense interpretations are not always helpful and need to be complemented by competence-
oriented work in specific cases. Taking into account both competence-related concepts and 
internally-determined aspects of adaptation would permit a higher level of clinical precision 
and therapist flexibility in treatment planning and delivery. Competence-related aspects, i.e., 
coping, ask for training of stress management, whereas internally-determined aspects, i.e., 
defenses, ask for interpretative or clarification-oriented work with the patient’s motives and 
internal conflictuality. Combining both in the same therapy as a function of the clinical 
situation is certainly a challenge within our reach. This distinction may be paralleled to the 
two main mechanisms of change in a heuristic model of psychotherapy, defined by Grawe 
(1998): problem-activation and clarification. Even if these concepts are much broader, to be 
understood on the level of general principles of psychotherapeutic change, this author 
suggests that the combination of both aspects, when applied with clinical competence and 
based on a coherent case conceptualization, within the same psychotherapy enables a 
comprehensive understanding of the patient and may enhance efficacy of the treatment. Data 
from comparative psychotherapy research tend to confirm these assumptions (Grawe, 2005) 
 With these general goals in mind, we will develop specific clinical implications based 
on our research so far. 
 
Therapeutic implications 
The simple fact that we are in the position of evoking therapeutic implications means 
that the second aim of the dissertation formulated in the Introduction section is fully attained: 
to demonstrate the clinical usefulness and relevance of our models for psychotherapeutic case 
conceptualization and treatment.  
Even if this sub-section is more practice-oriented, it should not be understood as a 
complete treatment manual, but as an outline of treatment principles primarily focused on 
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Bipolar Affective Disorder, although certainly meaningful and effective, if applied with 
clinical competence and wisdom to various other psychiatric diagnoses, e.g., Borderline 
Personality Disorder and Major Depression. We will elaborate on the therapeutic relationship, 
on challenging of cognitive distortions, dealing with oppositional coping and defenses and the 
question of suicide prevention. Finally, we will give recommendations for particularities of 
inpatient treatment. Treatment implications will be deduced for the most part from the 
cognitive-behavioral model of psychotherapy in the broadest sense. Two reasons might be at 
stake: (1) The literature found for treatment strategies in BD stems mainly from CBT 
approaches, slightly less from other models, i.e., interpersonal, experiential and 
psychodynamic, and (2) The author is a psychotherapist with broad-spectrum CBT training, 
which biases the “clinical reflexes” proposed in this section. However, psychodynamic 
elements are also offered and should be implemented with these patients. 
As described in chapter F, the principle of the motive-oriented therapeutic relationship 
is based on plananalytic conceptualizations and enables the therapist to creatively develop 
adequate therapeutic attitudes with each patient (Caspar, 1996; Caspar, 2007; Caspar et al., 
2005; Grawe, 1998; Kramer, & Caspar, 2007). The therapist must be responsive to the motive 
“behind” the patient’s behavior and circumvent the Plans that impede the creation of a 
collaborative relationship. Thus, for each clinical situation, it is essential to assess reliably the 
motives and distinguish them from low-level Plans and behaviors, because one should not, as 
therapist, react directly to the patient’s observed behaviors and low-level Plans. Such 
behavioral strategies and coping Plans in the patient may be paralleled with the notion of 
interactional play-structure in the context of the double-action-regulation theory by Sachse 
(2003) implying specific interventions focusing on rendering explicit motives related to the 
interactional play-structure. For example, the motive of a patient presenting opposition (as 
part of his/her interactional play-structure) may be to maintain his/her autonomy. Related 
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Plans may have been blocked (i.e., by the constraints imposed by the inpatient treatment or by 
the increase of the symptomatology), thus opposition coping seems the only way to manifest 
his/her desire for autonomy. A motive-oriented therapeutic attitude would comprise the 
therapist’s validating the autonomy motive and render explicit (sensu Sachse, 2003) the 
conflict in the patient between blocked Plans and underlying motives. It might also mean, in 
inpatient treatment, that alternative ways – expressed as Plans - of satisfying the autonomy-
seeking motive can be explored or allowed, e.g., permission given for a day off, if the 
patient’s clinical status allows it. An important therapeutic ingredient when dealing with 
opposition coping is certainly the collaborative stance of the therapist (see below, but also 
Basco, & Rush, 2005). Analogue reflections may be developed with regard to dealing with 
omnipotence for instance as BD defense specificity. For this reason, the following points 
should all be embedded within the principle of the tailor-made motive-orientedness of the 
therapeutic relationship offer. 
Cognitive distortions are an important part of BD functioning (chapter E; Basco, & 
Rush, 2005); they are quite easily accessible in a therapeutic interview. If the timing is right, 
the therapist should point out these errors as they occur in the patient’s discourse. A 
prominent technique in this regard is the Socratic dialogue developed for depression (Beck, 
Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Basco, & Rush, 2005). It implies questioning the veracity of an 
assumption, while at the same time completely validating the patient’s own right to have a 
personal opinion (in the latter proposal, there is, of course, again an element of motive-
orientedness). As the Socratic dialogue develops, the therapist helps the patient to construct 
an alternative cognition, not underpinned by cognitive distortions, but by so-called “adaptive” 
cognitions (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). Especially the positive CE associated with mania 
should be restructured in this way (for an example of technique see Basco, & Rush, 2005). 
Positive CE may be considered by certain clinicians as “normal”, since normal functioning is 
DISCUSSION 240
characterized by a certain amount of positive CE (Beck, 1991). Informed clinicians, however, 
know about the negative effects of positive CE and question them in the early phases of 
hypomania. This questioning may elicit in its turn negative CE in the patient, who might start 
mistrusting – or accusing - the therapist when he/she is working on an obviously pleasant 
thought. Negative CE in BD, along with the afore-mentioned example, might occur in either 
phase of the disorder and must be addressed according to the principles of cognitive therapy 
in depression, to prevent the patient from slipping into profound hopelessness, and give 
him/her concurrently the right to feel sad, down or depressed. Generally, collaborative work 
on CE enhances the quality of the therapeutic relationship (for discussion of this question, see 
Castonguay, Goldfried, Wiser, Raue, & Hayes, 1996) and the patient’s confidence in the 
therapist, if the latter is genuine enough and shows that he/she truly understands – from 
“within the situation” - the patient’s way of thinking, feeling and experiencing, instead of 
labeling from a distance the patient’s utterances. 
As shown in chapters B and D, oppositional coping is a particularly important feature 
of BD patients. It is of paramount importance that it is dealt with in a constructive way in 
therapy to maintain collaboration, enhance therapeutic adherence, ensure medication 
compliance, and prevent symptom recurrence.  The motive-oriented therapeutic relationship 
offer might be a key principle in dealing with such “difficult” behavior, cognition and affect; 
it is thus indispensable to understand clearly its motive-related underpinning. An example is 
given at the beginning of this section. Furthermore, opposition might be tackled more globally 
according to stress management techniques used in cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy. First, 
self-observation techniques (e.g., files, diaries) may be applied to everyday situations where 
opposition is present. These situations are subsequently analysed and commented during 
therapy and the patient should be helped to construe alternative coping behaviors (see also 
skills training for BPD; Linehan, 1993) for similar future situations, which will be role-played 
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in the therapy session and the competence obtained transferred to reality. Such alternative 
coping includes, prior to the use of opposition on the micro-level of the situation, time-out 
techniques, cognitive distantiation techniques, self-assertive or negotiative cognitions and 
behaviors, support-seeking, behavioral isolation from the stressor, prioritizing and 
anticipating by imagining the negative consequences of opposition. A particular important 
technique for BD patients when they tend to be oppositional is relaxation. Relaxation helps 
the patient to find and connect momentarily with “an inner space” devoid of conflict. Such 
techniques may not only enhance cognitive and behavioral distantiation from the stressor on 
the micro-level of the situation, but also and most importantly have an effect on the 
psychobiological system of sleep. A relaxed body finds sleep more easily, which is extremely 
important for the manic phase, but also for depressive episodes, when the patients may engage 
in depressive rumination, leading potentially to hopelessness. Relaxation may be achieved by 
using classic progressive muscular relaxation or image-inducing techniques (Reddemann, 
2001); in some cases, hypnosis might be indicated (Revenstorf, & Peter, 2005). Of course, the 
choice of the particular technique would depend on the individual case conceptualization and 
cannot be treated in this context. 
In the perspective of long-term rehabilitation of seriously impaired psychiatry patients, 
working with defenses has proven to be promising (Perry, 2001). In BD patients, immature 
defenses may impede the establishment of a constructive therapeutic alliance. Thus, they need 
to be addressed as early as possible in the therapeutic process. Much care needs to be taken, 
since defense and transference interpretations are anxiety-provoking interventions and not 
always associated with positive outcome (Piper, Azim, Joyce, & McCallum, 1991; for a 
discussion see Hoglend, 2007). Thus, principles from transference-focused psychotherapy 
(Kernberg, 1984; Yeomans, Clarkin, & Kernberg, 2002), developed for Borderline 
Personality Disorders, may be applied in a variation to BD patients (Gunderson, Weinberg, 
DISCUSSION 242
Daversa, Kueppenbender, Zanarini, Shea, et al., 2006). Most importantly in this setting, 
contract negotiation is a condition for further treatment. The authors underline that in highly 
disturbed individuals, this negotiation might take several sessions and should not be shortened 
for the sake of efficacy. Addressing the most-salient immature defenses might already be 
indicated in this preparatory phase, to enhance the  accuracy of the patient’s perception of 
reality (Coughlin Della Silva, 1996) and increase the chances of engaging fully in a solid 
therapy contract. Acting out or splitting might be candidates for such very-early-in-process 
defenses, which need to be treated with great care and competence. Later in the process, 
defenses are as important as in these early encounters, but the psychodynamic work may be – 
if timing is correct - more expressive and interpretative, aiming to give the patient a better 
insight into his/her psychological functioning. However, in these interpretations for BD 
patients much more than with other patients, the links between defensive functioning and 
symptom evolution should be established and reinterpreted on a regular basis. A purely 
psychodynamic understanding excluding symptom recurrence and its biological 
underpinnings risks denying psychiatric priorities. The psychodynamically-oriented 
psychotherapist, and, maybe to a lesser extent, the cognitive-behavioral psychotherapist run 
the risk of interpreting sexually-seducing behavior in hypomanic patients according to 
psychodynamic understanding and thus, may engage in a “folie à deux”, kindling 
unintentionally the recurrence of manic symptoms in these patients by the use of 
interpretations. This might be one argument why Fromm-Reichmann (1949) discouraged 
clinicians from treating patients with manic-depressive symptoms by means of psychoanalytic 
therapy. Our research should help to offer clinical and empirical arguments in favor of such 
psychotherapies. 
The question of suicide and suicide attempts is very important in the treatment of BD 
patients, as the prevalence numbers of suicide attempts for such patients are generally higher 
DISCUSSION 243
than for other psychiatric patients (ranging between 15 and 50%; Newman, 2004; Goodwin, 
& Jamison, 1990). Psychotherapeutic interventions in this regard need to be based on an 
individualized understanding of the suicidal attempt, according to the functional analysis of 
behavior proposed by Linehan (1993) and according to Plan Analysis (Caspar, 1995). This 
complete conceptualization of suicidal behaviors and cognitions allows the therapist to 
understand functional and instrumental relationships. We know that the plananalytic subgroup 
emotion control is theoretically related to a higher risk for suicidal behavior, i.e., associated 
with higher levels of depressive symptoms and an aggressive potential (Newman, 2004), 
compared to the subgroup relationship control. Thus, if emotion control or psychological 
harm avoidance turns out to be a higher-order Plan or motive for suicidal behavior in a 
patient, the intervention would be – in line with the motive-oriented therapeutic relationship - 
to provide the patient with sufficient internal security and self-soothing capacities, i.e., by 
means of relaxation techniques or by enhancing distantiation capacities (see above and 
especially Linehan, 1993), in the form of skills training, to give the patient alternative coping 
Plans to deal with the stress. If relationship control, on the contrary, turns out to be a higher-
order Plan or motive for suicidal behavior in a patient, the intervention would be very 
different: the therapist would need to reassure the patient that the therapist is someone the 
patient can count on in the therapeutic context, even when in a crisis situation. In addition, the 
therapist needs to convey convincingly that he/she will not abandon the patient. Clarification-
oriented work (Sachse, 2003) is needed for such patients, as their degree of awareness of the 
motives related to their interactional play-structure by using suicidal threats and behaviors is 
low; thus, the intervention aims at overcoming alienation of the self (Sachse, 2003), which 
should reduce, ultimately, these threats and behaviors. In some countries, legal constraints 
impose the negotiation of a non-suicide-contract. This might help as well in planning crisis 
intervention, but will never suffice for treating suicidal thoughts and behaviors. 
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If the patient is in a crisis and inpatient treatment is necessary, some particularities 
may be of interest. The treatment focus for crisis intervention is on compliance assessment 
and enhancement and coping with acute symptomatology (Basco, & Rush, 2005). This means 
that a much more psycho-educational approach is indicated. This is also confirmed by 
outcome studies, where cognitive-behavioral treatments in the acute phases of BD yield only 
mitigating results (Scott, 2004; Rizvi, & Zaretsky, 2007). Psycho-education is an important 
part of psychotherapy irrespective of the approach used, but its effects might be 
underestimated. For personality disorders, for instance, we have found that a creative version 
of a psycho-educational group approach is more efficient, in comparison with a traditional 
problem-solving psychotherapeutic approach (Zorn, Roder, Kramer, & Pomini, in press). 
More specifically in BD patients, what needs to be emphasized is the importance of 
medication compliance, the enhancement of early detection of symptoms and stress 
management (see above). As shown in chapter D, a variety of coping and defenses are elicited 
in the crisis situation; they help the individual to adapt to the crisis situation. Thus, these 
patient’s perceptions of reality might not be distorted due to only the presence of psychotic 
symptoms, but also due to underlying adaptational processes (e.g., immature defenses) in the 
patient’s psychological functioning. Moreover, oppositional coping along with other BD 
specificities need to be understood within a comprehensive case conceptualization and the 
therapeutic attitude adjusted as a function of the motives and Plans involved (see above).  
Other very important clinical domains at stake in such patients involve the treatment 
of co-morbidity (Gunderson, Weinberg, Daversa, Kueppenbender, Zanarini, Shea, et al., 
2006),  interpersonal aspects of the disorder and the work with the partner and the family 
(Morris, Miklowitz, & Waxmonsky, 2007; Weissman, Markowitz, & Klerman, 2000), long-
term coping with life events (Bock, & Koesler, 2005) and finally, the prevention of recurrence 
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(Scott, 2001). We will not elaborate on these aspects; our research provides only marginal 
elucidation.  
Finally, short-term dynamic psychotherapy may be enhanced with reference to coping 
concepts, as it is probably coping that changes in the short term, compared to defenses, which 
necessitates much more time to change profoundly. The use of Steffens and Kächele’s (1988) 
integrative model on adaptational processes certainly does not mean that the psychoanalytic 
therapist needs to learn CBT, but helps to disentangle partially overlapping concepts with 
regard to their underlying psychological processes. As this model is consistent with 
psychoanalytic theories, for clinicians there should be only therapeutic and personal benefits 
if they refer to it, as well as to the conclusions of our work. More concretely, interpretative 
work may tap not only defensive processes, but also coping. The raised awareness of a 
possible overused coping in an individual, or of its maladaptiveness due to the stress 
appraised as threat, may help the patient to engage in more constructive coping behavior. 
Especially in an intense crisis situation, the psychodynamic psychotherapist should be aware 
that specific coping and defenses may be recruited by the individual (Küchenhoff, & Manz, 
1993), to overcome the crisis, while overall defensive functioning should remain stable. 
Psychodynamic crisis intervention should take into account these ruptures in the course of the 
use of adaptational processes (see also Gilliéron, 1997); more supportive techniques, i.e., 
reflecting, acknowledging – as opposed to expressive ones - are indicated when the therapist 
is faced with such a breakdown of adaptation in a patient (Barber, Stratt, Halperin, & Beth 
Connolly, 2001). 
 
Methodological Considerations and Limitations 
 When conceptualizing adaptational processes in a patient, as a clinical researcher or a 
psychotherapist, we have several options at hand: self-report questionnaires, observer-rater 
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methodologies and complete individualized case conceptualization methods. As we 
understand these three methodologies, they represent three levels of increasing complexity, 
clinical validity, depth and precision in conceptualizing a clinical situation of a patient. Their 
respective relevance and limitations will be discussed. 
 First, self-report questionnaires are relevant for measuring behavior-related constructs 
such as career, preferences, life choices, certain types of symptoms (when easily detectable in 
the behavior) and some aspects of biography (see also above, the discussion of thesis 2). 
Furthermore, questionnaires or computer-assisted evaluation may be accurate, should 
assessment need to be done very quickly and effectively, for example for the purpose of feed-
back to the therapist (Lambert, 2007), or should assessment concentrate on adaptational 
processes in everyday life (Perrez, & Reicherts, 1996). Limitations in validity of self-report 
questionnaires have been cited several times (Fahrenberg, Myrtek, Pawlik, & Perrez, 2007; 
Lazarus, 2000; Perrez, & Wilhelm, 2000; Tschuschke, Pfleiderer, Denzinger, Hertenstein, 
Kächele, & Arnold, 1994). Thus, questionnaires need to be completed by using higher-order 
methodologies, especially when complex, partially unconscious, constructs, such as 
adaptational processes, are being measured. Therefore, our conclusions depended little on the 
self-reported measures of adaptational processes. A more thorough examination, item-per-
item, would allow a valid comparison. This was however not possible due to different 
theoretical underpinnings of the methods used and potential loss of power and validity of the 
scales; thus, we limited the multi-method comparison to mean and subscales scores. Clinical 
research solely depending on self-report questionnaires does not allow the introduction of the 
rater perspective. The latter enhances reliability and clinical validity and controls for biases 
(Hoyt, 2002;  see thesis 2). 
Second, observer-rater methodologies are the core of this dissertation. Observer-rater 
methodology is needed in assessment of complex concepts, for example interpersonal 
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relationship patterns, internal conflicts and adaptational processes, as research objects of 
clinical psychology. They control for rater biases, self-deceptive tendencies in individuals, 
along with other limitations of self-report questionnaires (see above). Their use requires a 
certain level of competence and they are high-cost, since based on transcripts of clinical 
interviews or psychotherapy sessions. Consequently, data production is time-consuming and 
laborious. They also require continuous calibration of raters, in the form of in-depth case 
supervisions. Furthermore, such observer-rater scales are inherently limited as regards the 
number of categories they offer. The exhaustive list of defenses, coping and cognitive errors, 
as measured by DMRS, CAP and CE, are the result of many years of work aiming at a 
consensus concerning the number, labels and definitions of each category. Consensus is a 
constraint. For instance, DMRS has been criticized for it is not a comprehensive review of the 
defensive functioning in the individual (see Perry, & Ianni, 1998, for a review); in particular, 
psychotic defenses are not included. Studies are underway with regard to the inclusion of 
psychotic defenses in the current version of the DMRS (Piasentin, Vigano, Azzone, Verga, & 
Freni, 2001). However, they are not yet sufficiently advanced for our study to be included. 
With regard to coping, even if CAP is based on a comprehensive review, it is also based on 
consensual research strategies limiting the number of categories. Well-defined categories are 
a simplification of a highly complex individual functioning. For example, raters are 
confronted at times with the intriguing situation that an adaptational process has been 
identified in the transcript, but does not fit any category; in this case, of course, no rating was 
applied, in order to avoid rater drift (Perry, & Henry, 2004). In other cases, a variant of a 
known category was found, but the code applied of the category did not fully account for the 
nuance; in this case the rating of the category was applied when appropriate and after 
discussion with colleagues and supervisor. Moreover, because observer-rater methods are 
based on session-transcripts, i.e., the patient’s narrative, strictly “covered” processes not 
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expressed in the interview are not assessable, unless there is sufficient information in the 
transcript for reliable inference. Finally, validity and reliability for the scales used have been 
established on a session-level, therefore we did not use them in micro-analyses on the 
situational level. Such analyses would help corroborating more fully the state-trait-assumption 
in adaptational processes and testing sequential hypotheses (Chabrol, & Callahan, 2004). 
These limitations of observer-rater methodology need to be kept in mind for future studies; 
some of them may be compensated by higher-order methodology. 
 Third, Plan Analysis as an individualized case conceptualization method was applied 
to the BD sample. Plan Analysis approaches adaptational processes in the broadest sense, 
without distinguishing between defensive and coping processes. As underlined by Caspar 
(1996), Plan Analysis is based on a “slim” and parcimonious theory and thus, corresponds to 
Foppa’s (1984) criteria of a perspective theory. This means that it offers a concrete 
methodology and is not embedded in a specific theory in clinical psychology, even if Plan 
Analysis has been applied to Schema-Analysis according to Grawe (1998; Grawe, Grawe-
Gerber, Heiniger, Ambühl, & Caspar, 1996; Heiniger, Grawe-Gerber, Ambühl, Grawe, & 
Braun, 1996). This characteristic may, with respect to adaptational processes, account for an 
advantage and a shortcoming at the same time. On the one hand, its relative theory-
independency is a great advantage in the sense that it is compatible with many clinical 
theories, such as the psychoanalytic theory of defensive processes and the transactional theory 
of stress and coping. Moreover, it enables the conceptualization of individual-relevant 
concepts (Plans and motives) in an individualized language; thus, Plan Analysis in this regard 
is much closer to the specific person as he/she presents him-/herself in an interview and 
probably in daily life, compared to theory-laden concepts such as defenses and coping, 
implying a highly specialized language of conceptualization. The specialized language may 
yield a high accuracy of conceptualization in certain cases, but may also be less relevant for 
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other ones, for whom the assumptions of the theory do not completely correspond (see above 
for the limitations of the category systems approach; the individualized Plan Analysis 
approach compensates optimally for such flaws by adopting the individualized conception). 
On the other hand, the lack of theory in Plan Analysis may also prevent theory-driven 
hypothesis testing, such as our endeavor of disentangle coping from defenses, for which Plan 
Analysis would not be a suitable methodology. It must be noted, also, that Plan Analysis 
requires a great deal of training, in-depth case supervision and continuous rater calibration, 
placing it also among the high-cost methodologies. However, the high investment is paid off 
by the individualized case conceptualization, which neither self-report nor observer-rater 
methodology are capable of, especially with regard to assistance in psychotherapy treatment 
planning. Moreover, the openness of the approach would also permit the use of information 
from self-report or observer-rater methodology, if available to the plananalyst. This would 
have allowed us to relate defense or coping specificities in BD to higher-order Plans and 
motives on an individual basis. In order to control for confounds in our research setting, all 
Plan Analyses were carried out without the information from the defense and coping scales. 
However, in a clinical setting, all information available should be included and this would 
mean that the patient’s functioning is understood in a truly comprehensive way.  
Focusing on defense and coping at the same time also implies in itself limitations. 
While a specific approach, limited to either defense or coping concepts, enables to study in-
depth specificity and relations with symptoms and outcome, the integrative approach allows 
to investigate comparatively different types of adaptational processes. The latter approach 
implies that the “zoom” is laid on a more comprehensive picture, which omits necessarily 
details. This may be exemplified by the fact that a big number of categories reduce power of 
the studies; thus, limitation to the higher-order categories, as done in chapter D and G, is 
necessary. A radically different approach to defense and coping would be the use of an 
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aggregated single-case methodology, where each case is conceptualized and presented in its 
singular specificity, independently of any group specificity (Stiles, 2005). In this paradigm, 
interactions between defense and coping would come out on the basis of individual case 
studies. Furthermore, unit of analysis was the session and we did not conduct fine-grained 
analysis on the situational micro-level of stress, coping and defenses. Such a study would 
enable to test more clearly some of our assumptions, i.e., on trait- and state-aspects of 
adaptational processes. It would also be interesting to try to assess adaptational processes 
within the crisis situation, however, we have to bear in mind that feasibility of the dynamic 
interview would be very low for patients presenting high levels of manic symptoms, a 
different setting would be necessary in these cases. Finally, after this first step in research on 
adaptational processes as patient’s characteristics, it is high time the therapist be introduced in 
the model of therapeutic change. 
 
Future Research Perspectives 
 Since our research is the beginning of a theoretical, empirical and clinical 
understanding of adaptational processes from an integrative viewpoint - in general and more 
specifically in patients presenting with Bipolar Affective Disorder - it is time to move on to 
the next step. Several research perspectives ensue from our studies and the limitations 
discussed above. We will very briefly outline the complete corroboration of the integrative 
model on adaptational processes, the relevance of these research questions for long-term 
psychotherapies, mediational models on adaptational processes, the application of these 
questions to the marital context, the application of these questions to the diagnosis of 
Borderline Personality Disorder, neurobiological underpinnings of defense and coping and, 
finally, enhancement of the instruments used. 
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The Steffens and Kächele’s (1988) integrative model of defense and coping was not 
completely tested, as the link between defense and underlying neurotic conflict (v absence of 
such a conflict in coping) was not investigated. Such a question goes clearly beyond the scope 
of this dissertation, but could quite easily be tested in future research, by applying specific 
rating scales to our verbatim material, such as the Core Conflictual Relationship Theme 
Method by Luborsky and Crits-Christoph (1990; for a study on the relationship between 
defenses and conflicts, see de Roten, Drapeau, Stigler, & Despland, 2004) and testing 
linkages with adaptational processes.  
One of the main disadvantages of our studies so far is, along with the small sample 
size, their short-term time-frame for all assessments (BD sample, matched controls, 
psychotherapy patients), as the interval between the assessment points is three months for all 
samples. The links between adaptational processes and therapeutic outcome were not 
sufficiently investigated by this study due not only to drop-outs which diminished power, but 
also to the time-frame. Changes in defenses did not go beyond state-changes, also due to the 
time-frame. The same holds true for the study of cognitive errors. Plans may theoretically 
remain fairly stable in an individual over time; schema-theoretical elaborations based on Plans 
(Grawe, 1998; Caspar, 1996) postulate schema- and emotion-fluctuation due to therapeutic 
activating strategies as important mediators for symptom change over the course of treatment 
for personality disorders (Zorn, Roder, Kramer, & Pomini, 2007). These considerations lead 
to the investigation of long-term psychotherapies (lasting at least two or three years), ideally 
in a comparative study design opposing different approaches, including adaptational 
processes and the therapeutic work on adaptational processes as mediator variables for 
symptom change. Such comparative analysis of mechanisms of change across therapeutic 
approaches has already been undertaken on a theoretical level for Borderline Personality 
Disorder (Kellogg, & Young, 2006; Levy, Clarkin, Yeomans, Scott, Wasserman, & Kernberg, 
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2006; Lynch, Chapman, Rosenthal, Kuo, & Linehan, 2006). Between-approach comparison 
might give some indications about the process specificity of an approach and help disentangle 
common from specific change factors in these psychotherapies (Castonguay, Newman, 
Borkovec, Grosse Holtforth, & Maramba, 2005; Grawe, Caspar, & Ambühl, 1990; Kramer, 
de Roten, & Despland, 2005; Kramer, Vannotti, Pomini, de Roten, & Despland, 2005). Such a 
comparative study based on randomized clinical methodology on long-term psychotherapies 
regarding recurrent depression is currently underway at Lausanne University (Despland, de 
Roten, Pomini, & Zullino, 2004). 
Changes in patients undergoing psychotherapy, either long-term or short-term, might 
be mediated by (1) Adaptational processes themselves; (2) Therapist responsiveness; (3) 
Interaction between adaptational processes, therapist responsiveness and therapeutic alliance. 
In order to investigate the first, the analysis of several time-points over the course of 
psychotherapy by means of our methods, testing mediator hypotheses of ODF and OCF, can 
be conducted. These analyses may be done on direct recorded session material or by using 
dynamic interviews at a three-month-interval carried out by an independent investigator. For 
the study of long-term therapies, preference is given to an independent investigator 
conducting clinical interviews, to control for specificities of the relationship variables inherent 
to the psychotherapeutic relationship (Perry, 2001; Perry, Fowler, & Semeniuk, 2005). Links 
with therapeutic change may be established, introducing the quality of the therapeutic alliance 
into the predictive model (see Figure 1, Introduction section). In order to test the second 
hypothesis, recorded psychotherapy sessions are a useful data source on the therapist 
responsiveness (Stiles, Honos-Webb, & Surko, 1998). Two models might be applied: (a) the 
level of therapist’s motive-orientedness with regard to the patient’s Plan structure (Caspar, 
Grossmann, Unmüssig, & Schramm, 2005) could be investigated by testing links with 
therapeutic change; (b) the level of accuracy of the therapist intervention as adapted to the 
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patient’s defensive profile (or coping resources and deficits; Kramer, de Roten, Michel, & 
Despland, 2005; Stigler, de Roten, Drapeau, & Despland, 2007; Winston, Winston, Wallner 
Samstag, & Muran, 1994) could also be investigated by testing links with therapeutic change. 
Finally, for the third hypothesis, which is probably the most promising research perspective, a 
complex model implying adaptational processes, therapist responsiveness and therapeutic 
alliance (or patterns of alliance evolution) might account best for outcome variance in 
psychotherapy studies.  
An important feature of clinical intervention is the focus on couple interaction, in BD 
patients (Morris, Miklowitz, & Waxmonsky, 2007) as in patients with Major Depression 
(Gollan, Friedman, & Miller, 2002). Especially with regard to enhancement of coping 
capacities in couples, Bodenmann’s (2000; 2004) approach has shown convincing results for 
depressive patients and their partners in terms of treatment efficacy (Bodenmann, Plancherel, 
Widmer, Gabriel, Meuwly, Charvoz, Hautzinger, Schramm, & Beach, submitted) and 
enhancement of dyadic coping (Gabriel, Bodenmann, Widmer, Charvoz, Schramm, & 
Hautzinger, submitted). It would be interesting to adapt, apply and evaluate such couple 
interventions also to BD patients and their intimate partners. For this diagnostic group, to our 
knowledge, no such empirical data exist to date. 
A better understanding from a comprehensive vantage point of adaptational processes 
involved in other mental disorders than BD or Adjustment Disorder is urgently needed. In 
particular, patients presenting Borderline Personality Disorders (BPD) are interesting 
candidates, as BPD may be considered an “affect regulating disorder” (Ansmann, 2002; 
Sachse, 2004), as may be considered BD, as well (see Introduction section). Coping and 
defense specificities in BPD and BD should overlap consistently, at least for the subtype 
emotion control. This overlap is in fact found with regard to defenses in BPD (Perry, 1993a); 
however, we do not have comparable data using the CAP (nor the CE) for BPD as yet. 
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The partially non-conscious and automatized status of adaptational processes may also 
be reflected by research on neuropsychological und biological underpinnings of defense and 
coping. We would hypothesize that patients undergoing dynamic interviews implying a 
moderate level of emotion activation might have more activation in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex associated with automatic (or “schematic”) emotional processing of 
information (Schaefer, & Philippot, 2000; Schaefer, Collette, Philippot, Van der Linden, 
Laureys, Delfiore, Degueldre, Maquet, Luxen, & Salmon, 2003), as compared to the same 
people in situations without emotion activation (assessed by the substraction method in PET-
SCAN, for example). One might also find concurrent activation with the pre-frontal cortex 
(along with activation in the right intraparietal sulcus and the left superior parietal gyrus) 
when the individual engages in strategizing, planning, inhibition or other resourceful 
cognitive activities related to coping (e.g., CAP problem-solving cognitive or CAP 
information seeking cognitive; Collette, Van der Linden, Laureys, Delfiore, Degueldre, 
Luxen, & Salmon, 2005). No studies are known to date which use concurrently such multi-
level assessment of adaptational processes including observer-rater methods. 
Finally, the quality of the self-report questionnaires on defense and coping should be 
improved in accordance with our conclusions and more vast cross-validating procedures with 
the observer-rater scales should be carried out (see Kramer, 2005a; Kramer, & Drapeau, in 
prep.). Questionnaires evaluating adaptational processes should measure exactly the same 
dimensions as DMRS, CAP and CE, which was not the case in our study, especially as 
regards the coping scale (CISS), and, to a lesser extent, also the defense scale (DSQ). If this 
were done, it would be possible to confirm fully the unconsciousness hypothesis of 
adaptational processes and would add an argument in favor of discriminant (and convergent) 
validity between observer-rater methodology and self-report measures. To ensure sound 
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norms for these scales, including the observer-rater methods, it would finally be helpful to 
conduct a study on a representative community sample, with high numbers of observation.

 EPILOGUE 
 
 
“I am not sick. 
 But I am happy  
as long as I can paint.” 
Frida Kahlo 
 
 
 
The initial question which has appeared in the prologue of this dissertation on the 
difficulty in doing psychotherapeutic conceptualizations and interventions with Bipolar 
Disorder patients has been addressed. As I come to the close of my dissertation, I am 
persuaded that my research will lead to even more extensive reflections on the subject, taking 
into account the fresh conclusions, as well as humbly acknowledging the inherent limitations. 
My earlier “resistances” – probably held by most psychologists and psychotherapists - 
concerning psychotherapy of BD have been dispelled. And more generally, the methodology 
applied to adaptational processes may certainly be beneficial to all groups of patients. Having 
said this, I would like to underline, finally, that theoretical conceptualizations and technical 
guidelines would certainly not completely suffice for grasping what may be called the essence 
of psychological treatments and in particular psychotherapy: the therapeutic relationship as a 
unique human encounter. The following anecdote is a good example of such a unique 
encounter and will allow this work to end on a more light-hearted note. 
 A female patient from the BD sample (3024) left a message on my answering-
machine, cancelling her second interview.  When I called her back to fix another appointment, 
she was extremely ambivalent as regards coming back to the clinic for the research session.  
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Instead, she invited me to her home for a cheese fondue, so that, as she said, “We could 
discuss everything calmly in a nice context … this would be much more pleasant than at the 
psychiatric clinic.”   I thought fast and, trying to respect complementarity, replied, “Thank 
you for your kind invitation. Of course, I can’t accept the idea of a fondue, but would suggest 
that I could make an exception for once and come to your apartment just for the interview.”  
The patient agreed and we fixed an appointment for the following week early in the morning.   
Her flat happened to be close to the clinic.  Towards the end of this session, the following 
verbatim exchange took place (excerpt 3024.2, alinea 469-474) : 
T : “On the phone, you invited me to have cheese fondue with you.” 
P : “Well, OK, I can’t make cheese fondue anymore, but I can make raclette for you.” 
T : “You know perfectly well that I can’t accept that, but at the same time…..” 
P : “Yes, I know that, I know it’s impossible.” 
T : “But this also shows something about you, it shows you trust me.” 
P : “I trust you entirely.”  Then the patient went on talking about trust and distrust of other 
people, which is one of her major relationship themes. 
This exchange and the preceding call show how important it is for the therapist to 
remain flexible, capable of adapting without any hesitation his own reactions to the patient’s 
interactional behaviors and motives. It is noteworthy that the psychotherapist or clinical 
researcher should respond in a motive-oriented way to the patient, even if the patient’s 
demands seem absurd or, as in this case, have a certain seductive element.  Here the therapist 
managed to abate the latter problem by realising what lay “behind” the patient’s words, what 
her true motive was. In fact, she was really checking whether she could actually trust the 
therapist and at the same time controlling her feeling of distrust.   
 Therefore, I reiterate that this dissertation would have been impossible without my 
adopting of a radically clinical stance in human encounters. This stance implies to constantly 
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keep in mind that each patient is unique within an individual situation, condition and 
suffering. Only in this respectful context, the patients will be able to reveal their intimate 
sufferings, become aware of their hidden resources and will, ultimately, change.
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Appendix B1 
Definitions of Coping Action Patterns according to the Manual CAP (Perry, Drapeau, 
Dunkley, & Blake, 2005, French Translation by Kramer, & Drapeau, 2005) 
 
Résolution de problème (PS) 
Définition : Gérer un stress en tentant à le comprendre et à le résoudre en tant que problème et 
à réaliser une solution désirée. 
Fonction : La résolution de problème cherche à comprendre un événement stressant pour 
ensuite ajuster les réactions de la personne en développant des plans d’action et par ce moyen, 
réaliser un outcome désiré. 
 
Recherche de l’information (IS) 
Définition : La recherche de l’information gère un événement stressant en tentant de recueillir 
de l’information qui peut aider à la gestion du stress. Ceci inclut des informations concernant 
l’événement stressant, soi-même et tout ce qui est relié à la réalisation d’un outcome positif. 
Fonction : La recherche d’information cherche à découvrir ou développer des possibilités 
supplémentaires pour la gestion du stress. 
 
Impuissance (H) 
Définition : L’impuissance gère un événement stressant en renonçant à affronter la situation et 
en même temps en exprimant de la souffrance par rapport à l’événement. 
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Fonction : L’impuissance cherche à exprimer de la souffrance au sujet de l’incapacité à gérer 
un événement stressant, au lieu d’une action directe sur la situation, quand l’individu pense 
qu’aucune action effective n’est possible pour la personne. Un objectif secondaire peut être 
dans certains cas d’avoir quelqu’un qui prend en charge la gestion du stress. 
 
Fuite (E) 
Définition : La fuite gère un événement stressant par le désengagement et l’évitement de 
l’affronter. 
Fonction : La fuite cherche à protéger la personne de l’événement stressant et de son contexte, 
quand l’individu pense qu’aucune issue n’est ouverte qui permettrait de gérer favorablement 
l’événement stressant et permettrait d’éviter des conséquences négatives appréhendées. 
 
Auto-détermination (SR) 
Définition : L’individu utilise ses propres ressources pour gérer le stress et aller de l’avant 
pour se prendre en charge. 
Fonction: L’auto-détermination cherche à protéger, préserver, augmenter ou actualiser des 
ressources personnelles pour gérer le stress. Régulation émotionnelle, régulation 
comportementale, expression des émotions, se rapprocher des émotions 
Ceci peut impliquer de faire des choses pour autrui, si ceci entre dans les objectifs de la 
personne. 
 
Recherche de soutien (SS) 
Définition : La recherche de soutien social gère un événement stressant en cherchant, en 
trouvant ou en engageant des ressources sociales qui aident à atteindre un but désiré ou à 
éviter un but non-désiré. 
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Fonction : La recherche de soutien social utilise des ressources sociales pour remplacer ou 
compléter ses propres efforts pour gérer le stress. 
 
Délégation (D) 
Définition : La délégation gère un événement stressant en laissant sa gestion explicitement ou 
implicitement à autrui, au lieu de la gestion du stress par la personne elle-même. 
Fonction : La délégation est utilisée quand la personne pense que ses propres ressources sont 
insuffisantes pour gérer le stress. L’individu renonce à des tentatives actives à gérer le stress 
et tente à convaincre autrui d’assumer la responsabilité pour la gestion de l’événement 
stressant. 
 
Retrait social (I) 
Définition : Le retrait social gère un événement stressant en se retirant de celui-ci ou en 
s’isolant socialement. 
Fonction : Le retrait social cherche à retirer ou protéger la personne de l’événement stressant 
ou d’un entourage social ou matériel peu soutenant, ce qui permet à la personne d’éviter des 
dégâts ou de la souffrance (ou d’autres effets négatifs, comme les sentiments de honte ou de 
culpabilité). 
 
Accommodation (A) 
Définition : L’accommodation gère un événement stressant en construisant un compromis ou 
en acceptant ce qui peut être changé et ce qui ne peut être changé dans la situation stressante.  
Fonction : L’accommodation ajuste flexiblement les préférences de la personne, par exemple 
en acceptant de recevoir moins de ce qu’on désire, en gérant les limites des options émergeant 
de l’événement stressant ou son contexte. 
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Négociation (N) 
Définition : La négociation gère un événement stressant en tentant de développer de nouvelles 
options pour enrichir le répertoire des possibilités. 
Fonction : La négociation cherche à élargir les possibilités d’action pour gérer le stress, en 
examinant les priorités de la personne ou en s’engageant avec autrui dans un échange 
réciproque. Elle peut inclure l’enlèvement des options avec moins d’importance pour 
maximiser les chances des options avec plus d’importance, si la situation impose de tels 
choix. 
 
Soumission (S) 
Définition : La soumission gère le stress en cédant à autrui et en renonçant à réaliser les 
préférences personnelles 
Fonction : La soumission enlève la personne d’un conflit avec l’événement stressant en 
validant l’incapacité de surmonter l’événement stressant et en conséquence, en retirant la 
personne de tentatives actives de gérer le  stress. 
 
Opposition (O) 
Définition : L’opposition gère un événement stressant en le confrontant et en tentant d’enlever 
toute contrainte imposée aux préférences de la personne. 
Fonction : En confrontant un événement stressant et tentant d’éliminer ou éviter les 
contraintes imposées, l’opposition canalise la frustration en action pour élargir les options de 
la personne.  
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Appendix B2 
Reliability Formula 
 
 
 
   σα² 
ρ =    ____________________ 
     σα² + σβ² + σε² 
 
Note. According to Wirtz and Caspar, 2002; p. 171; Two-factors Random; Perfect Agreement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 320
Appendix B3 
Reliability Results CAP 
Case Rater ICC (2,1) 
3001.2 
3003.1 
3005.1 
3006.1 
3006.2 
3007.1 
3008.1 
3009.1 
3010.1 
3011.2 
3012.1 
3012.2 
3013.1 
3014.1 
3015.1 
3016.1 
3017.1 
3020.1 
3052.1 
3060.1 
DD 
DD 
DD 
DD 
NP 
NP 
NZ 
IR 
DD 
NZ 
IR 
NZ 
IR 
NZ 
NP 
UK 
UK 
UK 
NP 
UK 
.89 
.79 
.78 
.80 
.85 
.91 
.82 
.94 
.84 
.59 
.87 
.86 
.90 
.60 
.89 
.88 
.91 
.86 
.93 
.91 
Mean 
SD 
 .84 
.10 
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      Note. ICC (2,1) on 36 categories of coping 
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Appendix B4 
Reliability between Members of the Lausanne Group and the McGill Group Consensus for 
CE-CAP Ratings (English Ratings, including 12 CAP Categories and 14 Errors) 
Rater nested within case ICC (2,1) 
Case 3002 RS2 
UK 
NP 
NZ 
IR 
DD 
 
.75 
.61 
.70 
.51 
.76 
Case 3002 RS3 
UK 
NP 
NZ 
IR 
DD 
 
.78 
.83 
.83 
.72 
.60 
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Appendix B5: Canonical Correlations CAP-CISS (BD patients; N = 30) 
 
                               CISS   
CAP 
Task Emotio Escape Distract Soc Div 
OCF 
Problem-Solving 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Information-Seeking 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Helplessness 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Escape 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Self-Reliance 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Support-Seeking 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Delegation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Isolation 
 Affective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Accommodation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Negotiation 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Submission 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
Opposition 
  Affective 
  Behavioral 
  Cognitive 
2.29* 
 
. 
1.74 
1.03 
 
-2.12* 
1.40 
0.53 
 
-2.12* 
-0.14 
0.10 
 
0.86 
-1.33 
-0.59 
 
0.59 
0.80 
0.71 
 
-1.44 
-1.92 
0.93 
 
-0.91 
-1.17 
-0.02 
 
-1.33 
-0.62 
-0.56 
 
1.01 
-2.45* 
-0.02 
 
-0.04 
-0.01 
2.45* 
 
-0.91 
-1.23 
-1.67 
 
-0.38 
-1.46 
0.56 
-0.92 
 
. 
-0.23 
-0.29 
 
-0.71 
0.89 
-0.37 
 
-0.97 
1.13 
1.44 
 
0.55 
-0.03 
0.02 
 
-1.68 
-1.36 
1.08 
 
-0.87 
0.15 
-0.20 
 
-1.53 
-1.39 
-0.80 
 
-0.48 
-0.24 
-0.32 
 
-0.43 
-1.18 
-0.05 
 
-1.29 
1.51 
-0.03 
 
-1.37 
0.63 
0.11 
 
2.10* 
0.17 
0.74 
-0.54 
 
. 
0.63 
-0.50 
 
-0.45 
1.67 
-0.60 
 
-0.66 
0.43 
-0.68 
 
0.23 
-1.11 
0.68 
 
-0.60 
-0.29 
-0.64 
 
-0.19 
-0.38 
-0.28 
 
0.54 
-1.47 
1.14 
 
-0.79 
-0.55 
0.56 
 
-0.17 
-1.73 
-1.56 
 
0.51 
1.94 
0.64 
 
0.00 
-0.02 
-2.04* 
 
1.76 
-0.40 
1.00 
-1.30 
 
. 
0.16 
-1.39 
 
0.09 
1.21 
-1.16 
 
-0.51 
-0.44 
-0.41 
 
-0.63 
-0.86 
0.84 
 
-0.94 
-0.85 
-0.38 
 
-0.16 
-0.82 
-0.79 
 
0.76 
-1.01 
1.34 
 
-0.62 
-0.72 
1.27 
 
-0.61 
-1.60 
-1.95 
 
0.38 
1.70 
-0.22 
 
0.46 
0.49 
-1.19 
 
1.92 
-0.44 
1.18 
0.23 
 
. 
1.02 
0.74 
 
-0.82 
1.28 
0.56 
 
-0.53 
0.99 
-0.56 
 
0.83 
-1.10 
-0.01 
 
-0.24 
0.06 
-0.49 
 
0.06 
0.23 
0.46 
 
0.26 
-1.76 
0.43 
 
-0.89 
-0.51 
-0.37 
 
0.54 
-1.27 
-1.04 
 
0.48 
1.28 
1.24 
 
-0.48 
-0.30 
-1.71 
 
1.27 
-0.07 
0.88 
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                Note. Overall t = 0.81, ns 
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Appendix B6 
Mean Reliability per Category CAP (Control Group; N = 30) 
 ICC (2,1) 
Problem-Solving 
Information-Seeking 
Helplessness 
Escape 
Self-Reliance 
Support-Seeking 
Delegation 
Isolation 
Accommodation 
Negotiation 
Submission 
Opposition  
.88 
.88 
.96 
.84 
.87 
.90 
.71 
.77 
.61 
.81 
.94 
.74 
Note. Results from the French Validation Study CAP (Kramer, & Drapeau, in prep.)
APPENDICES 326
Appendix B7 
Canonical Correlations CAP-CISS (Control Group; N = 30) 
            CISS    
CAP 
Task Emotion Avoidance Distraction So-Diversion 
OCF 
PS-a 
PS-b 
PS-c 
IS-a 
IS-b 
IS-c 
H-a 
H-b 
H-c 
E-a 
E-b 
E-c 
SR-a 
SR-b 
SR-c 
SS-a 
SS-b 
SS-c 
D-a 
D-b 
D-c 
I-a 
I-b 
I-c 
A-a 
A-b 
A-c 
N-a 
N-b 
N-c 
S-a 
S-b 
S-c 
O-a 
O-b 
O-c 
1.55 
-- 
1.62 
0.20 
-0.26 
1.33 
0.11 
-2.31* 
-1.13 
-0.17 
-0.24 
-1.13 
-0.75 
0.97 
-0.07 
0.05 
-1.95 
0.05 
1.21 
-0.54 
-0.73 
0.01 
-0.75 
0.28 
0.64 
-0.05 
-0.51 
0.61 
-2.80** 
-0.24 
0.63 
-0.24 
0.08 
-0.12 
-2.07* 
0.53 
1.45 
-1.01 
-- 
-2.11* 
0.55 
0.62 
0.16 
0.09 
2.12* 
1.50 
0.76 
-0.04 
0.26 
0.46 
-1.62 
-0.76 
0.57 
-0.36 
0.58 
0.18 
-0.24 
-0.70 
-0.69 
0.88 
-0.55 
-0.65 
-0.81 
-0.66 
-1.41 
1.51 
0.82 
-0.04 
-0.01 
0.30 
0.06 
1.97 
1.11 
-0.72 
-0.55 
-- 
-1.20 
-0.14 
0.77 
0.98 
-2.58* 
0.78 
2.00 
-1.37 
0.01 
-0.81 
-0.37 
0.23 
1.37 
-1.16 
-1.62 
-0.02 
0.25 
-1.11 
-1.02 
-0.68 
1.21 
0.96 
0.42 
-0.48 
-0.11 
-1.28 
0.06 
1.35 
0.15 
-0.48 
2.21* 
-1.12 
0.74 
1.13 
0.37 
-1.59 
-- 
-1.48 
-0.28 
1.33 
0.80 
-3.06** 
0.98 
0.64 
-1.79 
-0.90 
-0.38 
0.29 
0.05 
1.28 
-1.10 
-1.09 
-1.05 
-0.39 
0.09 
-0.51 
0.25 
1.71 
0.41 
1.45 
-0.67 
-0.39 
-0.46 
0.50 
0.68 
-0.65 
1.19 
2.68* 
-0.12 
0.94 
1.21 
-0.15 
0.13 
-- 
-0.42 
0.18 
-0.43 
0.38 
-1.00 
0.12 
2.31* 
-0.38 
0.92 
-0.56 
-0.68 
0.26 
0.40 
-0.64 
-0.92 
0.73 
0.83 
-1.68 
-1.19 
-0.92 
-0.13 
0.74 
-0.64 
0.22 
0.26 
-1.78 
-0.47 
0.85 
0.52 
-1.27 
1.63 
-1.19 
0.43 
0.87 
0.75 
Note. Overall t = 0.80, ns 
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Appendix B8 
Canonical Correlations CAP-CE (Control Group; N = 30) 
Positive Errors Negative Errors         CE 
CAP 
Ratio 
FT OG SA P FT OG SA P 
OCF 
PS 
IS 
H 
E 
SR 
SS 
D 
I 
A 
N 
S 
O 
-1.46 
-1.06 
0.41 
0.76 
1.45 
-0.71 
-0.07 
1.63 
2.08* 
1.51 
-0.54 
0.49 
0.43 
2.17* 
-0.20 
0.93 
-1.09 
-2.08* 
-1.11 
-1.08 
-0.58 
-0.73 
-0.45 
-0.18 
-0.41 
-2.33* 
1.16 
-0.00 
1.44 
-0.69 
-0.34 
-0.17 
1.52 
-1.70 
-1.58 
-0.33 
2.53* 
-0.25 
0.12 
-0.77 
-0.97 
1.15 
1.02 
1.73 
0.64 
0.32 
-0.84 
0.36 
-0.93 
1.22 
-0.18 
1.06 
0.80 
0.77 
-1.08 
0.34 
-0.33 
0.68 
1.83 
0.07 
0.24 
-0.05 
0.49 
-0.09 
1.13 
1.13 
-0.64 
0.70 
0.06 
-1.27 
-0.09 
0.06 
-1.66 
0.57 
-0.62 
0.43 
-0.67 
-0.53 
-0.08 
0.15 
2.04* 
0.19 
0.02 
2.34* 
0.13 
-0.58 
-0.27 
-0.01 
1.03 
0.45 
3.07** 
-3.50** 
-1.49 
1.23 
3.17** 
3.71** 
0.19 
2.24* 
2.47* 
3.35** 
0.14 
-0.01 
1.28 
1.39 
-0.26 
1.71 
-0.02 
0.08 
0.73 
0.17 
0.08 
-0.91 
-0.31 
0.27 
-0.80 
-0.26 
2.45* 
Note. Overall t = 0.90, ns 
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Appendix B9 
Canonical Correlations CAP-GSI-SCL-90 (Control Group; N = 30) 
CAP GSI 
Overall Coping Functioning 
Problem-Solving 
Information-Seeking 
Helplessness 
Escape 
Self-Reliance 
Support-Seeking 
Delegation 
Isolation 
Accommodation 
Negotiation 
Submission 
Opposition 
-2.63* 
-0.97 
0.79 
2.53* 
1.43 
-0.37 
0.64 
0.22 
1.80 
-1.39 
-0.66 
2.18* 
0.52 
Note. Overall t = 1.13, ns 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Appendix C1 
Reliability results DMRS 
Case Rater ICC (2,1) 
3005.1 
3006.2 
3007.1 
3007.2 
3010.2 
3011.1 
3011.2 
3019.1 
3022.1 
3022.2 
3051.1 
3052.1 
3053.1 
3054.1 
3056.1 
3057.1 
3058.1 
3059.1 
3060.1 
3065.1 
MB 
MB 
YdeR 
GA 
GA 
YdeR 
MB 
MB 
GA 
YdeR 
VB 
VW 
VB 
MB 
VW 
NT 
VW 
GA 
VW 
VW 
.78 
.81 
.89 
.64 
.50 
.85 
.78 
.85 
.95 
.86 
.88 
.85 
.95 
.79 
.83 
.95 
.94 
.87 
.73 
.94 
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3070.1 VW .81 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
.83 
.10 
                  Note. ICC(2,1) on 28 singular defenses 
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Appendix C2 
 Canonical Correlations between DMRS and DSQ-60 (BD Patients; N = 30) 
Note. Overall t = 1.51, ns 
Defenses ODF (DSQ) Image-D 
(DSQ) 
Affect-R 
(DSQ) 
Mature (DSQ)
DMRS 
ODF 
Mature: 
Affiliation 
Altruism 
Anticipation 
Humour 
Self-Assertion 
Self-Observation 
Sublimation 
Suppression 
Obsessional: 
Isolation affect 
Intellectualization 
Undoing 
Neurotic: 
Repression 
Dissociation 
Reaction formation 
 
Displacement 
Narcissistic: 
Omnipotence 
Idealization 
Devaluation 
Disavowal: 
Denial 
Projection 
Rationalization 
Autistic Fantasy 
Borderline: 
Splitting others 
Splitting self 
Projective identification 
Action: 
Acting out 
Passive-aggression 
Help-rejecting complaining 
 
0.26 
 
-0.44 
1.36 
1.51 
1.67 
2.17* 
1.77 
0.76 
1.43 
 
1.23 
1.44 
0.30 
 
1.00 
-1.94 
1.15 
-0.43 
 
-0.86 
-1.33 
-0.45 
 
-0.22 
0.02 
1.95 
-3.37** 
 
-4.04** 
-3.01** 
-1.52 
 
-2.05* 
-0.16 
0.70 
 
-0.50 
 
-1.15 
-1.52 
-1.82 
-1.29 
-2.44* 
-2.08* 
-0.72 
-1.58 
 
-1.26 
-2.57* 
-0.78 
 
-0.97 
2.09* 
-1.05 
1.66 
 
1.43 
-0.44 
-0.55 
 
0.44 
-1.28 
-1.59 
2.25* 
 
2.59* 
1.72 
2.12* 
 
0.93 
1.00 
0.33 
 
-1.08 
 
-0.62 
-0.76 
-0.88 
-0.63 
-2.60* 
0.58 
-0.42 
-0.96 
 
-1.64 
-1.44 
-0.20 
 
-0.07 
0.43 
-0.79 
0.42 
 
1.44 
0.67 
-0.22 
 
0.29 
-0.86 
-0.89 
-0.99 
 
-0.44 
-0.80 
-0.21 
 
2.39* 
0.22 
1.95 
 
0.09 
 
0.49 
2.20* 
0.70 
1.42 
2.23* 
1.93 
0.84 
1.09 
 
-0.06 
2.28* 
0.31 
 
0.47 
-3.40** 
0.87 
-2.09* 
 
-1.04 
-0.99 
-1.17 
 
-0.31 
0.14 
0.86 
-1.75 
 
-2.03* 
-2.73** 
-0.69 
 
-1.39 
0.15 
0.64 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Appendix D1 
Reliability results CAP 
Case Rater ICC global ICC per coping 
3001.2 
3003.1 
3005.1 
3006.1 
3006.2 
3007.1 
3008.1 
3009.1 
3010.1 
3011.2 
3012.1 
3012.2 
3013.1 
3014.1 
3015.1 
3016.1 
3017.1 
3020.1 
3052.1 
3060.1 
DD 
DD 
DD 
DD 
NP 
NP 
NZ 
IR 
DD 
NZ 
IR 
NZ 
IR 
NZ 
NP 
UK 
UK 
UK 
NP 
UK 
.84 
.88 
.83 
.85 
.92 
.91 
.84 
.91 
.95 
.90 
.84 
.84 
.89 
.79 
.83 
.93 
.90 
.84 
.94 
.89 
.90 
.66 
.65 
.84 
.91 
.85 
.84 
.89 
.94 
.54 
.86 
.88 
.89 
.87 
.92 
.90 
.91 
.84 
.83 
.88 
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Mean 
SD 
 .88 
.04 
.84 
.10 
Note. ICC global: CE and CAP together (26 categories); ICC per coping: CAP on 12   
categories 
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Appendix D2 
Reliability results DMRS 
Case Rater ICC per level 
3005.1 
3006.2 
3007.1 
3007.2 
3010.2 
3011.1 
3011.2 
3019.1 
3022.1 
3022.2 
3051.1 
3052.1 
3053.1 
3054.1 
3056.1 
3057.1 
3058.1 
3059.1 
3060.1 
3065.1 
3070.1 
MB 
MB 
YdeR 
GA 
GA 
YdeR 
MB 
MB 
GA 
YdeR 
VB 
VW 
VB 
MB 
VW 
NT 
VW 
GA 
VW 
VW 
VW 
.70 
.76 
.92 
.89 
.85 
.82 
.80 
.82 
.91 
.96 
.73 
.86 
.99 
.71 
.84 
.99 
.96 
.82 
.76 
.95 
.95 
Mean  .86 
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SD  .09 
      Note. ICC per level: 7 levels of defenses 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
Appendix E1 
Definitions Cognitive Errors according to the Manual Cognitive Errors (Drapeau, Perry, & 
Dunkley, 2005), French Translation by Kramer, & Drapeau (2005) 
 
 
Pensée anticipatrice (FT) 
La pensée anticipatrice assume  que le pire ou le meilleur des résultats se produira dans une 
situation. Une pensée anticipatrice négative s’appelle aussi Catastrophisation, qui prédit que 
le résultat futur d’une situation spécifique est négatif, sans tenir compte des résultats plus 
probables qui peuvent être moins négatifs. La pensée anticipatrice positive prédit que le 
résultat futur d’une situation spécifique sera positif ou favorable, sans tenir compte des 
résultats moins positifs qui sont plus probables. 
 
 
Sur-généralisation (OG) 
La sur-généralisation assume que si un résultat négatif se produit dans un cas, il se re-produira 
dans un autre, si celui-ci est un peu similaire. Il y a deux formes : étiquettage et sur-
généralisation. 
 
Etiquettage 
L’individu pose une étiquette globale et fixe sur soi-même ou autrui, sans tenir compte que la 
réalité peut mener plus raisonnablement à une conclusion moins désastrueuse (ou moins 
positive). Il peut s’agir d’un adjectif (« Je suis un perdant », « C’est un mauvais type ») ou 
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une phrase (« Je suis le genre de personne qui échoue, peu importe ce que je fais »). 
Distinction étiquettage et utilisation d’un adjectif : on peut décrire le comportement de 
quelqu’un à l’aide d’un adjectif, sans nécessairement recourir à de l’étiquettage, par ex. 
« c’était malpoli » est descriptif et adjectival, tandis que « il est malpoli, c’est pour ça qu’il ne 
m’écoutera pas ».  
 
Abstraction sélective (SA) 
Pensée en tout-ou-rien 
Cette erreur est aussi appelée pensée en noir et blanc, polarisée, ou pensée dichotomique. 
L’individu perçoit une situation appartenant exclusivement à l’une ou l’autre catégorie 
opposée, au lieu d’une perception en termes de mélange ou de continuum entre les deux 
extrêmes.  
  
 
Ignorance des aspects positifs ou négatifs 
L’individu ignore sélectivement des aspects positifs ou négatifs de l’information, pour cela, il 
ne retient qu’une valence d’information en tant que vraie ou pertinente.  
 
 
Raisonnement émotionnel 
L’individu pense que quelque chose doit être vrai parce qu’il ou elle sent et croit que c’est 
vrai, ignorant des arguments en faveur du contraire.  
 
 
Magnification des aspects négatifs ou minimisation des aspects positifs 
Quand la personne évalue quelqu’un, soi-même ou une situation, elle gonfle les aspects 
négatifs, sans raison, ou minimise les aspects positifs, ou fait l’inverse. 
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Discrimination : La magnification a souvent deux parties : x  démontre y, et non seulement 
l’énoncé « y est vrai », dans ce cas, il s’agirait d’étiquettage. 
 
Filtre mental 
L’individu fait seulement attention à un seul aspect d’un individu ou d’une situation, sans 
reconnaisssance  des autres côtés du thème qui compléteraient l’image globale.  
 
A. Filtre mental négatif : Ceci est probablement la forme la plus fréquente : voir les 
aspects négatifs sans reconnaître les aspects positifs. Par exemple, voir les coûts, mais 
pas les bénéfices d’une idée. 
B. Filtre mental positif : La personne voit tout en rose, se centrant sur les caractéristiques 
positives et ne pas reconnaissant les aspects négatifs. Ceci donne une image 
unilatéralement positive, au lieu d’une image globalement nuancée. 
 
 
Pensée impérative 
L’individu a une idée précise et fixe sur comment les autres et soi-même devraient se 
comporter. Comme résultat, quand ces attentes ne sont pas remplies, l’individu surestime les 
conséquences  négatives. 
 
 
Vision rétrécie 
L’individu se centre sur les aspects négatifs d’une situation. (Tunnel vision). 
 
 
Raccourci vers conclusions 
L’individu prend un ou deux faits et en tire des conclusions insolites. 
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Personnalisation (P) 
Lecture de pensée 
La lecture de pensée permet à l’individu de croire qu’il sait ce que les autres pensent, ignorant 
d’autres possibilités plausibles. 
 
Personnalisation 
L’individu prend les choses personnellement de manière excessive, en croyant que les autres 
se comportent de manière positive ou négative à cause de lui, sans considérer des explications 
plus plausibles pour leurs  comportements qui n’impliquent pas sa personne. 
 
Auto-accusation inappropriée, tout en ignorant le rôle des autres 
Dans cette erreur, l’individu s’auto-accuse pour quelque chose de négatif qui lui est arrivé, 
pendant qu’ils laisse de côté les contributions des autres à ce même problème. L’individu se 
met dans la position de victime. 
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Appendix E2 
Reliability Results CE 
 
Case Rater ICC (2,1) 
3001.2 
3003.1 
3005.1 
3006.1 
3006.2 
3007.1 
3008.1 
3009.1 
3010.1 
3011.2 
3012.1 
3012.2 
3013.1 
3014.1 
3015.1 
3016.1 
3017.1 
3020.1 
3052.1 
3060.1 
DD 
DD 
DD 
DD 
NP 
NP 
NZ 
IR 
DD 
NZ 
IR 
NZ 
IR 
NZ 
NP 
UK 
UK 
UK 
NP 
UK 
.48 
.76 
.75 
.76 
.89 
.62 
.73 
.93 
.79 
.83 
.73 
.73 
.83 
.89 
.64 
.95 
.94 
.83 
.94 
.88 
Mean 
SD 
 .80 
.12 
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Note. ICC (2,1) on 28 categories of errors 
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Appendix E3 
Mean Reliability per CE Category (Control Group) 
 ICC (2, 1) 
Positive Errors 
  Overgeneralization 
  Selective Abstraction 
  Personalization 
Negative Errors 
  Overgeneralization 
  Selective Abstraction 
  Personalization 
 
.57 
.91 
.99 
 
.90 
.85 
.82 
Note. Results from the French validation study CE (Kramer, & Drapeau, in prep.) 
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Appendix E4 
Canonical Correlations CE-GSI (Control Group ; N = 30) 
CE GSI 
Ratio 
Positive Errors 
  Overgeneralization 
  Selective Abstraction 
  Personalization 
Negative Errors 
  Overgeneralization 
  Selective Abstraction 
  Personalization  
0.42 
0.51 
-1.06 
0.82 
-0.76 
0.68 
1.05 
1.12 
0.03 
Note. Overall t = 0.75 
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
Appendix F1 
Reliability for Plan Structures 
Cas No 3006 
 
 
 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Garde 1 place 
importante à  
ton fils 
Evite de 
perdre ton fils
1 3.5 
Plans sup Aie du 
contact 
Sois proche 
de l’autre 
Plans inf Contrôle les 
finances 
Fâche-toi 
quand thérap 
pose question 
Fais tout pour 
ton fils 
Evite de te 
plaindre 
2.5 
70 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Isole-toi 0 0 
Plans sup Evite de 
souffrir 
0 
Plans inf Evite de 
répondre aux 
appels 
Coupe le 
contact 
0 
0 
0 0 
 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Ne déçois pas 
les autres 
Evite de 
déranger les 
autres 
1 
Plans sup Fais-toi 
apprécier 
Sois proche 
de l’autre 
Plans inf Accueille bien 
beau-frère 
Evite de 
t’affirmer 
3 
4 80 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Evite le 
conflit 
Montre-toi 
poliment 
1 
Plans sup Evite de 
souffrir 
Evite de 
t’affirmer 
Plans inf Coupe le 
contact 
Donne de 
l’argent 
Evite état des 
lieux 
Excuse-toi 
Accomode-toi 
en entretien 
1 
2 40 
 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Sois appréciée 
pour autre 
chose que 
l’argent 
0 0 
Plans sup Fais-toi 
apprécier 
Sois 1 St-
Bernard 
Plans inf Ne te fais pas 
marcher 
dessus 
0 
2 
2 40 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Donne de ta 
personne aux 
autres 
Fais tout pour 
les autres 
1 
Plans sup Fais-toi 
apprécier 
Sois 1 St-
Bernard 
Plans inf Donne ton 
argent 
Sois serviable 
Fais tout pour 
ton fils 
3 
4 80 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans 0 Fais que 
l’autre apitoie
0 
Plans sup Aie du 
contact 
Evite de 
perdre 1 
relation 
Sois 1 St-
Bernard 
Plans inf 0 Montre-toi 
faible 
1 
1 20 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans 0 Sois proche 
de ta mère 
0 
Plans sup Aie du 
contact 
Evite de 
perdre 1 
relation 
Plans inf Tente de se 
suicider 
Rêve d’1 
paradis 
Fais tentamen
3 
3 60 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Donne ton 
argent 
Fais ce qui 
plaît à l’autre 
.5 
Plans sup Donne de ta 
personne 
Evite de te 
plaindre 
Plans inf Fais ménage 
gratuitement 
Fais semblant 
en sexualité 
0 
.5 10 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Aie du 
contact 
Evite de 
perdre 1 
relation 
1 
Plans sup Obtiens 
l’affection des 
autres 
Sois proche 
des autres 
Plans inf Fréquente 
beau frère 
Garde 1 place 
importante 
pour fils 
Fais que 
l’autre 
t’apitoie 
Sois proche 
de ta mère 
Evite de 
perdre ton fils
3 
4 80 
Note. Moyenne (%) = (70+0+80+40+40+80+20+60+10+80)/10 = 48% 
Plans sup : Plans (hierarchiquement) supérieurs; Plans inf : Plans (hierarchiquement) 
inférieurs; Valeur corr : Valeur de correspondance; Valeur c total : Valeur de correspondance 
totale 
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Cas No 3007 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Evite des 
pertes 
Evite de 
perdre 1 
relation 
1 
Plans sup Réalise ton 
besoin 
d’attachement 
Sois proche 
Plans inf Cache ta 
dépression 
Evite le 
changement 
Evite de 
perdre la 
famille 
Fais tout pour 
les autres 
2 
3 60 
 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Reste digne Evite de te 
montrer faible
1 
Plans sup Montre 1 
image pos de 
toi-même 
Evite des 
émotions 
négatives 
Plans inf Cache ta 
dépression 
Pleure en 
cachette 
4 
5 100 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Présente-toi 
comme 
victime 
Fais tout pour 
les autres 
.5 
Plans sup Attire 
l’attention 
Evite de 
perdre 1 
relation 
Evite de 
perdre ta 
famille 
Plans inf Montre que tu 
n’as pas le 
choix 
Pense devoir 
donner tout 
2.5 
3 60 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Rends-toi 
indispensable 
aux autres 
Sois 
superwoman 
1 
Plans sup Evite les 
pertes 
Réalise ton 
besoin 
d’attachement 
Réalise toi-
même 
Evite les 
émotions 
difficiles 
Plans inf Sois 
superwoman 
Affirme-toi 
2.5 
3.5 70 
 
APPENDICES 352
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Evite le 
conflit 
Retire-toi des 
autres 
1 
Plans sup Sauvegarde 
ton couple 
Protège-toi 
des autres 
Plans inf Utilise 
épilepsie 
comme 
prétexte 
Sois 
redevable 
Evite de 
parler de 
l’enfance 
Isole-toi 
1 
2 40 
 
 
 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Valorise-toi Améliore-toi 1 
Plans sup Préserve ton 
identité 
Réalise toi-
même 
Plans inf Montre tes 
compétences 
Cherche psy 
2 
3 60 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Fais en sorte 
que le 
thérapeute te 
prenne au 
sérieux 
Recherche de 
l’aide 
1 
Plans sup Evite de 
nouvelles 
déceptions 
Sois proche 
Améliore-toi 
Plans inf Sois attirée 
par les 
médicaments 
Laisse-toi 
aller 
1 
2 40 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Montre tes 
compétences 
Evite d’avoir 
honte 
1 
Plans sup Valorise-toi Evite les 
émotions 
difficiles 
Plans inf Sois 
superwoman 
Evite de te 
montrer faible
3 
4 80 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Evite le 
changement 
Protège-toi 1 
Plans sup Préserve ton 
identité 
Evite des 
pertes 
Evite la 
blessure 
psychologique
Plans inf Idéalise sa vie Protège-toi 
des autres 
2 
3 60 
Note. Total = (70+60+100+60+70+40+60+40+80+60)/10 = 64% 
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Cas No 3011 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Reste 
dépendante de 
tes parents 
Sois 1 bonne 
fille 
1 5 
Plans sup Fais en sorte 
que l’on 
s’occupe de 
toi 
 
 
 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Aie 1 relation 
intime 
Cherche 1 
copain 
1 
Plans sup Obtiens de 
l’affection 
Evite d’être 
seule 
Plans inf Imagine 
l’amour d’1 
chanteur 
Rêve de B. 
4 
5 100 
Occupe-toi 
des parents 
Fais en sorte 
que tes 
parents 
t’aiment 
Plans inf Soucis-toi de 
ta mère 
4 
Ne laisse pas 
tomber la 
mère 
100 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Rejette ta 
mère 
Mets une 
distance avec 
ta mère 
1 
Plans sup Détache-toi 
de tes parents 
Evite d’être 
dépendante 
Plans inf Doute de 
l’identité de la 
mère 
Méfie-toi de 
la mère 
4 
5 100 
 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Garde le 
contrôle 
Contrôle 
l’interaction 
1 
Plans sup Evite la 
souffrance 
Sois proche 
Maintiens le 
contrôle 
Plans inf Lutte contre 
le sentiment 
d’impuissance 
Fais en sorte 
que le 
thérapeute ait 
pitié 
Séduis le 
thérapeute 
3 
4 80 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Montre-toi 
comme 
victime 
Montre-toi 
maltraitée 
1 
Plans sup Evite que le 
thérapeute 
exige trop de 
toi 
Fais en sorte 
que le 
thérapeute ait 
pitié 
Plans inf Apitoie sur 
toi-même 
Plains-toi 
3.5 
4.5 90 
 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Evite les 
prises de 
consciences 
sur l’origine 
des difficultés 
Evite les 
surprises 
négatives 
.5 
Plans sup Evite le 
changement 
Isole-toi des 
autres 
Plans inf Fais en sorte 
que l’entretien 
se termine 
Evite de 
vérifier 
l’identité de 
B. 
2 
2.5 50 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Attire 
l’attention des 
autres 
Séduis le 
thérapeute 
.5 
Plans sup Fais en sorte 
qu’on 
s’occupe de 
toi 
Contrôle 
l’interaction 
Plans inf Montre-toi 
déprimée à la 
sorte de 
l’hôpital 
Dis 1 chose 
pour la 
première fois 
2 
2.5 50 
 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Occupe-toi 
des parents 
Sois proche 
des parents 
1 
Plans sup Obtiens de 
l’affection 
Sois proche 
Plans inf Reste 
dépendante 
des parents 
Respecte les 
normes 
Fais en sorte 
que les 
parents 
t’aiment 
3.5 
4.5 90 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Plans Sois 
autonome 
Isole-toi des 
autres 
.5 
Plans sup Réalise toi Evite d’être 
trop près des 
autres 
Plans inf Aie davantage 
de liberté 
Evite d’avoir 
des surprises 
négatives 
2 
2.5 50 
Note. Total = (100+100+100+100+80+90+50+50+90+50)/10 = 81% 
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Appendix F2 
Reliability for Emotion Frames 
Cas No 3006 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Emotion Tristesse Tristesse 1 
Plan bloqué Evite de 
perdre 1 
relation 
Recherche des 
liens solides 
1 
Plan Coping Sois 1 St. 
Bernard 
Occupe-toi 
des autres 
1 
3 100 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Emotion Joie 0 0 
Plan bloqué Recherche 
expériences 
agréables 
0 0 
Plan Coping 0 0 0 
0 0 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Emotion Colère Décourage-
ment 
0 
Plan bloqué Contrôle la 
relation 
Evite de 
perdre 1 
relation 
1 
Plan Coping Sois prudente Evite de faire 
confiance 
1 
2 66 
Note. Total (100 + 0 + 66)/3 = 55% 
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Cas No 3007 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Emotion Angoisse Angoisse 1 
Plan bloqué Protège-toi Evite la 
blessure 
1 
Plan Coping Retire-toi des 
autres 
Isole-toi 1 
3 100 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Emotion Culpabilité Culpabilité 1 
Plan bloqué Sois 
superwoman 
Présente-toi 
comme 
superwoman 
1 
Plan Coping Recherche de 
l’aide 
Evite de te 
montrer faible
0 
2 66 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Emotion Désespoir Désespoir 1 
Plan bloqué Améliore-toi Sois proche 0 
Plan Coping Evite de 
perdre ta 
famille 
Fais tout pour 
éviter d’être 
seule 
1 
2 66 
Note. Total (100 + 66 + 66)/3 = 77% 
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Cas No 3011 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Emotion Tristesse Tristesse 1 
Plan bloqué Détache-toi 
de tes parents 
Sois proche 
de tes parents 
0 
Plan Coping Isole-toi des 
autres 
Isole-toi des 
autres 
1 
2 66 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Emotion Désespoir Désespoir 1 
Plan bloqué Sois 
autonome 
Evite d’être 
seule 
0 
Plan Coping Réalise tes 
désirs 
Cherche 1 
copain 
1 
2 66 
 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Emotion Désespoir Désespoir 1 
Plan bloqué Séduis le 
thérapeute 
Garde le 
contrôle 
0 
Plan Coping Montre-toi 
maltraitée 
Attire 
l’attention des 
autres 
1 
2 66 
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 Structure 1 Structure 2 Valeur corr Valeur c total % 
Emotion Colère Colère 1 
Plan bloqué Sois une 
bonne fille 
Evite les 
prises de 
conscience  
0 
Plan Coping Mets une 
distance face 
au thérapeute 
Fais en sorte 
que l’entretien 
se termine 
1 
2 66 
Note. Total (66 + 66 + 66 + 66)/4 = 66% 
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Appendix F3 
Exhaustive List of all Plans (N = 30 Patients) 
Plans Frequency 
Prototypical Plans 
Search for being close 
Avoid losing the other 
Realize yourself 
Impress the therapist 
Avoid appearing as weak 
Avoid negative emotions 
Avoid being harmed 
Control the relationship 
Look for help 
Search for the other’s attention 
Avoid losing control over yourself 
Avoid mentioning difficult events 
Avoid being overwhelmed by emotions 
Maintain control over yourself 
Maintain your self-esteem 
Avoid conflict 
Protect yourself 
Take care of yourself 
Assert yourself 
Avoid pain 
Be yourself 
 
26 
19 
17 
14 
14 
14 
13 
11 
10 
8 
8 
8 
7 
7 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
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Do everything to be taken seriously 
Appear as competent 
Transgress rules 
Present as a victim 
Be an achiever 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Other Plans 
Avoid being ignored 
Avoid undergoing a manic crisis 
Appear as weak before the therapist 
Respect the norms 
Avoid taking responsibility 
Avoid being asked bothering questions 
Avoid fully engaging in therapy 
Minimize your difficulties 
Appear knowledgeable 
Do everything in order to provoke particular consideration 
Do everything in order to provoke pity 
Improve yourself 
Search for better understanding 
Be autonomous 
Do things your way 
Distance yourself from difficult themes 
Approach the therapist 
Appear as motivated 
Appear as strong 
 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3  
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Appear as special 
Complain about your situation 
Provoke a dispute 
Appear as not being in need of help 
Avoid making confidences 
Avoid losing your son 
Avoid complaining 
Avoid shameful experiences 
Avoid being a psychological case 
Avoid admitting the gravity of your crisis 
Be like the others 
Be close to your father 
Avoid being confronted with your failure 
Avoid being too close to the others 
Avoid being dependent 
Seduce the opposite sex 
Explain your story by means of anecdotes 
Be close to the community 
Avoid depression 
Do everything that suits the other person 
Show yourself as being correct 
Let yourself go 
Impose yourself 
Do everything for the others 
Be a good daughter 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
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Note. N = 198 different Plans are found ; in total 483 Plans 
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
 
Appendix G1 
Reliability results for CAP for STDP 
Case Rater ICC (2,1) 
LONG 
COQS 
STUD 
DD 
UK 
NP 
.75 
.88 
.73 
Note. ICC (2,1) for 12 coping categories 
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Appendix G2 
Reliability results for DMRS for STDP 
Case Rater ICC (2,1) 
LARD 
FORZ 
STUD 
UK 
UK 
UK 
.95 
.76 
.98 
 
Note. ICC (2,1) for 7 levels of defenses. 
